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PROLOGUE

Providence did not abandon the people of Saint-Germain-au-M o n t d ' O r in 1709.l T h o u g  h the great winter of that year de­
stroyed their vines and froze their crops, and peasants from the sur­
rounding countryside refused to sell them even the most meager 
grains of wheat, though hunger stalked their village day and night, 
all was not irretrievably lost. O  n the thirteenth of April in that ter­
rible year, a lone grain boat was making its w a y slowly d o w n the 
Saone, w h e n it was suddenly struck by a strong wind and beached 
upon the river's bank. 
T h e news brought the inhabitants of Saint-Germain rushing to 
the boatman in hopes of buying his grain. Their inspection of the 
boat found it half full of oats bound for the stables of the royal in­
tendant in Lyon. Underneath the oats, however, the boatman had 
stashed a supply of wheat and peas, purest gold in the food-starved 
hills of the Beaujolais. After confirming that the oats were indeed 
bound for the intendant, the villagers shifted them carefully to another 
boat and sent them on their way. T h e abbot of nearby Masso then 
agreed to journey to Lyon to inquire after the going price for wheat 
and peas so that the village could buy them. Until his return, Antoine 
Prost, Philibert Archer, and his brother Jean-Baptiste joined other 
villagers in guarding the boat. Arming themselves with an assortment 
of weapons, they watched day and night lest an effort be m a d e to 
steal this gift of life that G o  d himself had deigned to provide. 
N e w  s of the boat and its contents spread quickly through the coun­
tryside and soon reached the town of Neufville only a few kilometers 
southward. There, in the dark of night on 17 April, u n k n o w n to the 
villagers of Saint-Germain, thirty hungry townsmen gathered and 
armed themselves with guns, sabers, and bayonets. They boarded 
small river boats and m a d  e their w a  y upstream toward the coveted 
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prize. At eleven minutes before midnight, Antoine Prost bolted to 
his feet. H  e had heard a noise, perhaps a mutter of voices or a swish­
ing of paddles. H  e sent the Archer brothers and two others to inves­
tigate. Bricitte, one of the band from Neufville, spotted the four 
scouts from Saint-Germain descending toward his group along the 
bank and ordered his followers to open fire. As bullets sailed about 
them, the Archer brothers turned and beat a hasty retreat toward the 
boat, but their attackers had taken the land and were on them in an 
instant. Prost and his friends joined the battle and managed gradu­
ally to push the attackers back. Prost himself was so badly beaten 
that he had to be carried back to his house afterward, but the defense 
was successful. T h e Neufville raiders failed to seize the grain and had 
to content themselves with taking as their prisoners the hapless Archer 
brothers. Prost later testified that he watched them all disappear into 
the darkness. Luckily for the Archers, Bricitte did not m a k e good on 
his threat to drown them in the river, and they managed to escape 
once the group had returned to Neufville. The  y m a d  e their w a  y back 
to Saint-Germain, where they brought charges against those w h  o 
had kidnapped them. In the meantime, on 18 April, the treasured 
grain was carried triumphantly into the village and sold to a grateful 
population at the price then current in Lyon. In Saint-Germain-au-
M o n  t d 'Or, for a brief time, people ate bread while the terrible fam­
ine of 1709 raged about them. 
T h  e image of desperate townspeople fighting in the dark for a few 
sacks of grain makes a good metaphor for the crisis of 1709. Like all 
subsistence crises, it bred a wide variety of conflicts, and like all such 
crises it also bred desperation. Townspeople fought in physical dark­
ness, but also in the darkness of administrative chaos and a lack 
of reliable information about the location and availability of grain. 
Indeed, no events reveal the nature of the Old Regime more clearly 
than the subsistence crises that plagued it. N  o wars or treaties or re­
forms or royal acts help better to expose the economic, geographic, and 
political structures, to understand the real administrative power 
and reach of the monarchy, or to grasp the condition of the people 
and their relationships to their institutions. 
This is particularly the case with general crises like that of 1709. In 
a given year, one or another region of France always suffered bad 
crops and food shortages. Other regions were usually able, if not 
always willing, to m a k e up the difference. In 1709, however, as in 
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1662 and 1694, the shortage was general, and provinces, cities, and 
towns became competitors for meager supplies.2 While it might be 
assumed that the monarchy of Louis X I V , so legendarily absolute, 
would have coordinated the m o v e m e n t of supplies to even out the 
impact, such royal efforts were at best sporadic. At the very m o m e n t 
Antoine Prost battled Bricitte for his wheat, the merchants of Lyon 
were locked in a high-level battle of influence and patronage to force 
local officials in surrounding provinces to give up meager supplies of 
grain so that France's second city would survive the famine. M a n i p ­
ulating a variety of clientage networks through such court powers as 
the Marechal D u  e de Villeroy and the controller general Nicolas 
Desmaretz, the officials of Lyo  n labored through a flood of inter­
locking administrative correspondence, gifts, and bribes to ensure 
the cooperation of the monarchy in their effort. Thus , as will be 
seen, royal efforts in crises such as that of 1709 were most often the 
product of individual influence and local power rather than attempts 
at a just or efficient distribution. 
T h e continuity and pervasiveness of grain shortages in the Old 
Regime tended to develop specific administrative responses, but also 
created a culture of subsistence, a developing set of attitudes and 
corresponding behaviors directly related to the causes and cures of 
famines. A  s crisis followed crisis, the peasants gradually learned to 
foresee a bad harvest and to take action to protect their reserves. 
Suspicious activity on the part of the peasants motivated m a n y grain 
merchants to hoard supplies. Officials responded by arresting those 
merchants, forcing inspections of their granaries, or coercing them 
to supply more . These actions in turn led to increasing panic a m o n g 
the populations of cities and towns and hostility between those towns 
and surrounding regions. Panic and hostility m a d e the crisis worse, 
reinforcing fears of starvation, multiplying conflicts a m o n  g officials, 
worsening suspicions of peasants and grain merchants. Fear and con­
flict reduced the alternatives open to everyone, and violence often 
resulted. 
It is not surprising, given their obvious value as tools for analyzing 
and interpreting the Old Regime, that subsistence crises have attracted 
the attention of historians. Since the turn of the century, w h e  n the 
works of Georges Afanassiev, A  . P. Usher, and Joseph Letaconnoux 
broached the question, the study of subsistence has taken m a n  y di­
rections.3 Jean Meuvret pointed to the importance of grain prices 
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and demographic methods for gauging the impact of crises.4 Louise 
Tilly and O l w e n Hufton, a m o n g others, charted the causes and pat­
terns of collective violence bred by food shortages.5 Steven L  . Kaplan 
explored the mechanics of the grain trade, efforts by eighteenth-
century physiocrats to revolutionize old paternalistic notions about 
its regulation and control, and the extraordinarily complex provi­
sioning system of Paris in the eighteenth century.6 A large group of 
historians, led by George R u d e and Richard C o b b , charted the vital 
role of subsistence crises in the Revolution.7 Yet, in this large and 
growing literature, relatively few works have concentrated on a sin­
gle crisis in a single city.8 Those that have, published either as articles 
in French journals or as small parts of large theses, have tended to suf­
fer generally from a narrow range of questions and methods.9 W h a t 
follows is as complete a history as can be written of a single subsis­
tence crisis in a defined region. 
I have chosen to study Lyon , the destination of the grain boat at 
Saint-Germain, the greatest city in France after Paris, a city famous 
for its commercial wealth and charitable institutions, and yet a city 
both blessed and crippled by its o w  n geography. Lyon sat then and 
n o  w astride two of France's great navigable rivers, the Saone and the 
R h o n e , and anchored a network of roads linking Paris and the north 
to Provence, Savoy, and the cities of northern Italy. These routes 
endowed the city with great commercial vitality and considerable 
wealth. But Lyon was also cursed by its location, cursed by the ste­
rility of its o w  n mountainous provinces, which spilled out their pop­
ulations in ever-increasing numbers to find food and w o r k in the city 
without yielding any grain with which to feed them. In times of 
plenty, their wealth and power enabled the Lyonnais to reach far 
into neighboring provinces for sustenance, and thus to maintain a 
balance between the positive and negative features of their location. 
In time of dearth, however, with grain dear and the need great, neigh­
boring provinces could quickly close the doors of their granaries, 
stranding the city with ever-increasing mouths to feed and steadily 
decreasing supplies to feed them. 
T h e Great Winter and Famine of 1709 laid bare the perils of the 
city's awkward geographic position and required the m e n w h o ruled 
it to use every means at their disposal to forestall disorder. T h e rec­
ords of their struggle and those of the people they worked for and 
against relate an intense drama of personal and institutional survival. 
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In the process, the crisis of 1709 becomes a prism, refracting into 
stark visibility the networks of clientage and power, of trade and reg­
ulation, of society and authority, and of poverty and wealth. M o r e  ­
over, Lyon suffered special problems in 1709. A s h o m e to the greatest 
m o n e  y market in France, the city watched its econom y increasingly 
held hostage to the financial instability of the crown, and to royal 
bankers such as Samuel Bernard, w h o borrowed m o r e m o n e y in the 
city than they could afford to repay. T h  e ensuing financial crisis top­
pled Bernard in 1709 and smashed the city's econom y at the very 
beginning of the food crisis. Survival for all classes in Lyon pitted 
them against each other and pitted the city against other towns and 
provinces in the region. These battles tore, in turn, at a crown weak­
ened by years of war and at a king increasingly burdened with old age. 
At Versailles, the crisis marked the nadir of a reign for which every­
thing seemed to have gone wrong. Louis X I  V had been almost con­
tinuously at war for twenty years, and the strain had done m u c h to 
destroy the financial machine so finely crafted by Colbert. Efforts at 
peace in this last war were unavailing, and so crown and country 
dragged themselves from campaign to campaign. Taxes remained 
chronically high, and the crown resorted to all manner of financial 
subterfuge to support its operations. T h e burden was heavy and 
showed no sign of growing lighter. Certainly, the crisis of 1709 brought 
no relief. 
Indeed, the Great Winter and Famine of 1709 m a d e the burden 
worse. Since the crisis was national in scope, the struggles of the 
magistrates and people of Lyon represented only a part of a wider 
series of actions and conflicts. F r o m the crowded salons of Versailles 
to the smallest hovels of the Burgundian countryside, m e  n and w o m e  n 
great and small struggled with the awful threat of dearth. T h o u g  h 
some of the great might profit from high prices and the opportunities 
afforded by the war economy, most undoubtedly feared the withered 
incomes that resulted from both a disastrous harvest and a bankrupt 
state. Worse yet, they feared the inevitable epidemics of violence and 
disease that issued from a desperately poor population threatened by 
starvation. If the mighty and the small struggled for a very different 
kind of survival, it was for survival nonetheless. 
M  y effort to chart these contrasting struggles for survival begins 
by introducing and analyzing the various structures that contributed 
to the crisis: the city itself, with its fiercely independent government 
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and its host of institutions designed to maintain order in time of 
dearth; the provisioning system centered in Burgundy, Lyon's pri­
mary provincial granary and its most reluctant benefactor; and the 
chaotic state of the royal finances, which brought about the collapse 
of the city's economy. T h e narrative follows, illustrating the disas­
trous conjuncture of the food and financial crisis in 1709 and efforts 
by the city to overcome the dogged resistance to its demands in its 
customary supply areas. T h  e final section analyzes the h u m a  n and 
institutional cost of the crisis of 1709 and seeks to place it in the 
broader context not only of subsistence problems during the Old 
Regime but of the very nature of that regime itself. 
Indeed, the struggles of the Lyonnais to provision their city reveal 
m u c  h about the larger problem of absolutism. Like the problems of 
subsistence, absolutism too has drawn a considerable literature, as 
historians have sought to qualify and clarify the exact relationship 
between the monarchy of Louis X I  V and the network of local and 
regional power centers. T h e tired paradigm of a king smashing noble 
opposition and destroying traditional authorities has been reversed. 
Sharon Kettering has demonstrated the overriding importance of pa­
tronage networks and the extent to which royal officials enmeshed 
themselves within them, cooperating with rather than undermining 
traditional authorities.10 William Beik proved that local officials 
had a vested interest in the monarchy and argued that the key to 
Louis XIV's "absolutism" lay in his ability to empower certain noble 
authorities in such a w a y that local officials found themselves want­
ing more royal influence, not less.11 In two meticulous studies, 
Albert Hamscher showed h o  w the power of the parlements over 
other courts was actually increased by the king even as their ten­
dency to political obstruction dissipated.12 Finally, Roger Met tam 
has argued that the king used his great nobility to mediate between 
regional authorities and the crown, and that the king was perfectly 
content to wor  k within the constraints of the aristocratic and hier­
archical society of which he was so m u c h a part.13 
As the subsequent analysis will show, the merchants of Lyon did 
work through patronage and clientage networks. They were in a 
sense empowered by their relationship to the crown. Yet, the reach 
and power of the monarchy was so ephemeral in 1709 as to m a k e 
even the use of such a term as "absolutism" questionable. If any­
thing, the merchants of Lyon manipulated the crown in the same 
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way that Louis X I V allegedly manipulated others. O f course, the 
issue of royal power was entirely secondary to them. T h e monarchy 
was little more than a means to a more important end as they strug­
gled with the visceral dilemmas of order and disorder, survival and 
starvation, discipline and charity. 
N  o reality was harsher, no fear closer to the hearts and minds of 
eighteenth-century Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, than the dread­
ful menace of adisette. N o event drew them closer together or threw 
them farther apart. For after all the analysis is finished and the n u m  ­
bers have been placed neatly into tables and graphs, the story of the 
Great Winter and Famine of 1709 in Lyon remains a tale of basic 
h u m a n struggle, of desperate improvisation, of the misery that comes 
of failure, and the exhausted elation that accompanies success. 

PART \ ONE

Setting:

Lyon before the Crisis

Vaize 
St. Vincent 
St. Pierre 
et 
St. Satumin 
St. Paul 
Fourviere 
Ste. Croix 
St. Nizier 
\Pierre1 
'St. 
/ 
St. Just 
W Ainay 
L a
 Guillotiere 
Parish boundaries of Lyon in 1709 
The Structures of Order

To early eighteenth-century travelers approaching Lyon by water for the first time, the paradoxes and contrasts of its geography 
were not immediately apparent. T h e Saone was the preferred high­
w a  y to the city, and merchants and their barges plied its waters and 
entered its port towns in every season of the year. F r o m Gray to 
Auxonne, from Pontailler to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, from Chalons, 
M a c o n , and Villefranche southward, boats brimming with people 
and goods floated serenely past the sunbaked hills of the Beaujolais. 
Only as they passed the old monastery tower of the Ile-Barbe just 
north of the city did the rural scenery give w a y on the right bank to 
the inns and boathouses of Vaize, Lyon's northern faubourg, or sub­
urb. O  n the left bank, the steep hillside of the Croix Rousse arose to 
obscure the view of the city around the river's bend ahead. 
Once around that bend, travellers' eyes rose sharply to the royal 
fortress towers of Pierre Seize perched ominously on the cliff to the 
right, and then fell to the houses crowded in between the bottom of 
the cliff and the river below. T h e visual suddenness of the city was 
matched by the shock of its odor, since the phlegmatic current of the 
Saone failed entirely to carry off the chemicals of the dyers, the 
harsh soaps of the laundry boats, the carrion of the butcher shops, or 
the h u m a  n excrement emptied into it with a regularity enforced by 
years of regulations.1 Gradually, as they passed through the octroi 
chains of Benin, travellers could begin to study the ceaseless activity 
on and around the river. Ferryboats full of goods moved busily back 
and forth. O  n either bank, at those points where houses did not 
crowd the river's edge, dockworkers loaded and unloaded supplies 
under the watchful eyes of officials busily calculating the octrois and 
droits that formed the greater part of municipal revenues. Continu­
II 
12 Setting: Lyon before the Crisis 
ing their voyage, our passengers floated beneath three bridges link­
ing the right and left banks. O f the three, two were of w o o d and in 
constant need of repairs to buttress the ramshackle supports that 
took such a pounding during the annual spring flooding of the river.2 
Only one was of stone, the old "Pont de Saone," and it was so nar­
row that only two small wagons at a time could cross it. Yet this 
bridge, with its tiny chapel in the center and buildings piled onto its 
arches from either end, linked L y o n  s most important sections. 
O  n the right bank, only a short distance from the towers of Saint-
Jean Cathedral, lay the Place de Change. There, four times yearly, 
France's greatest m o n e  y market flourished in the costume of a Re  ­
naissance fair, and merchants from all over Europe gathered to settle 
their accounts and m a k e n e w loans. Across the bridge on the left 
bank, hidden behind the single spire of the canon church of Saint-
Nizier, lay the seat of power in the city, its magnificent, baroque 
Hotel de Ville. Travellers could not continue m u c  h farther by boat, 
for beyond the last bridge linking the archepiscopal palace and the 
city's largest square, the Place Bellecour, the Saone disappeared into 
the swirling currents of the R h o n e  . 
As a highway, the R h o n  e contrasted sharply with the quiescent 
Saone. Its current flowed so fast that doctors at the Hotel-Dieu dan­
gled the insane in it once yearly in hopes its force would strip away 
their confusion.3 Navigating the river required expensive teams of 
horses and m e n to keep barges tightly bound and close to the banks. 
T h e task was best undertaken from late spring to early fall. In winter, 
w h e n the wind shifted hard to the north, the R h o n e defied all navi­
gation, and only foolishness or ample wages could drive a boatman 
to the attempt.4 
Water travel was not the only w a y to approach Lyon. Five gates, 
three on the right bank of the Saone and two on the left, opened the 
city to land-bound travellers. T h e busiest of the right bank gates, the 
Porte de Vaize, lay beneath the fortress of Pierre Seize and welcomed 
travellers from Paris and Burgundy into the large merchant-domi­
nated parish of Saint-Paul. T h e Porte Saint-Just on top of the hill of 
Fourviere to the west opened to travellers from the hills of the Lyon­
nais and the Auvergne, w h  o had upon entering the city to descend 
steeply and quickly toward the Cathedral and the L a  w Courts by 
the river below. Still on the right bank but at the southern tip of the 
city lay the Porte Saint-Georges. Travellers from the Vivarais and 
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Languedoc entered here to be enveloped by the bustle of silk work­
ers and day laborers in Lyon's poorest quarter, the parish of Saint-
Georges. O n the left bank of the Saone, at the top of the vine-strewn 
hill that pushed and crowded the city's population d o w n into the 
narrow peninsula between its two rivers, was the small Porte Saint-
Sebastian. This gate welcomed those from the northeast, from the 
D o m b e s and the region around Bresse and Bugey and from the small 
faubourg of Croix Rousse, which lay just outside the walls. D o w  n 
the hill from Saint-Sebastian, on the eastern side of the peninsula 
that the Lyonnais still call the "Presqu'ile," only one bridge dared 
span the torrent of the R h o n e  . T h  e Pont de la Guillotiere, with its 
twenty-one great stone arches, its draw tower in the center and its 
constant stream of travellers from Dauphine, Provence, and Savoy 
to the southeast, connected the city with its faubourg of La Guillo­
tiere. "La Guille," in the argot of the eighteenth century, was a vil­
lage of small farmers and vine growers dotted by inns catering to the 
Dauphinois w h  o worked across the river during the day. 
Like arteries and veins, its rivers and gates p u m p e d life into Lyon, 
connecting the city with the life beyond its walls. Indeed, the flow 
of people and goods in and out was constant. Maurice Garden, in 
his great study of Lyon's demographic and social structure, estimated 
that at any time during the eighteenth century, 70 percent of the city's 
residents were born outside its walls, mostly in the Lyonnais and 
provinces to the east and south.5 This constant circulation of people, 
as well as a shortage of census or tax data from the period, makes 
any estimate of the city's total population difficult.6 Contemporaries 
ranged in their estimates from Lambert d'Herbigny's low count of 
90,000 in 1697 to the A b b  e d'Expilly's high count of 124,086 for 1708.7 
After careful analysis of every source, Garden settled on a popula­
tion of 100,000 in 1700,110,000 including the faubourgs of Vaize, La 
Guillotiere, and Croix Rousse.8 O f this population, fully four-fifths 
labored as artisans, silk workers, day laborers and domestics. M e r  ­
chants, nobles, and ecclesiastics m a d e up the other fifth, constituting 
the bourgeois elite of the city.9 Rich and poor alike crowded into an 
area of less than 364 hectares (approximately 900 acres) in buildings 
averaging five stories in height.10 T h  e height of its buildings and 
crush of its population m a d e Lyon a dense city of narrow winding 
streets, imposing stone facades, and hidden inner courtyards.'' T h  e 
city's density did not prevent some trades from concentrating in cer­
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tain quarters. T h  e elite, the merchants, bankers, judges, ecclesiastics, 
and the domestics they employed, all tended to crowd the center on 
either side of the Pont de Saone. Thus , the parishes of Sainte-Croix, 
Saint-Paul, and Saint-Nizier enjoyed a large proportion of the city's 
wealth.12 Boatmen, wagoners, and dockworkers naturally preferred 
the riverside parishes of Saint-Vincent and Saint-Paul; printers, binders, 
and booksellers traditionally concentrated around the rue Mercier 
in the parish of Saint-Nizier.13 D a  y laborers, peddlers, and beggars 
plied their trades throughout the city during the day but returned at 
night to the poor quarters in the parish of Saint-Georges on the right 
bank and those around the two great hospitals of the Hotel-Dieu and 
the Charite on the left.14 T h e silk workers, w h o anchored Lyon's 
foremost industry, were scattered throughout the city because of 
their need for rooms of sufficient size and light to accommodate their 
large looms. Only later in the eighteenth century were they to stake 
out as their o w n the hillside of the Croix Rousse, which in 1709 was 
still covered mostly in vines worked by growers in the parish of 
Saint-Vincent.15 
This urban population, dominated by artisans, day laborers, do­
mestics and shopkeepers, could at times become quarrelsome and 
unruly, and was given like other urban populations in the Old Regime 
to occasional episodes of collective violence. Only over some two 
hundred years of constant effort did the city's elite improvise urban 
institutions that ultimately constituted the city's structures of order. 
A s in other cities, the magistrates of Lyon developed and maintained 
tools of coercion such as judicial courts and armed guards, but the 
expense of such tools was great, and the rulers of the city had long 
recognized the need to prevent disorders by attending to their causes. 
Thus, the structures of order in Lyon also included tools of charity 
in the form of hospitals and tools of sustenance, which included the 
strict regulation of bread prices and markets and urban institutions 
designed to procure grain from fields far away. A  n understanding of 
the evolution, condition, and function of these institutions is instruc­
tive if one is to comprehend their vital role during the crisis of 1709. 
In 1700, the Lyonnais installed their government in one of Europe's 
loveliest buildings, its rooms decorated with a sumptuousness worthy 
of Versailles itself.16 Every Tuesday and Thursday morning, in a 
gilded chamber of marble bas-reliefs and silk tapestries on the second 
floor of this building, five m e n assembled as the city's Consulate. A s 
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reconstituted by Henri IV in 1603, the Consulate was composed of 
four echevins and apre'vot des marchands. B  y law, the prevot had to be a 
resident of the city for at least twelve years and o w  n property there 
worth at least 10,000 livres.17 Election as an echevin brought an auto­
matic patent of nobility (with an exemption entitling the newly en­
nobled to continue in commerce) as well as a variety of other priv­
ileges and honors. T h e elaborate ceremony of election took place 
each year on the Sunday before the feast of Saint-Thomas w h e n rep­
resentatives of the city's guilds met to select two echevins for two-
year terms.18 If a new prevot was to be elected, the same group nomi­
nated three candidates and set their names before the king, w h o nearly 
always chose the one with the most votes. T h e two echevins not leav­
ing office joined the assembly and chaired it with the electoral title 
of terrier.] 9 Since the representatives of each guild were carefully 
selected each year by the Consulate, and since members of the C o n ­
sulate chaired the electoral assembly, each Consulate effectively con­
trolled the nature of its successor. Such a system enabled the great 
merchants of Lyon to maintain a remarkable stability in their gov­
ernance of the city. 
T h e m e n of affairs w h o served as echevins pledged their credit and 
standing to their city. Service could be both expensive and time con­
suming, and not all of Lyon's great merchants agreed to don the rich 
blue robes of office.20 Those w h  o served fought long and hard dur­
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to maintain and expand 
their control of the city in competition with crown officials and other 
local authorities. Wealth constituted their most effective weapon, and 
they brought it to bear repeatedly on the battlefield of venality, buy­
ing newly created royal offices in order to scuttle them and thereby 
avoid any diffusion in their power. Examples of this practice abound.2' 
In 1632 the Consulate purchased n e  w offices of "intendant" and 
"receveur des denrees c o m m u n a u x  " for 180,000 livres to ensure that 
they would never be filled.22 In 1639 came the purchase of newly 
created "gaugers" for 63,000 livres, and in 1674, of "mesureurs du 
vin" for 40,000 ecus.23 N o n  e of these offices survived to threaten 
consular authority, but these and other purchases exacted a heavy 
price. B y 1677, the magistrates of Lyon had spent over 6,000,000 
livres buying offices, incurring a huge floating debt of 2,400,000 
livres.24 T h o u g h Colbert granted the Consulate a surtax on wine in 
1677 to help reduce the debt, the resulting period of relief was cut 
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short by a string of n e w exactions during the costly W a r of the Span­
ish Succession.25 
T h  e extent to which these efforts brought any degree of indepen­
dence is arguable, since the very fact of purchase demonstrated a 
consistent subservience to the crown. Yet, it is also true that the 
Consulate managed to retain its governance of the city undiluted and 
uncorrupted by layers of useless offices and venal officeholders. As 
far as was possible in the framework of the Old Regime, the bour­
geois of Lyon controlled their o w  n affairs. 
T h  e Consulate did not always purchase offices simply to get rid 
of them. Occasionally, a n e w office might help the magistrates to 
enhance their authority. Such was the case in their longrunning and 
ultimately successful effort to supersede Lyon's oldest law court, the 
Senechaussee\ by creating a n e  w city criminal court. T h  e Senechaussee 
formed a part of the network of parlements whose political preten­
sions had so provoked the kings of France for m a n  y years. Louis 
X I  V had succeeded in stalling these pretensions and turning the par­
lements into more acquiescent partners in royal government, but he 
was not averse to maintaining competing authorities to insure against 
any revival in parlementary rebelliousness.26 T h  e Consulate thus 
found consistent support from the crown for its efforts to create a 
competing court. T h o u g h the struggle had begun early in 1633, w h e n 
the Consulate purchased the right to n a m  e judges to a bureau de 
police, it did not begin in earnest until 1699 with the acquisition of 
the office of lieutenant of police.27 T h  e old bureau was transformed 
into a n e w Tribunal de Police, and the Senechaussee immediately chal­
lenged the authority of the n e  w court with an order blocking its 
power to issue judgments. T h e Consulate appealed to Versailles, and 
a royal arret quickly quashed the order, restricting the Senechaussee to 
merely processing appeals directly from the n e  w tribunal to the par­
lement of Paris.28 W h e  n in 1701 the Senechaussee tried to force two of 
its o w n councillors onto the n e w court, it was again rebuffed by the 
crown. 2 9 Thrice more from 1702 to 1704 the court tried to block or 
hinder its dangerous competitor, and each time the crown quickly 
struck it d o w n .  3  0 B  y 1709, as a result of this struggle, the Consulate 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly of judicial authority within the city as 
well as the support of the royal power at Versailles. As usual, that 
support had not c o m e cheaply. F r o m 1698 to 1706, at the same time 
that they were battling the Senechaussee, the magistrates of Lyon pur­
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chased the suppression by edict of n e  w royal offices and exactions 
whose value totalled 1,429,000 livres.3' For Louis X I V , the Consul­
ate of Lyon obviously possessed a double value. Not only could it 
prove a successful ally in his longrunning effort to balance the pre­
tensions of the sovereign courts, but it was also a valuable source of 
revenue. This alliance of royal and consular authority thus served to 
create a bond of mutual interest that was to prove of incalculable 
value during the crisis of 1709.3 2 
For the echevins of Lyon, the n e w tribunal represented simply an 
added measure of judicial authority, the third court of law that they 
controlled. T h e first met every Wednesday morning w h e n the C o n ­
sulate formed itself into a court to decide disputes and receive peti­
tions from the guilds, with whose regulation and governance it had 
long been charged.33 O  n M o n d a  y and Friday afternoon, the magis­
trates m o v e d from the consular chamber through a great w o o d e n 
door into a larger room to be joined by six additional judges in a 
second court, the Conservation des Privileges Royaux des Foires de Lyon. 
Through the Conservation, they ruled the city's commerce . A n y mer­
chant signing a note during one of the four seasonal fairs held in the 
city fell under its jurisdiction. If a debt rested unpaid, the plaintiff 
had only to appear before the court to bring charges. If the debtor 
did not then appear in person or by proxy within three days, he could 
be arrested anywhere in France without recourse to any other judicial 
body.3 4 Only after the Conservation passed sentence could that sen­
tence be appealed, and then only directly to the parlement of Paris.35 
After 1669, the Conservation gradually widened its scope to include 
disputed letters of exchange, liquidations of partnerships, conflicts 
between merchants and carriers, and a multitude of disputes involving 
the exchange and theft of merchandise and deadlines for shipment.36 
Its power grew with the increasing success and influence of the Lyon 
m o n e y market, which was by 1709 one of the most important sources 
of credit in France. As widening circles of French and foreign mer­
chants used the fairs to borrow m o n e y , their actions came within the 
power of the Conservation and its parent, the Consulate of Lyon. 
T h e judicial powers the magistrates of Lyon derived from these 
criminal and civil courts represented important tools of coercion. 
Every individual in the city, from the lowest pickpocket to the high­
est merchant, fell into one judicial category or another, guaranteeing 
the Consulate at least some measure of social control. 
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In the streets, however, where coercion was most often a matter 
of muskets and bayonets, the city was pitifully ill equipped. O f the 
200 armed arquebusiers w h  o supposedly formed the heart of the police 
force, 150 served only during the annual election ceremony.37 T h e 
50 w h  o actually patrolled did earn grudging respect in the streets 
(the poor nicknamed them the "garots" after their rather unfortu­
nate habit of garrotting prisoners), but because of the need to rotate 
shifts only 25 were on duty at any single moment—hardly a formida­
ble deterrent.38 T h e only other force of note was the Compagnie 
Franche of the Lyon Regiment. C o m m a n d e  d by the Consulate in the 
absence (permanent under Louis X I V  ) of the royal military governors, 
the Compagnie guarded the city gates and patrolled the faubourgs. As 
with the arquebusiers, however, the 50 m e n of the Compagnie split 
into two shifts, and thus only 25 ever patrolled at one time.39 While 
the city also technically possessed a watch of 50 m e n , it had become 
purely ornamental by 1709, a display for public ceremonies and pro­
cessions.40 T h e result was almost ludicrous. A total combined force 
of 50 m e  n patrolled a city and its suburbs with a population approach­
ing 110,000 at any given m o m e n  t of the day or night. 
Contemporaries were painfully aware of the inadequacy of the 
police. W h e n  , later in the century, there was a riot by silk workers, 
the intendant Pallu wrote, "they are presently the masters. They dic­
tate to us and w e are in no state not to submit to them. . . . O u r lack 
of strength . . . makes the authority confided to us useless because 
w  e are not in a state to enforce the orders of the king."41 T h  e woeful 
inadequacy of its armed force threw the Consulate into reliance on an 
even older institution for enforcement of its ordinances and decrees. 
In each of the city's thirty-five quarters, the Consulate appointed 
three officers—a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign—who together 
with at least one sergent and one caporal per quarter composed the 
city's penons, its medieval bourgeois militia.42 Far from playing 
the purely ceremonial roles to which they would be reduced later in the 
eighteenth century, the penons served an important function during 
the reign of Louis XIV. They were the eyes and ears of the Consulate 
throughout the city. W h e n e v e  r granaries had to be inspected, bak­
eries watched, censuses or registrations taken, or vagabonds and 
drifters reported, the job inevitably fell to the penons. T h e m e n w h o 
served as officers in this system were without fail the city's elite, and 
m a n  y merchants w h  o refused election to the Consulate itself served 
 19 The Structures of Order
willingly in the penons.** T h e prevot des marchands himself carried 
the title ofCapitaine Penon Colonel, serving also as captain of his o w  n 
quarter, and the Consulate took care to fill all vacancies in the sys­
tem quickly.44 Through the penons merchants, bankers, and nota­
bles in Lyon actively aided their colleagues in the Consulate in rul­
ing and administering the city. 
Even with its penons in working order, L y o n s meager "armed 
forces" could not hope to stem serious disorders. As far back as the 
sixteenth century, therefore, the city's magistrates had searched for 
ways to prevent such disorders without having to resort to force or 
the threat of judicial action. W h e  n sixteenth-century humanists urged 
them to the reform of charity, they discovered an entirely n e w form 
of social control.45 T h e church of Lyon raised little objection to the 
municipal expropriation and reform of charitable institutions, per­
haps because relations between the municipality and the clergy were 
so poor in this period.46 Municipal control led to the application of 
mercantile efficiency in finance and operation so that by the early 
eighteenth century, charity in Lyon had been neatly centralized into 
the city's two great hospitals, the Hotel-Dieu and the Charite. 
O  f the two, the Hotel-Dieu was m u c h the older, and while not as 
yet graced by the beauty and ample space of Soufflot's midcentury 
architecture, the hospital managed nonetheless to accomodate over 
7,000 patients per year from 1711 to 1720.47 Administered by a revolv­
ing committee of fourteen rectors (plus the Consulate, whose m e m  ­
bers served on a de facto basis), the Hotel-Dieu employed over fifty 
servants as well as a fulltime baker, butcher, mason, and carpenter.48 
A m o n g the wealthiest landlords in L y o n (rents on its various proper­
ties constituted almost one-fifth of its revenues), the hospital s chief 
function was to serve the sick, though it had other functions as well.49 
T h e saddest was the acceptance and housing of children abandoned 
at its doors or in the churches and streets of the city.50 
Here, as with other urban institutions in Lyon , Italian models 
played an important role. Florence in particular had possessed found­
ling hospitals since the fourteenth century, accepting abandoned 
infants, baptising them and sending them to wetnurses in the coun­
tryside.51 Like its Florentine forbears, the Hotel-Dieu kept meticu­
lous records of their discovery and fate, also dispatching infants to 
wetnurses in the provinces, w h  o were paid 7 livres, 10 sous per month 
for their services.52 Abandoned children were joined in the hospital 
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by those born to unwed mothers, since the Hotel-Dieu served also as 
Lyon's chief center for illegitimate births. These children were treated 
exactly as were the others: baptised in the hospital and dispatched to 
the surrounding provinces for sustenance.53 Mortality a m o n  g all 
children sent to the provinces remained chronically high, and only 
45 percent on the average lived to age 7, w h e n they were handed 
over by the Hotel-Dieu to Lyon's other great hospital, the Charite'.5* 
T h e rhythm of abandonments from month to month and year to 
year was a tragic but important barometer of the depth of misery 
within and without the city walls. It was to reach awful proportions 
during the crisis year. 
T h e Charite, where those surviving the rigors of early childhood 
arrived, was itself an amalgam of various institutions—an orphanage 
for the very young, a hostel for the very old, a workhouse for the 
very poor. It represented the best and worst of poor relief in the Old 
Regime. O  n the one hand, again following the Italian model, male 
orphans were often apprenticed at the expense of the hospital to 
various trades in the city, while females were usually dowered, also 
at hospital expense.55 T h e very old (the hospital could a c c o m m o ­
date some 200 of them) w h  o were too feeble or disabled to care for 
themselves were taken in, fed, and clothed, and no vacancy remained 
long unfilled.56 Yet, the Charite also played a central role in the gen­
eral seventeenth-century movement to "enclose" the poor, to isolate 
them from the rest of society and to give them w o r k so that they 
might not cause trouble by begging or stealing.57 Most of those 
"enclosed" in Lyon worked at the spinning and reeling of silk thread, 
which the hospital subcontracted to various merchants.58 T h e n u m ­
ber of poor imprisoned in this fashion appears to have remained 
fairly constant, from a population of 1,200 to 1,300 at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century to an average of approximately 1,300 from 
1711 to 1713.59 Beyond their number, information on w h  o they were, 
their origin, or their fate is virtually nonexistent in the archives of 
Lyon. 
O  f course, the Charite of Lyon was not so well k n o w n for those it 
housed or imprisoned as for those it fed each Sunday through the 
institution of the Aumone-Generale. From its beginnings in 1534, the 
Aumone had endowed the city with an international reputation 
for generosity.60 At 6:00 A . M  . each Sunday during the long days, 
7:00 A . M  . during the short, those of the city's poor w h  o had applied 
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for aid and been approved by the rectors would gather at five distri­
bution points to hear their names called out and receive their twelve-
pound loaves of "pain a tout," or rough black bread. Pilgrims and 
foreigners found deserving could receive the passade, a single loaf of 
bread and a sou, to continue on their w a y to their destination.6' Not 
surprisingly, such an institution acted from the beginning like an 
enormous magnet, and its history during the seventeenth century 
was one of proliferating restrictions and limitations. 
Already before 1600, the Aumone had been forced to establish 
a seven-year residency requirement for the weekly distributions. In 
1602, the resident poor in the faubourgs were permanently excluded 
from the rolls, while catechisms, suggested as early as 1615, were 
m a d e mandatory in 1648 under the influence of the C o m p a n y of the 
Holy Sacrament.62 Their effect was, of course, to exclude Protes­
tants. Efforts to reduce fraud increased in the course of the century, 
though the very frequency of those efforts suggests a lack of success. 
In 1628 each person receiving the aumone was required to wear a red 
and blue cross sewn into his or her clothing to assure recognition.63 
W h e  n the practice of wives going in place of their husbands to re­
ceive the aumone became too widespread, the rectors ruled that hus­
bands must be present. 
Despite the restrictions, the number of recipients on the rolls con­
tinued to rise, and sometime during the century, the size of loaves 
was cut from twelve to six pounds. A reckoning of sorts came in 
1694, w h e  n the rectors of the Aumone undertook a thorough investi­
gation of recipients and found m a n  y and varied forms of fraud.64 
S o m e recipients were managing to get from one distribution point 
to another on the same day so as to double or even triple their as­
signed amount. Others used the names of deceased recipients which 
had not yet been stricken from the rolls. Yet others lied about the 
size of their families in order to receive a greater number of loaves. 
T h e investigation ended in a purge that reduced by 1,000 the number 
of loaves distributed each week. 
Like the weekly distributions, the passade also experienced changes. 
W h e n  , during the famine of 1598, the Aumone-Geherale was swamped 
by poor peasants from the countryside requesting the passade, it was 
suppressed altogether.65 Though it had returned by 1632, it no longer 
consisted of a loaf and a sou, but rather of 3 sous alone.66 Further, it 
could n o  w be distributed only after the supplicant had been inter­
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viewed personally by a single official, and even if granted, it was not 
dispensed until the recipient had been accompanied to a city gate by 
one of the six Swiss soldiers w h  o guarded the hospital.67 This pro­
cedure m a d e it m o r e difficult to leave by one gate and reenter by 
another to receive a second passade since the same official, and only 
that official, personally interviewed the individual supplicant. These 
measures ensured that the passade would seldom exceed 200 livres in 
any given year, an amount which still amounted to some 1,400 gifts.68 
Did all of these restrictions, investigations, and purges of the rolls 
reduce the n u m b e r of recipients? If so, the Aumone-Gene'rale con­
tinued to distribute considerable amounts of bread—an average of 
4,600 six-pound loaves per w e e k from 1711 to 1713, the only years for 
which a register of distributions has survived.69 Each Thursday the 
rectors continued to receive supplicants seeking aid, to ask them 
(gently, if they followed the guidelines) about their work , their fami­
lies, and their incomes. A n  d each year the expenses of the Aumone 
continued to account for as m u c  h as 50 percent of the total expenses 
of the Charite.70 T h o u g h its records are less complete than one would 
like for 1709, those that survive speak volumes of the heavy weight it 
bore during the crisis, and of the succor it provided. 
Threats of coercion and offers of charity were often effective in 
stemming disorder, but neither dealt directly with its cause. Most dis­
orders in the history of the city up to the Revolution could be traced 
directly to the price, quality, and availability of bread. Certainly, 
no other subject assumed greater importance for Lyon's magistrates, 
for w h o  m the regulation of markets, milling, baking, and sale was a 
deadly serious matter requiring constant vigilance. Such vigilance 
seemed imperative given the city's peculiar geographic position. It 
remains, therefore, to explore the unusually fragile provisioning sys­
tem that attracted so m u c h official attention. 
An Ungrateful Province

•• I he Lyonnais is an ungrateful province which yields only 
X wine. T h e Forez has only enough for itself, and the Beau­
jolais has even less than the Lyonnais."l Such was the dismal assess­
ment of Lyon's surrounding provinces by one of the city'sprevots, an 
assessment shared and corroborated by others. T h e Parisian commis­
saire de police, Nicolas Delamarre, noted that "there is very little 
arable land in the Lyonnais," and one of the province's intendants, 
Lambert d'Herbigny, wrote in 1698, "the mountains of the Beau­
jolais are for the most part untilled, and there is very little to support 
livestock."2 T h e merchants w h o ruled Lyon had no better opinion 
of the province than their officials. Garden noted that few bothered 
to purchase estates in the region surrounding the city, while those 
lands they did acquire tended to be small and unimpressive, always 
the first assets liquidated in time of trouble.3 
This lack of mercantile interest in the surrounding countryside, 
somewhat unusual for the bourgeois of early modern French cities, 
had three important consequences for the provisioning of the city. 
First, the merchants of Lyon seldom fled the city in time of trouble, 
be it food crisis or epidemic, since they possessed no country estates 
to which to flee. Second, they had no recourse to the sort of private 
grain supplies that such estates might otherwise have provided. This 
tended to leave them as dependent as their poorer neighbors on 
imported grain and helps to explain w h  y they worked especially 
hard to keep the city provisioned in time of crisis. T h  e third conse­
quence of the barren and unattractive nature of the Lyonnais was its 
minor role in supplying grain. While grain and flour did arrive by 
land nearly every day, the total was always very small in proportion 
to water-borne arrivals. T h o u g h data are scarce, it seems that no 
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more than 28 to 30 ane'es of wheat ever entered the city's gates in any 
m o n t h .  4 B  y contrast, in October of 1708 alone, 2,707 ane'es of wheat 
were unloaded on the docks of the Saone.5 
Most of that grain came from Burgundy. As our prevot noted, 
"complete liberty has always been accorded in drawing grain from 
Burgundy, which is the only place from which it can be obtained."6 
Burgundy, with its valleys full of wheat and its navigable river sys­
tem, was indeed the natural food source for Lyon. Such had been 
the case since the rise of the city to mercantile predominance in the 
sixteenth century.7 B y the time of Louis XIV, Burgundian grain 
merchants such as Tremollet of A u x o n n e and Martin of Gray had 
founded family dynasties to control m u c  h of the city's provisioning 
system. Tremollet alone supplied all the needs of the Aumone-Generale 
from 1706 through 1708 with a volume of at least 12,000 anees worth 
some 120,000 livres.8 Martin of Gray sold some 2,000 anees in the 
single year of 1708 at a price of over 30,000 livres.9 Other merchant 
houses operated from as far away as Nancy and Besangon, but most 
concentrated their activities a m o n g the river towns on the Saone where 
they could more easily and cheaply store and transport supplies.10 
This long-term dependence on a distant province produced sev­
eral peculiarities in the marketing of grain in Lyon, the most visible 
of which was the relatively small role of Lyonnais merchants in feed­
ing their o w  n city. Garden mentions not a single grain merchant in 
his exhaustive study of the city's social structure, and in m  y o w  n 
analysis of crisis mortality, only 5 individuals out of 5,029 for w h o  m 
occupations were listed had any association with that trade.11 At the 
Grenette, Lyon's central food market, only the old Halle behind 
St. Nizier was set aside for Lyonnais merchants selling grain. T h e 
remainder, stretching all the w a y across the Presqu'ile, was given 
over mostly to Burgundians.12 O  f course, Lyonnais merchants did 
occasionally buy and sell grain, but there was no specialized c o m m u ­
nity of grain merchants as there was, for example, in Paris.l3 Indi­
vidual Lyonnais merchants dabbled in the trade as a sideline, but it 
required a crisis such as that of 1709 to create a body of local grain 
merchants under official sanction. 
While such a situation might seem unusual in a city so precari­
ously dependent on outsiders, it was not at all peculiar in the grain-
poor Mediterranean, where chronic instabilities in the price and 
transport of grain m a d  e that trade unattractive to traditionally con­
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scrvative merchants.14 Here again, Italian models and patterns of 
behavior are useful for understanding Lyon and its merchants, since 
it was in Italy and with Italian merchants that the Lyonnais con­
ducted m u c  h of their business. R a  w silk for the city's primary indus­
try came from there, and Italian merchants continued to exercise 
enormous influence on the city's economic and political life.'5 
That Italian merchants seldom if ever sold grain in Lyon was less a 
matter of mentality, however, than of cost. T h e R h o n e proved a 
powerful obstacle to the transport of goods in bulk. It cost at least 
7 livres to m o v  e a single ane'e of grain up the river from Aries to 
Lyon, not counting the cost from any given Mediterranean port to 
Aries.16 There were, in addition, twenty-seven separate tolls on the 
river that totalled 4 livres per ane'e. Thus , the cost of one anee pur­
chased in Aries for 12 livres nearly doubled by the time it reached the 
city, and once in Lyon, measurers, carriers, and granary costs had 
yet to be met. In contrast to the expenses on the R h o n e , the total 
cost on the Saone from the river's northernmost port, Monthureux­
sur-Saone, averaged only 4.3 livres per anee including tolls.17 Cost, 
tradition, geography, and mercantile habits combined, therefore, to 
m a k e Burgundy the overwhelming choice. 
Unfortunately for the people of Lyon, Burgundy was not always 
a willing provider. It is true that the province's large landowners 
benefitted most from the trade, whether they were great nobles, 
urban bourgeois w h  o had purchased estates around towns and cities, 
or institutional landholders such as monasteries and hospitals. It is 
true also that these large landowners enjoyed a virtual monopoly of 
the most fertile land by 1709, but their predominance did not pre­
clude a great number of small holders from working that land as 
renters and censitaires.** These small holders persisted also in the 
less fertile areas of Bresse and Bugey in the south and in the m o u n ­
tainous regions to the west. They tended to be consumers of grain as 
often as producers, since they usually had to surrender their harvests 
immediately in September for taxes, rents, or debt payments. T h e 
loss of their grain in the autumn left them at the mercy of the local 
market for the remainder of the harvest year.19 Together with con­
sumers of the towns, they constituted L y o n s major competitors for 
Burgundian grain. 
T h e growing dependence of small holders on public markets ex­
acerbated tensions between Burgundy and Lyon in the seventeenth 
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century, since any grain shipped to Lyon inevitably portended a lower 
supply and a higher price on local markets. Other factors, however, 
also contributed to friction between city and province. O n  e was the 
expansion of vine cultivation. Opposed at every turn by the Estates 
of Burgundy throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
grapes displaced wheat at the very locations where high fertility and 
proximity to the river traditionally kept the latter's price low and 
supplies accessible.20 T h  e expansion of land purchases by the bour­
geois of the towns also caused friction. As large holders, they were 
more likely to hold their grain off the market to gain a better price. 
They were more likely also to ignore local markets in favor of buyers 
such as the Lyonnais, w h  o were willing to pay higher prices and buy 
larger quantities.21 Yet another source of friction were the Lyonnais 
themselves, w h  o so depended on Burgundian grain that they attempted 
to monopolize it. Efforts by Burgundian grain merchants to supply 
the R h o n e towns south of the city encountered stringent and stub­
born resistance from the Consulate, and the Estates of Burgundy 
complained repeatedly of Lyonnais efforts to tax or simply to im­
pound grain destined further downriver.22 Finally, both the Lyon­
nais and the Burgundians encountered an unwelcome competitor 
for the resources of the province late in the seventeenth century in 
the government and armies of the king. 
Burdens imposed by the crown on the province were numerous. 
T h e taille in Burgundy increased by 36 percent from 1685 to 1695 
alone.23 Munitioners for royal armies in Flanders and Dauphine 
purchased large volumes of Burgundian grain and regularly afflicted 
the province with the passage of troops. Royal monetary manipula­
tions, devaluations, and paper inflation combined to starve the prov­
ince of specie.24 Paradoxically, a series of good harvests from 1705 
through 1707 collided with these monetary problems to produce a 
serious depression in grain prices, forcing m a n  y small producers fur­
ther into debt or off their land entirely.25 L o  w prices also stifled any 
initiative on the part of large holders to m o v e more land into cultiva­
tion.26 As a result of these m a n y and varied conjunctures in Burgun­
dian agriculture, less land, not more, was committed year by year 
and season by season to grain cultivation, while much that was planted 
fell into fewer and fewer hands. In the resulting competition for food 
between the Lyonnais and the people of Burgundy, each brought its 
o w  n advantages to bear. O  n one side the city had access to substan­
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tial wealth, influence at court, and the desire for profit on the part of 
the region's large holders. O  n the other, the small farmers and towns­
people of Burgundy had the advantage of proximity. They could at 
any time and with sufficient provocation rise up in a paroxysm of 
collective violence to keep their grain at h o m e .  2  7 
As if they did not have enough problems, the Burgundians also 
suffered from a dearth of protectors and influence at court in the lat­
ter reign of Louis XIV. T h e C o n d e family, which had virtually ruled 
the province in the seventeenth century, suffered in the early eigh­
teenth from the debilities of its heirs. T h e death of the Grand C o n d e 
in 1686 left a relative void in the person of his weak and delicate son, 
Henri-Jules, w h  o lived most of his life at Versailles and was to die 
there in April of 1709. His son, Louis, D u e de Bourbon-Conde, sur­
vived him by less than a year.28 T h e province had also lost its greatest 
intendant, Claude Bouchu, in 1683. Bouchu had served nearly thirty 
years in his office. A r m e  d with the local prestige of his family— 
his father served as first president ofthe parlement of Dijon from 1638 
to 1653—he had helped guide the province away from rebellion dur­
ing the Fronde toward loyalty under Louis X I  V T h o u g h Bouchu's 
son, Etienne-Jean, became a valued army intendant under Louis XIV, 
his duties carried him far from the province of his birth. H  e did not 
return until his retirement, in 1705, though he remained until his 
death in 1715.29 T h e Estates of Burgundy, once a m o n g the most 
independent and powerful provincial assemblies in France, had grad­
ually fallen victim to the increasing power of the crown. T h o u g h 
they continued to meet every three years, they were reduced for the 
most part to collecting whatever amount the king demanded of them. 
Their meeting in 1709 was to provide only a fleeting whiff of resis­
tance to the various demands of the city.30 
Bereft of its traditional protectors, the province passed from inten­
dant to intendant like an orphan child. In October 1705, the posi­
tion was filled by one A n n e Pinon, vicomte de Quincy. Pinon was 
by then well travelled, having served as intendant in Pau, Alengon, 
and Poitiers. H  e seems to have enjoyed virtually no links with his 
new province, and his prior experience prepared him little for the 
trials of a subsistence crisis.3' H  e and the Burgundians delivered into 
his hands were to suffer great tribulations in the years to come . 
Despite these problems, Burgundian grain did, at least in normal 
times, travel constantly d o w n the Saone to the city's market. There, 
2 8 Setting: Lyon before the Crisis 
it entered into a regulatory apparatus designed, like so m a n  y such 
systems in the Old Regime, to keep supplies in the public eye. Unlike 
other cases, however, the attitude of regulators in Lyon remained 
more ambiguous with respect to transactions, especially those con­
ducted outside the walls of the city. This is not altogether surprising 
in a city ruled by competing and often secretive merchants, but it 
does pose frustrating difficulties for the historian w h  o wants to k n o  w 
exactly h o  w its market functioned. Wi t  h the exception of purchases 
by city-owned and -operated institutions, there are no documents 
and few regulations to explain exactly w h  o purchased grain, h o  w 
m u c h they purchased, or where and for h o w long it was stored. W e 
do have the regulations, but as will be seen, they seldom present a 
complete picture. 
T h e regulatory apparatus primarily targeted three groups: mer­
chants, millers, and bakers. Merchants dealing even occasionally in 
grain were required to register with the Consulate and were pro­
hibited from forming any "association" since, in the context of the 
period, any pairing of "grain" merchants automatically constituted a 
conspiracy to hoard and speculate. T h e y were prohibited, too, from 
storing grain outside the city and had to declare the location of all 
storage facilities within its walls.32 Non-Lyonnais merchants, by 
contrast, were barred by law from storing any grain within the city. 
O n c  e their grain entered the walls, it had to be taken directly to the 
public market and could not be stored in any interim facility.3 3 N  o 
merchant, whatever his origin, could legally purchase grain within 
five leagues distance of the city, a measure designed to ensure at least 
some competition on the market from local peasants. 
Most of these same regulations applied equally to the bakers. Like 
the merchants, they were prohibited from buying within the five-
league zone and from associating for the purpose of storage. They 
were additionally barred from storing more than one month's supply 
at a time and from buying on the public market before 3:00 P . M .  3  4 
T h e market was itself the object of some regulation and supervi­
sion. Stretching from the church of Saint-Nizier across the peninsula 
to the Place des Cordeliers, it consisted, as w  e have seen, of three 
parts, reserved in turn to local merchants, "foreign" (Burgundian) 
merchants, and local peasants.35 N  o one was allowed into the market 
before 9:00 A . M  . save sellers, and regulations repeatedly attempted to 
forbid interference with wagons and boats on their w a y into the 
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city.36 Interestingly, there were very few regulations regarding the 
protection of grain in storage, save for efforts by the city to convince 
boatmen to cover the grain to protect it from the elements.37 Unfor­
tunately, the regulations do not indicate the actual mechanisms of the 
market itself. Fro  m the very scanty sources available, it appears that 
the city's bakers bought m u c  h of their grain directly from Burgundian 
merchants, but there is no evidence that they were required to report 
these transactions.38 
O  f course, the regulatory apparatus did not stop with storage and 
sale. Millers also felt its weight. At their mill boats anchored securely 
in the powerful currents of the R h o n e , they were required to accept, 
mill, and return the grain the same day they received it for a fixed fee 
of 18 sous per ane'e.39 Grain and flour were to be weighed by a com­
mis despoids desfarines (at a fee of 10 deniers per anee) to ensure against 
skimming by the miller, and express prohibitions barred him from 
mixing "earth, sand, chalk, or any other substance" with the flour to 
increase its weight.40 T o ensure enforcement each miller was required 
to paint a red line on the keel of his mill boat. If the line disappeared 
at night, officials could assume that some suspicious substance was 
aboard and investigate for possible violations.41 
F r o m the mill boats, the flour journeyed to the bakeries, accom­
panied by more regulations. T h e bakers of L y o n had by ordinance 
to bake three kinds of wheat bread: a white bread from which vir­
tually all bran had been filtered, a bread with some bran, and apain 
a tout from which no bran was filtered. T h e Consulate fixed the 
price of each type of bread on an ascending scale linked to the cur­
rent price of grain on the market. Since the bakers probably did not 
purchase all or even most of their grain on that market, it was to their 
advantage to get the best price possible below that current in Lyon . 
Unfortunately for the bakers, it would not seem that they were 
always successful, since they appealed four times during the reign of 
Louis X I  V to the Consulate to revise the price scale upward—in 
1664, 1690, 1697, and 1707 42 Each time they pleaded an increase in 
costs due to difficulties in finding help or increases in the prices of 
w o o d and salt. Since bread prices were fixed according to weight, 
the bakers also were required to have their balances checked and 
stamped by a bilanier to insure against fraud.43 
Because city officials deemed the corps of bakers in Lyon insuffi­
cient to meet d e m a n d  , they allowed and encouraged the presence of 
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forains. These were bakers from outside the city, w h  o wheeled their 
carts and wagons into certain locations each morning to h a w k bread 
baked outside the walls. Efforts to regulate them appear to have 
proved singularly unsuccessful. Despite rules confining them to cer­
tain "places" in Lyon , they insisted on setting up shop in the middle 
of narrow streets, in front of doors, and especially around the en­
trance of Saint-Nizier, where their yelling drove the canon priests to 
distraction.44 T h e y insisted too on using small hooks called crochets 
instead of proper balances to weigh their bread, producing the sort 
of inaccuracies that inevitably "weighed" in their favor, and often sold 
rye bread or bread m a d e from a mixture of wheat and rye flour, all 
contrary to a host of ordinances.45 T h  e bakers of L y o  n complained 
ceaselessly about them, citing these abuses as well as their habit of 
selling bread at higher prices than those fixed by scale, but the con­
sistent policy of tolerance and protection of them by the Consulate 
gives eloquent testimony to the need for their product.46 
In all its regulations, the Consulate tended to concentrate on the 
price of grain. Every Tuesday without fail, the magistrates received a 
detailed report on prices and activities the preceding Saturday at the 
Grenette, watching carefully lest this sensitive thermometer of social 
unrest rise too high.47 T h e y were joined in this activity by the peo­
ple of Lyon , for w h o  m the slightest rise in prices could be potentially 
disastrous. 
Just exactly h o  w disastrous a price rise could be is not easy to deter­
mine, because data on wages in early eighteenth-century L y o n are 
not plentiful. S o m  e information can be gleaned from the city's hos­
pitals, which hired m e n in the construction trades, especially masons, 
keeping detailed records of their wages. T h e silk workers, w h e n they 
petitioned for an increase in wages in 1709, gave a good idea of their 
daily earnings.48 If one computes the m e a n price of a given grain dur­
ing the period (excluding, of course, the crisis year and those on either 
side of it) and utilizes the city's official fixed price scale for bread, it is 
possible to gain some idea of the proportion of a day's wages that 
went for bread.49 A master mason, for example, earned 18 sous per 
working day, but since neither he nor any other artisan worked every 
day (there were at least eighty-two Sundays and feast days in a given 
year), his real wages for every day of the year were lower.50 Even if 
he worked every possible working day, which is again unlikely given 
the haphazard nature of contracts and weather conditions, his real 
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earnings, spread over every day of the year, could have amounted to 
only 14 sous per day. If neither his wife nor his children worked, those 
14 sous would have represented the family's total income. 
As an example one can assume a relatively small family with two 
children in which the average daily consumption of bread was a min­
imal one and one-half pounds per person per day or a total of six 
pounds for the family.51 O n  e can assume also a m e a n price of wheat 
(the most expensive grain) of 3 livres, 9 sous per bichet.52 If the family 
ate the cheapest of the three wheat breads that bakers were required 
to make, the price of bread would have been 1 sou, 3 deniers per pound, 
or a total for our mason's family of 7 sous, 6 deniers per day.53 Bread 
alone would, therefore, have accounted for over 53 percent of the real 
family income of 14 sous. If on the other hand, our mason bought rye 
on the market and had it baked at h o m e , the cost would have been 
nearer 35 percent of his income.5 4 Did he eat rye bread? Jean-Pierre 
Gutton, Lyon's foremost historian of the poor, argues in the affir­
mative, but without substantial documentation.55 T h e hospitals used 
wheat for both those incarcerated and those receiving distributions 
from the Aumone on Sundays, and there is additional evidence that 
the Lyonnais m u c  h preferred wheat bread. W h e n  , during 1708, the 
intendant of Languedoc offered the city substantial quantities of rye, 
the prevot des marchands rejected the offer, writing that "the artisans 
and people of this city do not eat rye. That kind of food to which 
they have never accustomed themselves would lead to disorder a m o n g 
them and could cause sickness."56 It seems unlikely that the prevot 
would have been incorrect in his appraisal of the dietary habits of his 
fellow Lyonnais, especially since the purchase of less expensive rye 
could have saved the city a considerable sum of m o n e y . 5 7 
It remains nevertheless that rye, barley, and buckwheat were sel­
d o m absent from the Grenette. Their prices show up regularly on 
the weekly reports to the Consulate, and it seems obvious that some­
one must have bought them. Could it have been our mason's un­
skilled helper? H  e earned only 10 sous per working day, or a m a x  ­
i m u  m of 7 sous, 3 deniers for each day of the year.58 Given a family 
of four and the same circumstances as his master, wheat bread would 
have consumed 97 percent of his salary, leaving nothing for rent, 
w o o d , clothing, or any other essential. Even rye would have taken 
59 percent. As for the silk workers, they maintained in 1709 that they 
earned at most 13 sous, 6 deniers per working day or at best 10 sous, 
3 2 Setting: Lyon before the Crisis 
6 deniers per day over the year.59 A taste for wheat bread would have 
cost them 71 percent of their earnings, rye only 43 percent. All these 
figures assume a small family. T h  e cost in wheat of additional children 
would have been nearly 2 sous per day per child, the cost in rye just 
over one. It seems probable, therefore, that the poorest people of 
Lyon—the day laborers and peddlers w h  o ranked with our mason's 
helper—ate rye bread or even barley or buckwheat bread despite the 
prevot's statement. Furthermore, since the bakers were not con­
strained to m a k e barley or buckwheat bread, these grains were almost 
certainly h o m e treated. B y contrast, more highly skilled artisans 
from silk workers and masons to tailors, metalworkers, and gold­
smiths, likely chose between wheat and rye on the basis of the cost 
of the individual grain and the size of their families.60 
Whichever grain they consumed, the price remained the supreme 
factor in their calculations. If wheat climbed, rye would surely follow 
as those w h  o ordinarily consumed wheat n o  w switched to rye. Be­
hind rye, in dominolike fashion, followed barley and buckwheat.61 
Thus, the price of wheat carried significance all out of proportion to 
its consumption. 
Inevitably, Lyon's fragile provisioning system occasionally col­
lapsed, boosting all prices. W h e  n crops failed, not even the most re­
sourceful Burgundian merchant could meet the city's demand. Lack­
ing any organized community of local grain merchants, surrounded 
by a barren province in which its o w  n citizens took little interest, 
the Consulate faced a host of unpleasant alternatives. Like their col­
leagues in other cities, the magistrates of Lyon generally turned first 
to repeated inspections and forced declarations of supplies with an 
eye to rooting out suspected hoarders and speculators. A few such 
villains could always be found, and Old Regime officials often grum­
bled that they had only scratched the surface of a giant conspiracy 
to starve the people and undermine proper authority in the n a m e of 
usurious profit.62 Whether the cause was accidental or contrived, 
however, a high price was still a high price and a shortage still a short­
age. Officials could thus either search out grain and buy it at inflated 
prices to sell to the population at a loss, or they could try to ride out 
the violence of bread riots and pillaging of bakeries and officials' 
houses that might follow. Through m u c h of the sixteenth century, 
the Consulate of Lyon chose the second alternative. T h o u g h it occa­
sionally tried subsidizing the purchases of private merchants, it mostly 
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gambled on the ability of the Aumdne-Generale to act as a safety valve 
in warding off starvation. Only on a few occasions did the city choose 
to buy grain at municipal expense to feed a restive population.63 
In the seventeenth century, however, the first alternative gained 
favor, and the core of an urban institution began to take shape. In 
1630 the Consulate chose "directors of abundance" and secured royal 
licenses permitting them to buy grain anywhere in the realm, an ex­
periment that was repeated in 1636.64 Each time, the city sold most 
of its grain on the public market in an effort to support a lower price, 
but each time too not all the grain was sold. In 1630 the city ended up 
selling its surplus to the bakers at a loss to keep it from spoiling in 
storage. After the crisis of 1636, the Consulate endeavored to force 
the bakers to buy assigned amounts of grain at prices higher than 
those on the market. Angry bakers appealed to the Senechaussee, 
which quashed the consular action.65 In neither instance was it the 
intention of the magistrates to establish a permanent institution. 
That decision came in 1643 w h e n the city suffered its third major 
crisis in only thirteen years. 
This time the city established a Chambre d'Abondance with eight 
directors and a code of regulations.66 Italian models were once 
again influential. T h  e very n a m  e of the n e  w institution recalled the 
"Abbondanzas" of G e n o a and Florence, while its goals and function 
resembled those of the Venetian Grain Office and the A n n o n  a of 
R o m e .  6  7 Italian cities had long suffered from supply shortages and a 
fiercely competitive market, and city governments in Italy regularly 
directed and coordinated the purchase and distribution of grain.68 
While the proximity of Burgundy and the influence of its merchants 
had m a d e the creation of a strong and constant institution in Lyon 
unnecessary, Italian models proved useful w h e  n food crises began to 
strike the city with bewildering frequency in the seventeenth century. 
T h  e regulations of the n e  w Chambre d'Abondance in Lyon m a d e 
the purpose of the n e  w institution clear: to maintain a constant re­
serve that could at any time be d u m p e d on the market to drive d o w n 
the price of grain. T h e directors were instructed to buy in provinces 
other than Burgundy and those close to the city in order to avoid 
competition with Lyonnais and Burgundian merchants. T h  e Consul­
ate promised additionally to reimburse the directors for any losses 
incurred in the purchase, transport, or sale of grain.69 In practice, 
merchants were named as directors under the occasional supervision 
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of an echevin. During a crisis, individual directors travelled to cities 
such as Marseilles, Aries, and Tarasgon in the south or Dijon, Nancy, 
and Besangon in the north, where they dealt directly with local grain 
merchants and boatmen in the city's behalf. Service as a director re­
quired a healthy personal credit, since purchases were m a d e by the 
individuals on their o w  n accounts or as correspondents with their 
colleagues in Lyon . Only occasionally during a crisis or afterwards 
did directors charge their expenses to the account of the treasurer, 
w h  o then reimbursed himself from institutional revenues such as 
those received from sales to the bakers. Since those receipts seldom 
matched outlays, the treasurer ended by charging the city.70 In this 
way, the city managed to m a k e efficient use of the substantial credit 
of its merchant elite. 
Unfortunately, neither good credit nor the best of intentions were 
sufficient in the face of several crippling difficulties. First and fore­
most a m o n g these was the problem of storage. Even in dry, well-
ventilated granaries, a large volume of grain could be expected to mil­
d e w and spoil within two years.71 Lacking space of its o w n , the n e w 
Chambre d'Abondance was forced to rent space, mostly in the gran­
aries of various religious establishments scattered throughout the city. 
T h  e lack of any central urban granary boosted costs, and the Abon­
dance lacked the resources to have its grain regularly shifted in order 
to keep it dry.72 A s a result, the institution could not maintain any 
kind of steady reserve, and found itself repeatedly forced to sell old 
grain of indifferent quality to the bakers at a substantial loss. 
A second problem involved the cost of transportation. If, as in­
structed, the directors restricted themselves to purchases outside the 
usual grain procurement areas, they faced the considerable cost of 
transporting that grain over great distances. T h e three most likely 
target provinces were Lorraine to the north and Languedoc and Pro­
vence to the south. Transportation from Lorraine entailed carting by 
wagon over abysmal roads to the northern port towns of the Saone 
and river transport from there to Lyon . Alone, land transport from 
N a n c y to Monthureux-sur-Saone cost 3 livres per ane'e in a good 
year.73 T h e cost from Monthureux to Lyon, as seen above, added 
another 4.3 livres per ane'e for a total from Nancy to Lyon of 6 livres 
per ane'e. If the Abondance managed to get an average price in Lor­
raine (12 livres per ane'e from 1700 to 1709), transport alone increased 
that price by 50 percent. Transport on the R h o n e from Languedoc 
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and Provence was even more expensive, and all these figures reflected 
the relatively low cost of grain during a normal year. In a bad year, 
w h e  n the price of the grain skyrocketed and the institution found 
itself trying to transport large quantities in poor weather, all costs 
could easily rise out of sight. 
These difficulties proved insurmountable through most of the sev­
enteenth century, and the Chambre d'Abondance became at best an 
occasional institution, buying quantities too small to m a k  e a differ­
ence in a bad year and too large to store during a good year. T h e 
crisis of 1653 was typical. T h e directors bought a great deal of grain at 
high prices, only to find themselves saddled with a large surplus once 
the crisis had ended. Efforts to force the bakers to buy the surplus at 
a price substantially higher than the market price were successful, but 
resulted in lingering high bread prices and a serious bread riot.74 T h  e 
irony that the Abondance had accomplished precisely what it was de­
signed to prevent was not lost on the Consulate, and no n e w direc­
tors were n a m e d for over fourteen years. W h e  n the institution was 
revived in 1667, it appears to have acted as little m o r  e than a source 
of income for its directors, w h  o received interest at 5 percent on their 
advances for its support.75 Caught with virtually no reserves again 
in the awful famine of 1693, the Chambre d'Abondance was again reor­
ganized the following year by a Consulate determined to m a k  e a suc­
cess of it.76 
T h  e stated goal had not changed: to purchase reserves during years 
of plenty at relatively low prices that could be utilized in a bad year to 
moderate bread prices. Difficulties with storage were alleviated some­
what by the purchase in 1672 and 1676 of two large, well-ventilated 
houses in the parish of Saint-Paul along the Saone for use as perma­
nent granaries.77 Grain might still rot, but at least the costs of rental 
and transportation would be reduced as a result of the reduction in 
the number of granaries and their proximity to the Saone. T o deal with 
the high cost of transportation, the Consulate n o  w committed a con­
stant balance of 120,000 livres to the accounts of the institution and 
placed a senior echevin permanently at the head of an eleven-member 
board of directors. T h e institution was directed henceforth to main­
tain a steady reserve of 10,000 anees of grain, roughly enough to sup­
ply the city for six weeks. With one brief lacuna, such a reserve was 
maintained for seven years. After 1700, however, supplies began to 
slide again, and by 1707 there were barely 1,000 anees in storage.78 
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It would not seem from the brief history outlined thus far that the 
institution of the Chambre d Abondance boded well for the crisis year 
of 1709. Yet, despite its hit-and-miss past, the Abondance had m a n ­
aged to achieve a certain institutional permanence. Its directors met 
regularly in a room constructed specifically for them in the Hotel 
de Ville under the guidance of an echevin.79 They operated with a 
substantial budget, had access to two relatively large granaries, and 
already enjoyed a long if not altogether successful experience at buy­
ing and moving significant quantities of grain over large distances. 
T h e Abondance represented a structure in place, an institution that, 
given sufficient resources and impetus, could play an important role 
in supplying the city during the crisis year. 
Together with their tools of coercion and charity, these instruments 
of sustenance constituted the weapons with which the magistrates of 
Lyon hoped to fell the dark forces of violence and disorder. F e w other 
magistrates in France had access to so m a n y administrative mecha­
nisms of control, or to an e c o n o m  y as vital and wealthy as that of 
Lyon. Even the Lyonnais, however, found all their resources taxed 
to the limit during the difficult last years of the Sun King's reign. 
T h e desultory W a r of the Spanish Succession wrought misery and 
instability throughout the realm, creating havoc in royal finances, 
and stretching France's primitive network of credit and banking dan­
gerously thin. 
Because Lyon became a center of French credit and banking dur­
ing the reign of Louis X I V and because the economy of the city de­
pended heavily on the credit system of the four seasonal fairs, the 
financial condition of the crown was of vital importance both to the 
city's merchant bankers and to the artisans they employed. While 
the financial crisis that was to s w a m p Lyon in 1709 was largely unre­
lated in its causes to the famine of the same year, the conjuncture of 
the two proved disastrous for the city and its people. Having explored 
the structures of order in Lyon , it remains, therefore, to explore the 
structures of disorder at Versailles. 
Time of Troubles

On or about the afternoon of 6 M a  y 1708, Nicolas Desmaretz, controller general of finances, invited Samuel Bernard, the 
richest and most powerful banker in France, to Marly for dinner.' 
The controller general's avowed purpose was to squeeze more m o n e y 
from Bernard for the endless demands of the war. With the sort of 
timing that bespoke precision planning, Louis X I  V happened by the 
pavillion where the two m e n were in conference, spoke to Bernard, 
and to the latter's delight and surprise, invited him on a tour of the 
gardens. According to the king's most famous contemporary chron­
icler, Saint-Simon, "during the entire walk the king spoke only to 
him, took him everywhere and showed him everything, with the 
charm which he knew so well h o w to assume w h e n he had some ob­
ject in view." U p o n his return Bernard was "so delighted that. . . he 
said he would prefer ruin rather than leave in difficulties a prince w h  o 
had shown him so m u c h honor." H  e pledged an additional 900,000 
livres to the crown.2 Saint-Simon marvelled that the great king should 
"so prostitute himself" as to show such favor to a mere " h o m m  e 
d'affaires," a former Protestant w h  o derived m u c  h of his credit from 
other Protestants w h  o had fled the realm in 1685. 
H a  d Saint-Simon been as well informed about royal policy as he 
wished, he would not have been so taken aback. T h  e purpose of the 
tour was not, in fact, to squeeze additional funds from a resistant 
banker. In all his dealings with the crown both before and after 1709, 
Samuel Bernard virtually never resisted. T h e tour was actually a 
reward rather than an entreaty, a publicity stunt rather than a public 
admission of need, and it was certainly not an isolated incident. 
It constituted a small but important link in a long chain of events 
stretching back to the 1690s and the W a  r of the League of Augsburg. 
37 
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It was at that time that the crown first began the risky and laborious 
task of transferring the burden of a rising royal debt away from the 
nearly bankrupt financiers within the framework of the government 
to such great merchant bankers as Bernard outside it.3 This transferral 
was to have disastrous results for the city of Lyon in 1709. T o grasp 
the nature of the crisis, it is vital to understand the process by which 
the Lyonnais were dragged into the sinkhole of royal indebtedness. 
That process resulted from the very nature of the royal financial 
system. 
A  s every royal minister recognized to his dismay, France pos­
sessed no true central treasury. Le Tresor existed only as an optimistic 
abstraction in the official correspondence, referring more to the col­
lective assets of the monarchy than to any organized central exche­
quer for processing them. Like an enormous coral reef, the royal 
financial machine resulted from accretions over time, from count­
less improvisations by French kings dating back to the fourteenth 
century.4 It counted layer upon layer of officials, each one charged 
with the collection and disbursement of funds, each with his o w  n 
small royal treasury and his o w n accounts. Tax farmers at various 
levels collected the indirect taxes, the aides, the octrois, and the gabelles. 
Receivers-general amassed the taille and the capitation. Financiers, in 
their official guise oUraitants, subcontracted the sale of royal offices, 
honors, exemptions, annuities, increased gages, and whatever else an 
inventive minister might conceive to increase revenue. W h e  n m o n e  y 
was to be spent, orders went to a given official to pay, and that offi­
cial then issued an assignation allotting revenue to the payee. W h e n  , 
in the seventeenth century, expenditures rapidly outdistanced reve­
nues, the crown found it expedient to borrow from its o w  n officials 
at interest in anticipation of those revenues. Thus, a growing m o u n  ­
tain of assignations and promissory notes from a variety of official 
sources rapidly became a dreary administrative burden for those 
poor souls charged with the care of the king's accounts. In time of 
war, w h e n the d e m a n d for funds escalated far beyond collected or 
expected revenues, this volume of paper grew to alarming propor­
tions, reducing the value of a normally shaky royal credit and increas­
ing the cost of borrowed money . T h e longer the war lasted, the worse 
the problem. 
T h e need to find funds to support the W a r of the League of Augs­
burg and that of the Spanish Succession resulted in the gradual emer­
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gence of a twofold strategy, both portions of which affected Lyon in 
1709. T h  e first part of this strategy involved shifting the debt burden 
from financiers to bankers; the second, the creation of paper money , 
chiefly in the form of billets de monnaie, or mint bills, with which the 
crown hoped by turns to bribe and coerce both old and n e w holders 
of its debt.5 T h e main architects of this strategy were Michel C h a ­
millart, controller general of finances since 1699 and secretary of state 
for war since 1701, and Nicolas Desmaretz, nephew and heir to the 
financial acuity of Jean-Baptiste Colbert.6 S o m  e historians have sus­
pected Desmaretz of guiding m u c  h of royal policy during this period, 
citing Chamillart's preoccupation with his war duties and his sup­
posed incapacity and incompetence.7 Certainly Chamillart seems to 
have delegated the supervision over monetary manipulations and rela­
tions with the various bankers to Desmaretz, and it is true that the 
latter attended the Council of C o m m e r c e , whose deputies repre­
sented and spoke for the m e n of affairs upon w h o m the crown was 
increasingly dependent.8 Yet Chamillart's correspondence d e m o n ­
strates a continued, close supervision of affairs and a tendency occa­
sionally to act in opposition to his director of finances. It would be 
unwise, therefore, to conclude categorically that Desmaretz con­
ducted royal policy from the shadows. T h e ministerial environment 
in the last years of the reign tended to be remarkably collegial as crisis 
after crisis and defeat after defeat brought on the sorts of shared mis­
eries that draw any group together.9 Until 1708, it seems likely that 
Chamillart and Desmaretz worked in tandem. 
T h  e decision to turn to the great bankers for help in funding the 
war followed logically from the old royal habit of depending on their 
expertise in exchange rates to m o v  e m o n e  y to the king's armies in 
foreign countries. Paradoxically, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
in 1685 advanced this effort by dispersing French Protestant bankers 
into Switzerland, Germany , and the United Provinces. This allowed 
m e  n such as Bernard, w h  o conveniently renounced his Protestant­
ism in 1685, to profit from his connections with these emigre Protes­
tant banking houses.10 T h e crown attracted Bernard, the Hogguer 
brothers, and others with the promise of enormous profits and the 
sort of prestige that derived from such incidents as the tour of Marly. 
For a m a  n like Samuel Bernard, the son of a court painter, w h  o had 
risen to become first a merchant of silks and fine clothing and then 
a rich banker, the status afforded by such actions together with the 
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promise of rich returns proved irresistible.l ] Profits in lending to the 
crown derived from a complex combination of sources, including 
m o n e y m a d e on exchange rates, profits from currency devaluations, 
and commissions. While the effective return on investment that the 
bankers might obtain varied from transaction to transaction, it seems 
that Bernard and his colleagues rarely amassed less than 25 percent 
on their royal loans and often collected even m o r e .  1  2 O  f course, the 
risk was equal to the reward. In return for supplying hard currency 
to the crown which they themselves borrowed at interest, the royal 
bankers received royal paper in the form of assignations, rentes, and 
billets of every type and description.13 T  o remain solvent, they had 
to depend on the desperate need by an increasingly insolvent crown 
to maintain their o w  n credit. The  y calculated that the king's minis­
ters could not afford to let them default lest the government itself 
lose all means of continuing the war. For the crown, the bankers rep­
resented the only possible opportunity for transforming increasingly 
worthless royal paper into the only kind of paper with real value— 
the private letter of exchange. 
For the crown, the world of the private letter of exchange repre­
sented a largely alien set of mentalities. Merchants and bankers in 
the Old Regime lived by the "culte de la parole." As R a y m o n d 
Moulins, merchant of Lyon, wrote to his son, "I live by one invio­
late law, to be direct, frank, and sincere, and I a  m persuaded that all 
those w h  o k n o  w m  e will not think m  e otherwise."14 Moulins and 
others prospered on the basis of their reputations and built those rep­
utations upon a stern belief in moderation and prudence. They liked 
to have quick access to their m o n e y and felt uneasy w h e n it was tied 
up in long-term transactions. Their credit was no less than a synonym 
for their personal prestige. Melchior Philibert, one of Lyon's richest 
and most highly respected merchants, was able to demand a lower 
interest rate on his letters of exchange simply because of the impec­
cability of his reputation.l s 
As far as most Lyonnais merchants were concerned, the role of 
the crown in commerce was to "protect the liberty of commerce" by 
which they inevitably meant their commerce . 1 6 T h e merchants of 
Lyon saw no inconsistency in battling against the mercantile priv­
ileges of other cities while defending their o w n . While they might 
hope that the crown would keep trade routes open, internal tolls low, 
and currency manipulations to a m i n i m u m , such hopes were futile 
Time of Troubles 41 
during the latter reign of Louis X I V .  1  7 For its part, the royal govern­
ment so lacked these mercantile virtues of regularity, constancy, and 
stability that their great attraction to His Majesty's ministers is hardly 
surprising. 
Fortunately for the royal government and the bankers, regularity, 
constancy, and stability were the hallmarks of the Lyon m o n e y mar­
ket where Samuel Bernard and his colleagues increasingly conducted 
their affairs. T h e four seasonal fairs of Lyon dated back to 1420, but 
had by the eighteenth century lost all resemblance to fairs in the medi­
eval or Renaissance sense.18 Products of all kinds no longer flooded 
the city every three months as they had in the past. While the city 
maintained the pretense of seasonal fairs beginning in January, M a y  , 
August, and November , these fairs had in fact become ceremonial 
shells, entirely superseded by the Payments, or settlements of debts, 
which historically concluded them. Thus, the Fair of Kings, begin­
ning officially in January, concluded with the more important Pay­
ment of Kings in March . T h e Easter Fair in M a y gave w a y to the 
Easter Payment in June, the August Fair to the August Payment in 
September, and the Fair of All-Saints in N o v e m b e r to the Payment 
of Saints in December.1 9 T h e regularity supplied by the three-month 
interval between Payments, in conjunction with the stability in their 
structure, offered a near-perfect framework for making and paying 
loans. 
Each Payment period of four weeks began with a six-day period 
of acceptations in which letters were presented by holders to their is­
suers for payment. O  n the third day of the first week, the rates of 
exchange were fixed by a committee of six merchants (two from 
each "nation": France, Italy, and Germany , though the last were 
inevitably Swiss) chaired by Lyon sprevot des marchands. T h  e second 
week began a two-week virement des parties, involving the construc­
tion of complex balance sheets by which loans might be transferred 
between debtors and lenders without recourse to any actual exchange 
of coin. T h e fourth and last week witnessed the ecritures or writing 
of new loans. Outstanding debts were often rescheduled at interest 
during this last period to the next Payment, though any merchant 
had the right after any Payment to demand his due in coin. N  o coin 
could be exchanged legally, however, until the first three days of the 
month following the Payment. Such a delay allowed debtors the 
time to arrange the difficult and precarious transport of specie. 
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Should any problems arise, creditors had recourse to Lyon's power­
ful Conservation, which helped to ensure the reliability of the mar­
ket.20 Lyon's silk merchants, a m o n g others, depended on the Pay­
ments to finance all their operations. T h  e market not only supplied 
the coin with which they paid their subcontracting silk workers every 
Saturday, but also the raw silk itself, which they purchased on credit 
from Italian merchants. T h e Consulate always worked assiduously 
to court these Italian merchants in order to maintain their atten­
dance in person or by proxy at the Payments. Consequently, both 
the great merchants and the thousands of silk workers w h  o anchored 
the city's economy depended directly on the constancy and regular­
ity of these Payments for income and materials.21 
Until the latter reign of Louis XIV, the Payments of Lyon enjoyed 
a largely regional importance.22 Lyon had long ceased to be the great 
Renaissance center of European m o n e y markets, and the Genoese in 
particular had transferred their operations elsewhere. T h  e complex 
mechanisms of balance sheets and strict stages in payment were far 
too cumbersome to bear too great a load of debt. Yet, this relatively 
small m o n e y market soon attracted the attention of Samuel Bernard 
and his colleagues in Paris. That it did is hardly surprising. Not only 
were the Payments regular, but their geography was perfect. T h e 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 had driven a large number 
of Protestant merchants up the R h o n e from Lyon to Geneva, where 
m a n y established citizenship and then returned to Lyon as Genevan 
citizens.23 Because of past efforts to place the success of the fairs 
above religious conflicts, Genevan citizens enjoyed legal protection in 
Lyon and found the Payments an excellent means of transferring cap­
ital between the two cities. T h e occasional presence there of wealthy 
Italian merchants and the reputation of the Payments as secure vehi­
cles of credit also m a d e them attractive, given the persistent need by 
the royal bankers of n e  w funds to feed the voracious appetite of the 
crown. In addition, the royal paper with which Bernard and his col­
leagues were inundated by the royal government could be more easily 
negotiated in a French m o n e  y market than in a foreign one, and the 
relatively small scale of the Lyon market m a d e it potentially more 
submissive to the pressures and lures offered by the royal bankers. 
T h e merchants from w h o  m Bernard, the Hogguer brothers, and 
other bankers to the crown borrowed this m o n e y recognized the 
risks, and some of them gradually came to insist on some form of 
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security for their loans. Bernard in particular supplied such security 
in the form of mint bills, the first paper currency ever issued in France, 
and the second part of Chamillart's and Desmaretz's improvised 
strategy to sustain royal solvency. 
As was the case with the shifting of the debt burden to the bankers, 
so too the crown came to realize the utility of paper currency only 
gradually. Mint bills were at first only a byproduct of another tried 
and true revenue source, the manipulation of the coinage. T h e crown 
officially changed the value of its coin over forty times from 1686 to 
1709, generally by means of a simple arret.24 It actually reminted the 
coinage five times during this period (in 1689, 1693, 1701, 1704, and 
1709), each time requiring that all old coin be surrendered to the royal 
mints. Occasionally, if a delay in exchange of n e w coin for old was an­
ticipated at an individual mint, a receipt would be issued by the mint 
director promising reimbursement within a short time. In October 
1701, citing a general shortage of coin, the crown elected to system­
atize these receipts into credit instruments at an interest rate of 4 per­
cent. B y D e c e m b e r 1703, 6.7 million livres in these billets de mon­
naie, or mint bills, had passed into circulation. T h e crown's relative 
consistency in reimbursing these bills, as well as the modest n u m b e r 
in circulation, m a d e them popular enough to convince Chamillart 
and Desmaretz of their potential. T h e reminting of 1704 witnessed 
an enormous increase in the n u m b e r of bills in circulation.25 
These n e w bills, the exchange of which was soon confined to Paris, 
carried an interest rate of 7.5 percent. Unfortunately, the defeat of 
the French armies at Hochstedt in August 1704 so shook mercantile 
confidence in the royal government that there was a rush to exchange 
the bills for coin. Taken by surprise and finding itself short, the crown 
was forced to adjourn payment on the bills to 1708 and attempted to 
lighten the blow by raising the interest rate to 10 percent. This sub­
terfuge failed to conceal the default, and the value of the bills fell 
precipitously. Desmaretz and Chamillart were n o  w forced to launch 
what became a four-year campaign to restore their value, issuing 
n e  w bills at various rates of interest, forbidding discounting, and 
requiring that they be used as one-quarter of all payments on letters 
of exchange in Paris. As a result of these efforts there were, by the 
end of 1706, over 173,000,000 livres of mint bills in circulation, and 
Paris merchants grumbled at having to bear the total burden of their 
support.26 
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For merchants outside the capital, mint bills simply constituted 
another low-value royal credit instrument to trade, discount, or spec­
ulate upon. That Parisian merchants had n o w to count the bills as a 
substantial portion of their assets merely lowered the value of Pari­
sian letters as credit instruments in other cities.27 The Parisians de­
manded the diffusion of the forced use of bills in payments to other 
cities, including Lyon, where it was rumored that speculation in 
them was particularly lively. 
Their argument was given powerful impetus in 1706 by the mount­
ing troubles of one of the kingdom's wealthiest merchant houses.28 
The Hogguer brothers, Daniel, M a r x Friedrich, and Johanne Jacob, 
had supplied some 17,600,000 livres in coin to the crown in return 
for a variety of privileges, including the right to mint coins in Stras­
bourg. They had been reimbursed 31,352,000 livres, an effective inter­
est rate of 82 percent, but they had borrowed most of their mone  y at 
Lyon where the mint bills with which the crown paid them were 
nonnegotiable. Finding themselves unable to meet their obligations, 
they were forced to ask for several extensions of the Payments of 
Lyon while they attempted to cash their mint bills. With the value 
of the bills falling and the crown unable to redeem them, the H o g  ­
guers suffered losses of between 30 and 60 percent on their bills. In 
addition, the very act of such desperate transactions helped to d o o  m 
their efforts, since it quickly became apparent to all their creditors 
that most of their assets were tied up in increasingly worthless mint 
bills. The value of their paper began to fall until, by 1708, letters 
from the Hogguers were worth no more than the mint bills that 
backed them. 
Chamillart was sympathetic to the complaints of Parisian mer­
chants, worried by the mounting collapse of the Hogguers, and an­
gered at Lyonnais merchants w h o  m he suspected of profiteering. 
Accordingly, on 12 April 1707, he drafted a declaration to require use 
of the bills as a proportion of all exchanges throughout the realm.29 
H  e could not, alas, have been prepared for the storm that swept over 
him. C o m m e r c  e slowed to a crawl as hard currency, never a plen­
tiful commodity in the Old Regime, began to disappear altogether, 
its holders hoarding it for fear of amassing royal paper in its place. 
The merchants of Lyon wrote through their Chamber of C o m m e r c e 
that no coin was available to pay the silk workers and that as many as 
20,000 could be unemployed within a few weeks. They warned that 
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no foreign merchant would accept the mint bills in payment of any 
letter at the fairs and that the whole m o n e y market might well col­
lapse. " W  e must tell you," they concluded, "that the shops of our 
silk merchants and all others are closed, that no one is bringing in 
any merchandise and that all of our merchants have written to all 
their correspondents to say that they have finished with all c o m  ­
merce."30 Chastened by such reactions, Chamillart was forced to 
withdraw the declaration the following m o n t  h and again to restrict 
the official circulation of mint bills to Paris.3 • 
Careful study of the relevant documents shows the extent to which 
Chamillart acted alone. Desmaretz, in a m e m o i r on mint bills dated 
3 M a  y 1706, had specifically opposed their imposition on Lyon , fear­
ing for the stability of the Payments.3 2 Samuel Bernard, given an ad­
vance look at the proposed declaration, wrote in vehement opposi­
tion on 11 M a r c h 1707. "Very far from doing the treasury any good," 
he wrote, "this is going to ruin everything. W  e can only find coin 
here [Paris] in exchange for letters on the provinces; w h e n forced to 
pay in mint bills, w  e will not find one denier in coin." H  e warned 
that "you can no longer count on m  y ability to render service to you 
after such a blow."33 Not coincidentally, of course, such a declara­
tion might have served to save the Hogguers from ruin. Bernard was 
unlikely to support a m o v e that would benefit his only serious c o m ­
petition. It is probable, however, that his concern for the survival of 
his credit in the provinces and especially in L y o n played the more 
important role in his thinking. Certainly, Bernard was himself in no 
immediate danger of default. H  e o w e  d his strong position to the c o m  ­
plex methods by which he borrowed m o n e y , methods that did, h o w ­
ever, put him at great long-term risk. His operations came increas­
ingly to dominate the Lyon Payments, making his potential default 
a threat to the economy of the whole city. It is important, therefore, 
to explore briefly h o  w and from w h o  m Samuel Bernard borrowed 
the m o n e y to keep the armies of Louis X I V in the field. 
Samuel Bernard had by 1704 nearly monopolized the war financ­
ing of the French crown. Only the Hogguers, charged with the sup­
ply of French troops in Italy, represented any competition. Luethy 
estimates Bernard's monthly loans to the crown in 1704 alone at 35.7 
million livres and his monthly reimbursements at 41.4 million, an ef­
fective interest rate of 16 percent per m o n t h . 3 4 T o support such a m a m ­
moth volume, Bernard tapped into m o n e y markets in Paris, Amster­
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d a m , Geneva, and Lyon. Like the Hogguers he received much of his 
payment in mint bills, but unlike his less fortunate competitors, his 
cash flow from other sources was sufficient to assure payment in 
Lyon, at least for a time. At the end of 1706, in order better to tap 
resources in Geneva, Bernard took as his partner a Genevan mer­
chant named Jean Nicolas, w h o was in turn a close associate of one of 
Geneva's richest merchant bankers, Jean-Antoine Lullin.35 Lullin 
enjoyed extensive operations in Turin and had access there to a large 
volume of Italian piastres, the sort of hard currency of which Ber­
nard was in chronic need. Lullin also enjoyed a reputation for ex­
tracting every sou possible in negotiations with borrowers.36 Using 
the Lyon Payments, Bernard and Nicolas borrowed from Lyonnais 
and Genevan merchants through a correspondent in Lyon named 
Bertrand Castan. They employed two methods. O n e was simply to 
borrow coin in exchange for their letters at an average interest rate 
of 3 to 4 percent per Payment (an effective annual rate of 12 to 16 
percent).37 Such loans were unsecured. T h  e lender had only the let­
ters of Bernard and Nicolas on Castan promising repayment in coin 
at the next Payment. In practice, w h e n that Payment arrived, these 
loans generally were rescheduled to the next Payment with Bernard 
and Nicolas either paying the interest or borrowing a larger amount 
with new letters from one set of creditors to pay another. O f course, 
lenders did not necessarily hold these letters but often traded them 
or themselves borrowed from other merchants in order to lend to 
Bernard and Nicolas. With each Payment, the circle of merchants 
involved in the debt of Bernard and Nicolas grew ever larger. 
T h e other method, called the "quart au-dela," secured loans with 
mint bills.38 This was the method by which most of the Genevan 
loans were made , again using the Lyon Payments as a base. Luethy, 
w h  o successfully deciphered the "quart au-dela," has supplied an ex­
ample that m a  y prove instructive.39 If Bernard and Nicolas wished 
to borrow 45,000 livres in coin from Lullin, they would give Lullin, 
in exchange for the coin to be delivered elsewhere, 45,000 livres in 
letters of exchange on Castan and 15,000 additional livres in mint 
bills, an effective interest rate of 33 percent (making the "quart" into 
a third). Technically they would o w  e Lullin 60,000 livres in coin at 
the next Payment, at which time he would hand over both letters 
and bills. At that next Payment, lacking the coin, Bernard and Nic­
olas would reschedule the loan. Lullin would return to them the 
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45,000 livres in letters, but keep the 15,000 in mint bills as securities 
on repayment of the original loan. They in turn would give Lullin 
another 60,000 livres in letters and another 20,000 livres in mint bills. 
Lullin's total security on loans to Bernard and Nicolas would n o  w 
amount to 35,000 livres in mint bills. Even if Bernard and Nicolas 
defaulted on the 60,000 in letters, Lullin could hope to cash the mint 
bills. At the next Payment, Bernard and Nicolas would o w e 80,000 
livres to Lullin. They would again "roll over" the loan, giving Lullin 
80,000 livres in n e  w letters and an additional 26,666 livres in mint 
bills. At the following Payment, owing a total of 106,666 livres, they 
would render that amount in letters plus 35,555 livres more in mint 
bills. After one year, Lullin would hold 97,222 livres in mint bills and 
106,666 livres in letters of exchange on an original cash loan of only 
45,000 livres. Since mint bills carried an effective interest rate by 1707 
of 4.3 percent, their total value would n o w be 101,422 livres. Even 
assuming a loss of 50 percent due to the large volume and declining 
value of bills in circulation, Lullin could be assured of over 50,000 
livres in coin on his mint bills alone. 
Thus, in a worst-case scenario, even if Bernard and Nicolas de­
faulted on their letters and the value of royal mint bills tumbled by 
half, Lullin could hope to recover his original 45,000 livres and m a k e 
a 5,000-livre profit, or 11 percent in one year's time. If, however, Ber­
nard and Nicolas did not default, Lullin stood to m a k  e a fabulous 
profit at the extraordinary rate of 132 percent on the year. Bernard 
could afford to m a k  e such deals because, even as early as 1704, his 
effective monthly gain from the crown of 16 percent gave him an 
annual profit of 192 percent on his loans.40 This method also sup­
plied him with an excellent w a y to use the mint bills that the crown 
was showering upon him. 
T h e above example helps to explain the mechanics of Bernard's 
borrowing, but in no w a y reflects the volume. As Bernard and Nic­
olas rescheduled and reshuffled their loans from Payment to Pay­
ment in the years from 1704 to 1709, merchant after merchant found 
himself investing in their debt, either directly or indirectly. There are 
no statistics on the total volume of transactions at Lyon for a given 
Payment, but it seems certain that the 20 to 30 million livres o w e d 
and reborrowed by Bernard and Nicolas in the Payments leading up 
to those of 1709 constituted a very large proportion of the total vol­
u m e . Luethy notes that that volume had become so great by 1708 
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that the old methods of listing and shifting loans a m o n g merchants, 
the virement des parties, were no longer adequate; better simply to 
reschedule the loans than to sort them out for repayment.41 
As long as Bernard continued to have influence at court, influ­
ence that his tour of Marly was designed to display, merchants could 
feel assured of his continued solvency. Like all credit, that of Samuel 
Bernard was built on the intangibles of reputation and confidence. It 
could disappear all too quickly with a fractured promise or a minis­
ter's slight. Bernard himself was fully aware of the risks and never 
tired of warning the crown of the consequences of a default. As early 
as August 1704, he wrote that "from the m o m e n  t I fail to pay, m  y 
calamity will overwhelm an infinity of others causing more than 
forty bankruptcies immediately throughout the realm and absorbing 
whatever credit remains for the state and several individuals."42 In 
case his o w  n protestations failed to suffice, his creditors also m a d  e 
the situation clear to the crown. T h e Lyonnais merchant banker 
Antoine Saladin wrote in July 1705 that "the health of the State de­
pends on the manner in which Bernard's credit is sustained since that 
credit influences heavily that of other merchants in the realm."43 
Together, the rising tide of mint bills and letters on Bernard and 
Nicolas threatened to wash the city of Lyon into a sea of royal debt. 
A s unwelcome as they were, however, these n e w problems only 
capped a whole series of crises and disasters that had plagued the city's 
economy since 1700. T h e war itself threatened constantly to cut off 
the vital flow of raw silk from Italy, and Lyon's merchants worked 
feverishly through the Consulate and the C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e to 
maintain open trade routes through otherwise hostile kingdoms such 
as the duchy of Savoy.4 4 T h e y worked also to quash efforts by other 
cities on the Saone and the R h o n e to increase the octrois and droits, 
efforts that could force suicidal price increases on products and mate­
rials essential to the city.45 In fighting these various and sundry bat­
tles, the city m a d  e full use of its allies at court. These m e  n played a 
vital role in securing the city's interests and protecting its privileges. 
In pressing their case on these and other issues at Versailles, the 
Lyonnais depended largely on the court connections and loyalty of 
three m e n . T h e first was the city's deputy to the royal Council of 
C o m m e r c e , Jean Anisson, w h o seldom wavered in his efforts on 
Lyon's behalf, meeting constantly with Chamillart and Desmaretz 
to present the city's case and defend its interests.46 Anisson was the 
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second son of Laurent Anisson, marchand libraire of Lyon. H  e had 
already served as director of the Imprimerie Royale in Paris and had 
worked with the Farmers General on tariff problems. H  e was to 
serve the city on the Council until 1722. 
The second m a n was Charles Trudaine, royal intendant of the 
Lyonnais. Saint-Simon described him as "hard, exact, without tact 
or politesse, but molded in honor and justice, and universally recog­
nized as such."47 Trudaine enjoyed some connections at court, since 
his sister was the remarkably astute and ambitious wife of Daniel 
Frangois, comte de Voysin, later minister of war and close friend to 
the king's powerful wife, M a d a m e de Maintenon.4 8 T h e Lyonnais 
was Trudaine's first intendancy. B y 1708 he had served almost five 
years, taking part in the city's ceremonies, attending meetings of its 
Chamber of C o m m e r c e , and growing year by year more sympathetic 
to its plight. As Lyon's economic and financial health became in­
creasingly interlinked with that of the crown, Trudaine found him­
self defending the city under the guise of reporting its activities. Both 
Chamillart and Desmaretz were soon to remark on his apparent loss 
of objectivity. 
M o r e important than either of these two m e n , however, was the 
third, Lyon's patron at Versailles, Francois de Neufville, Marechal 
D u e de Villeroy, royal governor of the Lyonnais. Villeroy was as 
close a friend to Louis X I  V as the king could permit a m a  n to be. 
The two had played together as boys w h e n Villeroy's father served 
as the young king's governor, and Villeroy was the only courtier ever 
to merit the term "favorite" from the king.49 They remained close 
after Louis X I V took the reins of personal power, and the king hon­
ored his old friend with the c o m m a n  d of several armies from 1695 
through 1706. Unfortunately, Villeroy was a better courtier than a 
general, and his incompetence in the field sometimes reached mind-
boggling proportions. H  e derived infamy from his capture by the en­
e m y at C r e m o n a in 1702, after which his army, once delivered of its 
inept general, had w o  n a great victory.50 W h e  n Louis X I  V persisted 
in his loyalty to his friend, Villeroy was again disgraced by defeat at 
Ramillies. 
Despite his defeats, the last of which he chose to blame on the sec­
retary of state for war, Michel Chamillart, Villeroy remained a p o w  ­
erful m a n with m a n y influential friends. Not only was he a close 
personal friend of the king—one of the three or four m e  n present at 
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the premieres entrees w h e n the king arose in the morning—he was also 
very close to M a d a m e de Maintenon.5 1 Through his daughter-in­
law, the old Marshal was connected to the popular Duchess of Bur­
gundy and through his son to Ponchartrain and the descendents of 
the powerful Marquis de Louvois. H  e was close also to the other 
French marshals, particularly Berwick, Tallard and Boufflers, and 
later on to the minister of war, Voysin.52 
In addition, unlike several of the old noble governors w h  o seem 
to have abandoned their traditional duties during the second half of 
the reign, Villeroy took his very seriously. Indeed, he seems to have 
regarded his governorship as a sacred duty and the city of Lyon in 
particular as his "fidele," his corporate client. H  e maintained close 
contact with the city both directly through his correspondence with 
the Consulate and indirectly through his lieutenant "commanding 
for the King in the Lyonnais," Charles de Chateauneuf, Marquis de 
Rochebonne.5 3 T h e city reciprocated this attention, turning to him 
again and again for help at court, lavishing money , gifts, and praise 
on him and the members of his family.54 For the Consulate, a large 
investment in Villeroy obviously represented an investment in his 
considerable connections at court. These connections gave him the 
sort of power and influence that paid back every sou given so gener­
ously by the merchants of Lyon. Yet, there was also something more 
to the relationship than a simple exchange of favors. T h o u g  h official 
letters from this period often brim with apparently artificial praise 
and gratitude, those between Villeroy and his city hint at real affec­
tion. W h e  n the old duke died in 1730, his funeral in Lyon produced 
an outpouring of grief unlike any ever before witnessed.55 
It was particularly unfortunate, given Lyon's ties to Villeroy and 
rumors of speculation by the city's merchants on mint bills, that 
Michel Chamillart should have been Louis XIV's controller general. 
Despite Chamillart's o w  n connections to M a d a m  e de Maintenon, 
he was no friend to the old Marshal, and the two were not even on 
speaking terms after the latter's defeat at Ramillies. Thus, the city 
had to depend largely on Anisson and Trudaine to protect its inter­
ests.56 Unfortunately, both m e  n apparently exhausted their influence 
in the battle over the declaration of 12 April 1707, by which Chamil­
lart had attempted to force mint bills on the entire country. Forced 
to withdraw the declaration in M a y  , Chamillart grumbled that the 
king should have the right to issue any form of m o n e  y he pleased. B  y 
 51 Time of Troubles
October, with Parisian merchants still in an uproar and the Hogguers 
near bankruptcy, Chamillart determined to try again. H  e issued a 
declaration on 18 October virtually identical to that of 12 April.57 
T h e merchants of Lyon were outraged. Referring to the decision 
of 24 M a y not to force the bills on other cities, they stormed that "it 
was on that assurance of the royal word given after m a n y meetings 
. . . that our merchants again took heart and revived their commerce. 
They sent copies of the declaration [of 24 M a  y revoking that of 12 
April] to all the states and foreign kingdoms in order to show that 
foreign merchants could continue to have confidence in French mer­
chants. This succeeded so well that commerce revived quickly and 
continued despite the other difficulties of these times." They warned 
that, as a result of the n e w declaration, "foreign commerce will cease 
absolutely, that our Payments, so wisely established, will be abol­
ished and extinguished, that huge sums in coin will be necessary to 
pay debts because there will be no Payments, that shops and m a n ­
ufactures will perish, that our workers will leave the country or die 
of misery, that the destruction of our industry will aid that of other 
countries, that the Provinces will be reduced to destitution, that the 
entire state, in a word, can only suffer in ways which w e leave to the 
Council to imagine."58 
Anisson met quickly with Chamillart to remonstrate against the 
new declaration, but he found the controller general in no m o o  d to 
retreat again. His account of the meeting, given to the C h a m b e  r of 
C o m m e r c e in Lyon "word for word" on the admonition of Villeroy, 
portrayed a controller general brimming with hostility toward the 
city. After assuring Anisson that the bills would soon recover their 
value as a result of the n e  w declaration, Chamillart said that, as for 
Lyon, "it is better that the commerce of Lyon should suffer a little 
than that the whole realm should perish, that he [Chamillart] k n e w 
this business better than I did. H  e charged m  e to write the Lyonnais 
to execute peacefully the declaration and warned that if they did not 
the king was resolved to send an army." His temper evidently rising, 
Chamillart charged that the "usurers" of Lyon had speculated on 
mint bills, that more "evil deals" were m a d e in Lyon "than in all the 
other cities of the realm," that he had heard of widespread counter­
feiting in the city, and that the only reason the Lyonnais opposed the 
declaration was that it would prevent them "from making a m o n o p ­
oly and usury on these bills."59 
5 2 Setting: Lyon before the Crisis 
Chastened and no doubt somewhat taken aback by Chamillart's 
outburst, the C h a m b e r wrote to Anisson, and both Trudaine and the 
prevot des marchands wrote directly to the controller general. The pre­
vot calmly summarized the difficulties the city had faced in the past 
several years—hostile naval blockades in the Mediterranean, restric­
tions placed by their princes on Italian merchants, the choking off of 
vital materials from Italy. Gently, he explained h o w coin would dis­
appear as a result of the n e w declaration; h o w it would be hoarded 
by foreigners and by Frenchmen; h o  w foreign merchants would in­
sist on payment in coin, but would insist on paying French mer­
chants one quarter in depreciated mint bills; h o w , without coin, the 
silk workers w h  o counted on pay every Saturday would suffer and 
die.60 Trudaine, w h  o had opposed the original declaration of 12 April, 
wrote to Chamillart and Desmaretz on 29 October in terms similar 
to those of the prevot. Desmaretz answered on 9 November , having 
just returned from his estates at Maillebois where he had quietly ab­
sented himself prior to 18 October.61 In reference to Chamillart, he 
wrote, "I will not conceal from you that he appeared somewhat irri­
tated that you had taken sides against the declaration. H  e even told 
m  e that he had written you strongly on this and that he was not con­
tent that you seem to defer too m u c h to the sentiments of the Lyon­
nais. . . . It is necessary that you be instructed that M  . Chamillart is 
presently resolved to sustain the last declaration, that he is so firm, 
that I cannot believe he will change his mind." 
While gently urging the intendant to be cautious in his letters to 
the controller general, Desmaretz urged Trudaine to keep him well 
informed. " M a k e no difficulties, I pray you, about explaining the 
situation to m  e with total confidence; I a  m only too persuaded that the 
declaration can cause disorder in commerce, but it was not possible 
to do otherwise [emphasis mine]." T h e last line of the letter leaves 
Desmaretz's o w n role slightly ambiguous. Did he think the declara­
tion inevitable because of the collapse of the mint bills or because 
Chamillart had determined to carry it through no matter what the 
consequences? T h e tone of the letter hints that Desmaretz had op­
posed it, and his later actions were to confirm that opposition. W h a t 
is clear is that he had already established a separate and secret chan­
nel of communication with Trudaine. For the intendant, opposition 
to the declaration and a secret correspondence with Desmaretz could 
both prove dangerous, and he m a d e sure to write humbly to the 
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controller general that "I will always follow your orders exactly in 
all things... I hope that the bills succeed in the provinces. I will 
do all that is possible."62 
For its part, the C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e wrote Anisson that if 
there was usury in Lyon it was the Genevans w h  o were responsible, 
complaining that their market power was so great that "we are all 
obliged to pass through their hands." T h  e Lyonnais were hurt and sur­
prised to hear that the "true Lyonnais, these ancient houses, these 
depots of fidelity and of right, should be accused without pity of 
disorders which they are the first to c o n d e m n . " 6 3 Certainly some­
one was speculating on mint bills in Lyon, but Luethy's investiga­
tion and those by Sayous tend to support the Chamber's contention 
that Genevans were most active in this area.64 O f course, m a n y so-
called Genevans were only French Protestants once removed, and 
Chamillart could not have cared less which merchants in Lyon were 
guilty; they were all usurers as far as he was concerned. For the 
Lyonnais, the future looked increasingly bleak as they contemplated 
a possible collapse in credit, the total disappearance of specie, and 
the arrival en masse of the dreaded mint bills. C o m m e r c  e and trade 
declined steadily as winter descended over the city, and Trudaine 
wrote Desmaretz on 15 N o v e m b e r that "coin has become so rare and 
expensive here that the affairs of the king and those of commerce can­
not be sustained."65 As Chamillart continued to harden in his sup­
port of the declaration, merchants and officials alike looked forlornly 
for some kind of change in the ministerial climate at Versailles.66 As 
luck would have it, that change was not long in coming. Michel 
Chamillart was beaten d o w n and sickened by the crushing burden 
of his twin offices. B  y February of the n e  w year, he had finally con­
vinced the king to relieve him of half his burden. A n e  w controller 
general heralded a spring of prosperity for the city of Lyon. Nicolas 
Desmaretz was at last to receive the office that he had coveted for 
over twenty-five years. 
T h e coming of Desmaretz to power on 20 February 1708 was 
greeted with unrivaled joy in Lyon. Trudaine wrote the n e w con­
troller general, "I dare not describe to you the joy of the Lyon mar­
ket at the news, but I hope you will soon see the effects by the re­
newed confidence with which those w h  o handle royal affairs are 
treated."67 Unlike Chamillart, Desmaretz enjoyed an excellent rep­
utation as a friend and supporter of merchants and bankers. H  e liked 
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to equate their well-being with that of the realm, writing in 1689, "It 
is necessary that m e n of affairs m a k e honest profits and that the pub­
lic be persuaded of the king's wish that they prosper."68 T h e Lyon­
nais had particular reason to be pleased. Desmaretz was an old and 
trusted friend of Villeroy; the n e  w controller general's premier com­
mis, Clautrier, enjoyed a similar relationship with Jean Anisson; and 
it has already been shown h o  w Desmaretz had begun to form a work­
ing relationship with Trudaine.69 W h e n  , only five days after taking 
office, Desmaretz rescinded the unpopular declaration of 18 October 
which had so incensed the Lyonnais, his popularity was assured.70 
U n k n o w n to the merchants of Lyon, the n e w controller general 
faced a crippling task. As he was later to note, the expected revenues 
for 1708 had been almost entirely pledged in service to the debt.71 
Revenue from the General Tax Farms was consumed in annuities al­
ready issued on them, the taille was yielding barely half the total col­
lected to the crown, and most of that was already pledged in debt 
to collectors. T h e crown was finding it increasingly difficult to sell 
offices because it could no longer afford to pay the gages, the salaries 
of those offices.72 Worse yet, the Payment of Saints in 1707, seriously 
weakened by the declaration of 18 October, had had to be prolonged 
because of the mounting collapse of the Hogguers and the increasing 
volume of loans by Bernard and Nicolas. T h e controller general's 
m o v e to liberate letters of exchange from mint bills on 25 February 
thus represented a desperate effort to bolster the Lyon Payments, 
which had effectively become a vital royal revenue source. Desmaretz 
m a  y have hoped in addition to attract n e  w coin into the realm for a 
possible reminting later in the year. 
Whatever its salutary effects on the commerce and credit of Lyon, 
the n e w declaration sank the Hogguers, whose letters collapsed com­
pletely at the Easter Payment in June 1708. Desmaretz was n o w forced 
to rely almost wholly on Samuel Bernard for the hard cash to pay 
the soldiers of the king in Flanders and Dauphine. Yet, not all was 
well with Bernard. Increasingly pressed by the growing volume of 
his o w  n transactions, he was forced to request an extension of the 
Easter Payment of 1708 after he came up 2 million livres short in re­
scheduling his loans.73 These extensions of the once sacrosanct Pay­
ments boded ill for their stability and reliability. Bernard could not 
reschedule his loans forever, and his fall threatened to bring d o w  n 
not only the Payments of Lyon, but m a n y Lyonnais merchant houses 
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as well. While the presence of Nicolas Desmaretz at last restored 
some semblance of mercantile confidence in the crown, the essential 
problems remained and could only grow worse as long as the war 
continued. 
Given such a dire situation, one is surprised not to see any great 
credit crisis in 1708. That such a crisis was postponed owed a great 
deal to the seeming inexhaustibility of Samuel Bernard's resources as 
well as to the determination of the n e w controller general. It was not 
bankers w h o fell in the spring of 1708, but rain. Through most of the 
month of M a y  , the people of rural France watched and waited ner­
vously while the rains soaked the fields. T h  e all-important winter 
wheat crop had reached a fragile stage. T o o m u c h rain at this m o m e n t 
could mean serious trouble for the fall harvest. 
1708: The Rehearsal 
The rains that pelted the fields of Burgundy in M a  y foretold trou­ble for Lyon in September. O f the m e n w h o confronted that 
trouble as echevins on the Consulate of Lyon during the crisis period, 
w  e can trace only the barest outline. In 1708, Pierre Trollier and Andre 
Aussel were the senior echevins, having been elected the previous year. 
Both came from the families of silk merchants, and Trollier in particu­
lar had already served in other positions of municipal authority, in­
cluding a term as a director of the Aumone-Gehe'rale.l T h e two echevins 
elected for the first time in 1708 were Jean Estival, a sixty-two year old 
merchant draper, and Annibal Guillet, a fifty-eight year old avocat, 
doctor in law, procureur for the king, and himself the son of a mer­
chant draper. W h e  n Trollier and Aussel retired in December 1708, 
they were replaced by Jean Posuel, a printer and book merchant, and 
Francois Y o n , a secretaire du roi and son of a former echevin (and epicier).2 
O  f the m a  n w h  o led them through the crisis, somewhat more is 
k n o w n . Louis Ravat was fifty-three years of age upon his election as 
pre'vot des marchands in 1708. H  e was the product of a marriage alliance 
between two notarial families, and had invested in properties suffi­
cient to garner a long list of titles. In 1708 he was an e'cuyer, count of 
Baneins, seigneur of Clemencia, Dampierre, les Mazes , Monthellet 
"and other places," councillor of the king in the Sehechaussee and Pre­
sidial of Lyon . Ravat had already served as an echevin in 1685-1686 
and married the daughter of another e'cuyer in 1694. H e was to be 
Lyon s pre'vot des marchands until 1715.3 F e  w m e  n ever served a city 
with m o r  e energy or devotion. 
Ravat and his colleagues first suspected a potential grain shortage 
in the s u m m e r of 1708, though it was not the rains of M a y that alerted 
them. Rather, they remarked nervously on the frenetic activities of 
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the king's munitioners in Burgundy. "From the month of June in the 
year 1708," they later wrote, "it was perceived in Burgundy that 
the considerable removal of grain for the subsistence of the army of 
the king . . . began to cause a rise in price. This circumstance c o m  ­
bined with the export of a gross quantity for the army of M  . the 
duke of Savoy and with the avarice of several grain merchants caused 
a daily rise in price and determined the Chambre d'Abondance of 
Lyon . . to send several persons into Burgundy in order to begin 
making contracts."4 Altogether in the next three months, the direc­
tors of the Abondance contracted to spend nearly 300,000 livres to 
reserve grain from the forthcoming harvest for the city. Thus , the 
Chambre d Abondance, which had lain virtually moribund for several 
years, was suddenly and rapidly catapulted into major activity. 
Rising prices, ever the supreme administrative barometer in France, 
signalled the possibility of a subsistence crisis in Burgundy. With 
large-scale purchases taking place throughout the province and the 
mediocre state of the harvest becoming ever clearer, the intendant 
Pinon came under intense pressure to limit or halt exports of grain. 
H  e resisted all but the inhabitants of Bresse and Bugey, one of Bur­
gundy's poorest regions already burdened with detachments of the 
army of Dauphine. H  e ordered exports from that region halted in 
August.5 Ravat complained immediately to Desmaretz that such an 
interruption where the Lyonnais had evidently m a d e sizable pur­
chases "will oblige us to raise the price of bread above twelve deniers 
the pound even though it is already too expensive for the artisans 
and the poor." H  e feared that Pinon was about to cut off the whole 
province.6 Pinon defended himself, noting the poverty of the region 
and the need to feed troops there, but Desmaretz judged that such 
prohibitions "suffered great inconveniences." O  n 29 August he or­
dered the intendant to restore "liberty of commerce ." 7 
Fear, however, had already ignited panic. Jean Perrin, a merchant 
from Lyon acting as a buyer for the Abondance in Burgundy, reported 
in late August that "the terror of a shortage is great throughout the 
countryside." R u m o r s were spreading that Pinon had forbidden all 
exports and that the fine for exporting grain from the neighboring 
Franche-Comte was 3,000 livres and confiscation of grain. Worse , 
wrote Perrin, the harvest appeared to be "only half that of the year 
before," and he was having no luck finding sellers of grain." H  e urged 
the Consulate to look to the south. 
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T h e situation was no better in Provence. T h e intendant Le Bret 
noted in late August that "the harvest has been bad in Provence."9 
With enemy English ships hindering imports by the Mediterranean 
and the Genoese making large purchases in Italy, Le Bret feared for 
the survival of his o w n province. "I do not k n o w the situation in 
Languedoc, but I think it is our only resort." Despite such gloomy 
prospects, rising unrest both in Burgundy and at h o m e forced the 
Lyonnais to search d o w n the Rhone . O n 25 August, 200 anees of grain 
bound for Lyon on the Saone were forcibly stopped and distributed 
by a crowd at Chalons.10 In Lyon itself, a crowd gathered in the poor 
parish of Saint-Georges on the same day and began pelting the closed 
shops of several bakers with stones. Ravat quickly launched an inves­
tigation to discover w h  y these particular bakers had closed early but 
warned Desmaretz that "a frightened population is difficult to con­
tain."1 l Pierre Barthalon, a director of the Abondance, was quickly 
dispatched d o w  n the R h o n  e to Marseilles to begin negotiations for 
grain purchases in the south. 
T h  e decision by the city to purchase grain in the south d e m o n  ­
strated the seriousness with which the Consulate already regarded 
the situation. T h  e expense and difficulties of purchase and transport 
have already been shown, and the city very rarely m a d e purchases 
there. T h e presence of Barthalon in Marseilles, busily making con­
tracts with local grain merchants, importers, boatmen, laboreurs, and 
landlords, proves that Ravat and his colleagues had already decided 
in the s u m m e r of 1708 to spare no expense and leave no granary un­
touched in their effort to provision the city. 
At Versailles the controller general was confronted by a problem 
he had not before encountered. Having never served during a grain 
shortage, he sought the advice of an old and trusted advisor. Henri 
Daguesseau, one of the king's most respected administrators, had 
served as intendant in Bordeaux and Languedoc, advised on numer­
ous councils, and supervised m u c  h of royal policy during the famine 
of 1694.'2 Daguesseau delineated the finer points of crisis mentalities 
and administrative policy in a letter to Desmaretz on 22 August. 
Above all else, he wrote, all actions by the controller general must 
be taken in secret. Public proclamations could easily provoke panic 
and create a real crisis out of nothing. Daguesseau cautioned specifi­
cally against a public declaration barring exports from the realm, 
writing that "it would do more harm than good by the worry and 
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alarm it would arouse everywhere. . . . It is necessary to be content 
with restraining it [export] through secret orders." H  e urged the con­
troller general to solicit regular grain price reports from his intendants 
in Burgundy, Alsace, Lorraine, Provence, and Languedoc, to write 
forbidding the parlements to issue any public orders that might cause 
panic, and to write discreetly to Danzig and Ireland inquiring after 
the price, quantity, best shipping time of grain, and availability of 
neutral vessels to carry it. H  e remarked specifically on the problems 
of the Lyonnais "which is the most difficult place to sustain" and 
suggested that Desmaretz get some of his most trusted munitioners 
to buy for the city in secret. Under all circumstances, he concluded, 
orders such as those of Pinon restricting the trade must be counter­
manded "since they will have an effect contrary to what is intended."13 
Daguesseau's influence was to be heavily felt in the coming months 
as Desmaretz struggled to keep the grain trade moving. Unfortu­
nately, his admonitions to discretion were already too late, as the 
Lyonnais were learning to their sorrow in Burgundy. Yet, Daguesseau 
did supply powerful reenforcement to the Consulate's o w  n argu­
ments about the precarious position of the city and its need for con­
stant support at court. In contrast, Pinon suffered from Daguesseau's 
indirect charge of lack of foresight. T h  e intendant had erred in m a k  ­
ing his modest prohibition on exports from Bresse and Bugey public, 
and had therefore helped to induce panic in his province. As autumn 
fell over the Burgundian fields, the tone of Desmaretz's letters to 
Burgundy became increasingly impatient, terse, and even rude. 
September broke upon an increasingly nervous Consulate. T h e 
records of the Abondance show no substantial grain arrivals in that 
m o n t h . 1 4 N o doubt peasants in Burgundy already had begun paying 
the rents and fees that would soon m a k e their w a y into the granaries 
of grain merchants with w h o  m the Lyonnais had contracted. But the 
delay caused Ravat to worry about the reliability of the Saone and 
Rhone w h e n the weather grew worse. H e stressed to Desmaretz the 
urgency of rapid, unhindered transportation, and requested pass­
ports for free passage of grain up the R h o n e . 1 5 T o reenforce the 
urgency, the Consulate appealed for the first time to Villeroy, and 
the duke quickly added his voice to that of the city. H  e complained 
to Desmaretz of continued moves by Pinon in Burgundy and n o  w 
by Le Guerchois in the neighboring Franche-Comte to curtail the 
trade. Neither would cooperate, he warned, "unless you give them 
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precise orders."16 B y 8 September, Villeroy was more worried than 
his clients in Lyon. B y November , he wrote, "Lyon will run out of 
grain and boats will find it nearly impossible to travel up the Rhon  e 
in winter. In the n a m e of G o d , Monsieur, do not lose a m o m e n t in 
restoring calm to our city."17 
Desmaretz, perhaps judging it more important to restore calm to 
Villeroy, reacted by sending copies both to Lyon and to the worried 
duke of all the various letters he had written to numerous officials 
explicitly ordering them to keep the routes and the trade open. H  e 
also dispatched passports to the city that guaranteed free passage up 
the Rhone , and prepared an arret that would suspend all octrois and 
droits on grain on both rivers for the duration of the crisis.18 Finally, 
he assured Ravat in a remarkable passage, that "if you again have 
need of some n e w order, I will give it as soon as you need it."19 T h e 
Lyonnais could hardly hope for better cooperation at court. In con­
trast to his beneficence toward the city, Desmaretz wrote with irrita­
tion to Pinon. "After all the letters that I have written you on the 
importance of facilitating the transport of grain . . . to Lyon, it would 
seem useless for you to write m e again. . . . Y o u will give total pref­
erence to those w h o act for the city of L y o n . " 2 0 Such actions in their 
favor drew effusive gratitude from the Consulate. "It is to you alone," 
they wrote, "that this great city owes its salvation."21 
All was not so well in the south. Le Bret worried about Lyonnais 
purchases in grain-poor Provence, and those acting for the city began 
also to attract the attention of the powerful intendant of Languedoc, 
Nicolas de Lamoignon de Baville.22 Baville had governed Languedoc 
since 1685. Saint-Simon referred to him variously as "the powerful," 
"tyrant of the province," and "king of Languedoc," a m a  n for w h o  m 
the ends inevitably justified the means.2 3 H e was an old ally of M a ­
dame de Maintenon, veteran of m a n y an administrative battle, one of 
the king's most experienced, intelligent, and tenacious intendants. In 
Baville the Consulate of Lyon confronted a formidable adversary. H e 
had already been in touch with Desmaretz through the s u m m e  r of 
1708 on the problem of Genoese buying in the province, and the two 
had conspired by various means to limit such exports. Though their 
concerns were more of a strategic than a subsistence nature (they 
suspected the Genoese of selling to the Habsburgs and the duke of 
Savoy), the very act of working together drew them closer.24 Des­
maretz m a y have been curt and rude to Pinon. Not so Baville. 
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It was with respect, therefore, that the controller general received 
Baville's complaints that Lyonnais "agents" were crawling all over 
eastern Languedoc. With anxieties and prices rising, the intendant 
feared a shortage and warned that he would not be able to supply 
the needs of Provence if such untrammelled behavior was allowed 
to continue. O  n 16 September he pleaded for some kind of n u m  ­
ber. "Please inform m e what quantity I must allow for L y o n . " 2 5 
Desmaretz relayed these complaints to Lyon on 27 September, or­
dering the Consulate to communicate directly with Baville on their 
precise needs.26 
Baville was almost certainly justified in his complaints. Barthalon 
had been in the south barely two months by the end of September 
and had already contracted to spend some 214,000 livres on grain at 
an average price of 36 to 37 livres per anee.27 Such prices, 38 percent 
higher than those which the Abondance was paying in Burgundy, 
must have been very attractive to sellers. Yet, Barthalon was the 
only "agent" of the Abondance in the south, and those giving Baville 
so m u c h trouble were almost certainly local grain merchants and 
boatmen w h o m a y or m a y not have been acting under contract to 
Barthalon. Ravat could only respond evasively that Barthalon was his 
only agent, and that Baville was hearing unsubstantiated rumors.28 
It was probably in hopes of distracting the Lyonnais from the south 
that Desmaretz n o w informed them of the availability of grain in 
Lorraine. Contest, intendant of Metz , had informed the controller 
general of the availability of 12,000 to 15,000 sacs of wheat (roughly 
equivalent to 6,000 to 7,000 anees), and Desmaretz relayed the infor­
mation to Ravat on 25 September.29 O  n the twenty-eighth he also 
wrote to Trudaine, telling him to use his influence with the Consul­
ate in favor of Metz . 3 ( ) Desmaretz had already worried in an "obser­
vation" about the crisis on the twenty-seventh that Languedoc might 
be unable to supply Provence, and particularly Marseilles, if the 
Lyonnais purchased too m u c  h there.3' Ravat wrote immediately to 
Contest agreeing to a price of 15 livres per sac (approximately 30 livres 
per anee) for 15,000 sacs and dispatched de Roquement , one of the 
Abondance directors, to oversee the transaction.32 Though the negoti­
ations dragged on for a month, Contest eventually agreed to have the 
grain in the Saone port town of Auxonne by the end of December.3 3 
Desmaretz was unsuccessful in diverting the Lyonnais from the 
south, if indeed that was his intention. Though grain began arriving in 
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FIG. 4.1 Grain prices on the Grenette of Lyon, M a y - D e c e m b e r 1708, 
in livres per anee. 
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the Abondance granaries in October (over 2,700 anees for the month), 
the institution found itself turning over increasing quantities to the 
bakers.34 As figure 4.1 demonstrates, the price of wheat on the pub­
lic market had doubled since the beginning of August, rising from 18 
livres per anee to 36.3 5 T h e Abondance, however, was selling its Bur­
gundian grain to the bakers for only 24 livres per anee, a 33 percent 
savings over the market price, but a loss of only 2 to 3 livres per anee 
over the original purchase price of 26 to 27 livres.36 A  s a result of its 
willingness to accept a loss on sales, the Abondance came increasingly 
to dominate the sale of grain by the middle of October, and the C o n ­
sulate worried increasingly about reserves and the approaching win­
ter.37 O  n 11 October, Ravat announced a total grain reserve of only 
5,000 anees, barely enough for one month . "Time," wrote thepre'vot, 
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"is precious." Desmaretz must force the intendants of Provence and 
Languedoc to untie Barthalon's hands and allow more grain up the 
Rhone. 
Le Bret was having none of it. H  e wrote to Ravat on the sixth of 
October that "I cannot consent to this contract [by Barthalon to buy 
in Provence] because this province is very sterile and does not pro­
duce enough to feed its inhabitants for three months out of the year." 
H  e told the prevot that he had written the controller general asking 
him to "revoke the authorization that he has given."38 Ravat coun­
tered on the eleventh with rumors from Barthalon of Genoese grain 
exports from Provence and asked the controller general w h  y the for­
eign Genoese should be favored over L y o n .  3  9 Desmaretz responded 
on the seventeenth ordering Le Bret "not to place any obstacle in the 
way" of the 6,000 anees of grain that Barthalon had just purchased. 
W h e  n Le Bret persisted, Desmaretz became vehement. Provence 
would get its grain from Languedoc. H  e must let the Lyon grain go.4 0 
In Languedoc, too, Lyonnais influence at court began gradually 
to m a k e itself felt. Though he grumbled that the Lyonnais wanted 
their grain all at once and too fast, Baville reluctantly allowed 1,300 
anees up the R h o n e in early October. H  e worried, however, about 
the Vivarais, the region of eastern Languedoc along the Rhone where 
the city insisted on buying its wheat. "Bread is going there for two 
sous per pound," he warned. There had already been unrest at Puy.4 1 
If Lyon wanted wheat, he urged that the city procure it in Carcassonne 
and Narbonne where it was more plentiful. Ravat answered that 
shipments from far away southern Languedoc would be prohibi­
tively expensive and again insisted that the controller general clear 
the city's path.42 
By the end of the month, both Baville and Le Bret had been forced 
to surrender. T h  e former noted Desmaretz's apparent concern for 
the city, assuring him that "in order to quiet the concern that you 
have for this great city, I will allow them to take all that they wish."43 
Le Bret agreed to halt resistance by the magistrates of Marseilles to 
Barthalon's transactions, including several with the Compagnie du Cap 
Negre, the royal trading company that dominated trade with Af­
rica.44 Though the battle was by no means over by the first of N o  ­
vember, the Consulate had assured itself of the support it needed to 
put aside further opposition. Le Bret continued to oppose Barthalon's 
efforts to purchase grain in the R h o n  e valley and from merchants at 
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Marseilles, but Desmaretz repeatedly held his ground, ordering the 
reluctant intendant not to oppose Lyonnais purchases and trans­
port.45 Baville ceased even to complain, turning his attention to the 
provisioning of Guyenne and Nice.46 Released from official inter­
ference, Barthalon managed from October to December to spend 
another 132,335 livres for wheat.47 Though actual arrivals of grain 
from the south continued to be negligible (751 anees in November, 
727 in December), the Consulate blamed a shortage of transpor­
tation on the R h o n e . 4 8 O n 9 December, Ravat and his colleagues 
barred, for the duration, any Lyonnais boatman on the Rhone from 
carrying any merchandise except grain.49 
In Burgundy and the north, also, there was cause for optimism. 
D'Harouys, intendant of Champagne, saw no problems on 3 October 
in selling the Lyonnais 3,000 anees of wheat, and Pinon had wilted 
under the constant pressure from the controller general.50 Only 
Le Guerchois in the Franche-Comte continued to complain at being 
overrun by Lyonnais "agents."51 Ravat answered as he had when 
Baville made the same charge. T h e Abondance, he wrote, had made 
only two contracts in the C o m t e for a total of 2,250 anees. Le 
Guerchois, like Baville, was probably confusing those acting for the 
Abondance with local grain merchants and Lyonnais bakers, w h o  , 
Ravat admitted, "have spread out into the County of Burgundy and 
. . . have even helped themselves to our n a m e . "  5  2 
Ravat was n o w increasingly concerned about getting to the next 
harvest. In his letter to Desmaretz of 4 December, he calculated the 
weekly consumption of the city at 1,500 anees. With eight months 
remaining to the next harvest, the city would require 48,000 anees of 
wheat.53 O  n the fifteenth Desmaretz responded with his o w  n cal­
culations. The city would get 10,000 anees from Metz (some by way 
of Champagne), 6,000 from Languedoc, 1,000 from Avignon, 6,000 
from Provence, and 5,000 from Burgundy. Desmaretz estimated that 
the city could probably scrape up another 13,000 in Burgundy and 
another 7,000 in Languedoc.54 That both m e n had begun to look 
ahead to the coming year suggests that the immediate crisis had 
passed. Ravat was reassured at the end of December by the arrival of 
over 4,000 anees from Burgundy and M e t z .  5  5 Additional such arriv­
als would at last give the city some breathing space. Other factors 
also gave cause for optimism. T h e price of wheat on the Grenette 
fell on 22 December for the first time in over two months from 36 to 
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33 livres per ane'e, suggesting an expansion in supply and a correspond­
ing decline in crisis mentalities in the countryside.56 T h  e weather 
also continued to cooperate. T h o u g h shifting winds on the R h o n e 
caused the loss of one grain barge late in December, temperatures 
remained remarkably moderate throughout the fall and early winter, 
and both rivers remained navigable.57 Best of all, the city continued 
to bask in the light of support from Versailles. Desmaretz had not 
hesitated to discipline the intendants in keeping the doors open to 
the city's lifelines. 
T o show its gratitude, and no doubt also to insure continued sup­
port, the Consulate gave the controller general what he most needed 
on Christmas Eve 1708: a "free gift" to his majesty's government of 
1,040,000 livres.58 Negotiations for this don gratuit actually had been 
in process for some time. As with most such "gifts," this one was a 
disguised loan. T h  e Consulate agreed to act as a royal banker, bor­
rowing the m o n e y (mostly at Genoa) and lending it to the king at 
6 percent annual interest over a fifteen-year period. T  o pay back the 
principal, the king agreed to a continuation of a surtax on wine col­
lected by the city. T o pay the interest, the royal government signed 
over a larger proportion for the city from several other taxes that the 
two traditionally divided between them. T h e king agreed also to the 
revocation of three separate edicts that had threatened the city with 
a mass of n e  w venal officials.59 Desmaretz can only have been well 
pleased with the transaction, since it promised a needed boost in royal 
revenue at a very low interest. T h e timing of the loan, coming as it 
did at the end of a crisis in which the controller general had acceded 
to virtually every consular request, simply demonstrates h o  w well 
the city wielded its wealth to secure cooperation from the court. 
Compared to the financial transactions of Samuel Bernard, the one 
million livres "given" by Lyon to the king paled into insignificance. 
T o get through the Payment of August, Bernard and Nicolas had to 
turn over a debt of 30 million livres. N  o one, least of all Bernard, 
expected his creditors to keep rescheduling the debt forever. Indeed, 
several of the more prudent Genevans appear to have withdrawn at 
this time.60 Total escape from his debt burden would have required 
immense sums of cash, and even Bernard could not locate 30 million 
livres in coin. A method had to be found to improve the value of the 
paper that he and his creditors held in such abundance. As early as 
the end of 1707, therefore, he urged the creation of a royal bank.6 1 
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Bernard was not the first to advocate the formation of a royal 
bank, nor, as historians of John Law's Systeme are well aware, was he 
the last.62 But his project came closer than that of any predecessor to 
reality, largely because he proposed to capitalize the n e w bank with 
private funds rather than royal revenues.63 His plan was fairly sim­
ple. Backed by a proposed initial investment of 12 million livres in 
coin, the n e w bank would issue notes with a m i n i m u m denomina­
tion of 100 livres. These notes could be exchanged for coin at the bank 
for a fee of 5 percent. Holders of mint bills would be allowed to ex­
change them for the n e w bank notes at a loss of 5 percent off their 
face value.64 Thus, mint bills could be exchanged for coin, via the 
bank, at a combined loss of only 10 percent, considerably better than 
the discount of 25 to 30 percent at which they were being negotiated 
through most of 1708. T h e n e w bank would allow Bernard to turn 
his mint bills into bank notes backed by specie and enable the crown 
to retire a form of m o n e  y with which it had never been comfortable. 
In the process, the n e w bank might also strengthen Bernard's credit a 
thousandfold if it could be established alongside that of Amsterdam 
as one of the world's foremost financial institutions. T h  e possibil­
ities seemed limitless. 
Desmaretz, however, was not at first enthused. Such is the con­
clusion one draws from his lack of action on the project, for despite 
repeated urgings from Bernard and Nicolas, he refused either to per­
mit or to reject it.65 T o be sure, the bank had its opponents. T h e 
Council of C o m m e r c e , upon which Samuel Bernard served, opposed 
it strenuously as a dangerous improvisation, the collapse of which 
could bring ruin on all w h o touched it.66 Otherfinanciers and bank­
ers busily making small fortunes by speculating on mint bills and 
coin opposed it for less altruistic reasons.67 Desmaretz himself prob­
ably dreaded the addition of yet another complication in the awful 
confusion of royal finances. 
Whatever his reservations, the controller general was gradually 
brought round by Bernard's growing indebtedness and fears of a de­
fault. As December approached, it became increasingly clear that Ber­
nard might not be able to scrape together the 38 million livres needed 
to get through the Payment of Saints in L y o n . 6 8 Desmaretz decided 
to turn the bank project over to Caumartin, one of his intendants of 
finance, w h  o subjected it to intense scrutiny and gave it his approval 
in late December. O  n the twenty-ninth a projected edict was drawn 
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up creating the bank with Bernard, Nicolas, and the Fayard brothers 
of Lyon as directors.69 O  n the thirty-first Bertrand Castan, Bernard's 
correspondent in Lyon, asked Louis Ravat for a "prolongation" of 
the Payment of Saints. "I a  m obliged," he wrote, "to request this ex­
tension in order to sustain the credit of M  . Bernard."70 Acting on 
the advice of Trudaine, Ravat elected to keep the reasons for the 
extension secret so as not to arouse panic a m o n  g Bernard's creditors. 
" M  . Bernard and his correspondents can be assured that although 
they are the cause of this extension, no one will be so informed by 
m e  , and that I will keep it in strictest confidence."71 According to 
Trudaine, Ravat successfully m a d  e it appear as if several merchants 
and not one had requested the extension.72 
All concerned had embarked on a dangerous game. T h e extension 
of the Payment of Saints gave Samuel Bernard and Jean Nicolas 
breathing space and time to bring their bank project to fruition. If 
the bank could be established—and prospects at the end of the year 
looked promising—they might yet m a k e good on their obligations 
in Lyon and increase their wealth m a n y times over. Yet, they had 
n o w involved the Consulate of Lyon in a conspiracy to cover up 
their o w  n potential default and had thrown their last resources and 
hopes into the bank. That the gamble might fail was a prospect few 
wished to contemplate. 
Louis X I V kept Christmas that year at Versailles. T h e king was 
well pleased with his new controller general and optimistic about the 
upcoming campaign. Dangeau reported great expectations for the 
bank project "which promises to render the mint bills nearly as good 
as hard currency."73 H o p e and optimism reigned as well in Lyon, 
optimism that at last the city would escape the weight of Samuel 
Bernard and restore the Payments to their former health, hope that 
the city might enjoy a steady grain supply before a bountiful harvest. 
Louis Ravat was encouraged. T h e winter had been sweet, grain had 
been arriving in the Abondance granaries, and he could write on 27 
December that "we are not in a pressing necessity."74 Officials and peo­
ple alike had every reason to believe that 1709 would be a good year. 

PART TWO

rjog: 
Year of Trial


The Day ofKings

The night of 5 January 1709 began like any other. Butchers closed their shops, leaving their everpresent dogs to bark at passersby. 
Hawkers deserted their booths on the Place Bellecour for hovels 
close to the Hotel-Dieu. Bakers set to work on the next day's bread 
and the small cakes from which Lyonnais children would soon extract 
small wooden monarchs to celebrate the D a y of Kings. Below the 
great stone towers of the Guillotiere bridge, the m e  n of the guard 
stood talking to each other or quietly contemplating the wild cur­
rents of the R h o n  e flying by beneath their feet. The  y probably took 
little notice of the gusts of icy wind that began to dart across the old 
arches of the bridge sometime during the night. N  o doubt they gath­
ered the collars of their greatcoats up around their necks and sought 
refuge closer to the walls. There was nothing particularly unusual 
about the north wind in Lyon. T h e Lyonnais had long doubled their 
windows on the northern side to protect against this bize, which reg­
ularly travelled d o w  n upon the city by its river highways. Neverthe­
less, this wind on this night in this year was different, for it heralded 
a winter so fierce that it would quickly pass into legend as the worst 
in living m e m o r y . 
Contemporaries invariably pinpointed the exact m o m e n  t of the 
arrival of the Great Winter of 1709, and virtually every witness dif­
fered from every other in the details.' Most did manage to agree that 
it began sometime on the eve of the D a y of Kings. All agreed on its 
ferocity. T h e cure of Saint-Vincent in Lyon called it "so harsh, so 
cold, and so violent, the likes of which had not been seen nor heard 
of since the world was created."2 T h e cure of Vaize testified that "the 
winter began all at once the sixth of January, D a  y of Kings, but of 
such strength that the river was entirely frozen before the morning 
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of the following day, and [the ice] of a thickness so extraordinary that 
it could be crossed by a loaded wagon." 3 Claude Bernard, a lieuten­
ant in M a c o n , concurred in these facts, adding that the ground, un­
protected by any snow cover and drenched by three days of con­
tinual rain, was frozen "to a depth of three feet," the Saone frozen 
"nearly to the bottom."4 
Measurements of temperature were in their infancy during this 
period, but some primitive thermometers were in use. Philippe de la 
Hire, a m e m b e r of the Royal Academy of Sciences, employed a scale 
similar to that soon devised by Fahrenheit to measure the ferocity of 
the winter. Given the testimony of contemporaries, his measurements 
m a  y seem too moderate. If he can be believed, the temperature in 
Paris dropped from 48° on 4 January to 30° on the sixth, then to 22° 
the seventh,  9 0 the tenth and 50 the thirteenth. There it rested ten 
days without respite.5 O  n 22 January, R a y m o n d Moulins of Lyon 
complained that he was "having trouble continuing this letter because 
the ink freezes on the plume. W  e have never seen such a harsh win­
ter. Since the D a  y of Kings, the cold has been so great that the shops 
have closed and none can work. As a result, there is no demand for 
merchandise."6 At Versailles the cold became a royal inconvenience. 
Louis X I V insisted upon his usual promenade on the seventh, but 
the cold so overwhelmed those endeavoring to walk with him that 
he decided not to go out again until the weather improved.7 For two 
weeks he remained inside, increasingly irritated at his forced con­
finement. A stubborn effort at escape to Marly on the seventeenth 
was again cut short by the cold.8 His courtiers huddled close to their 
fires, but even the largest fire seemed incapable of protecting them 
against the drafts of the palace. M a d a m e  , the king's sister-in-law, 
wrote to the Electress Sophie in Germany, "I a m sitting by a roaring 
fire, have a screen before the door, which is closed, so that I can sit 
here with a sable fur piece around m  y neck and m  y feet in a bearskin 
sack, and still I a  m shivering with cold and can barely hold the pen. 
Never in m  y life have I seen a winter such as this one." Saint-Simon, 
w h  o described the weather in similar terms, marvelled that the cold 
caused liquids to freeze and bottles to break even w h e  n stored next 
to fireplaces.9 
From all over France came reports of people found frozen to death, 
of limbs and fingers lost to frostbite, of commerce and industry en­
tirely halted.lo T h e R h o n e was soon blocked by large chunks of ice, 
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and the Marseillais beheld the rare sight of ice in the salty Mediterra­
nean. Agriculture suffered paralysis. Vincent, an estate manager for 
Chateauneuf de Rochebonne in Lyon , wrote to his master from the 
latter's estates in the Vivarais that "it is impossible as long as the cold 
lasts for any of our people to w o r k on the land. I hardly k n o w what 
to do with them."1 1 In Beaune, a canon of the cathedral remarked 
that "voyagers died in the countryside, livestock in the stables, wild 
animals in the woods ; nearly all the birds were killed, wines frozen 
in casques, and public fires were lit to w a r  m the poor."12 Through­
out France, prayers united in hopes that the winter would not last. 
As if in answer to such prayers, the winds vanished on the night of 
24 January, replaced by rain. Yet the thaw that followed proved nearly 
as harmful as the freeze. T h  e sudden rise in temperature broke the 
Saone into a huge ice flow, and the river flooded the low-lying val­
ley around Vaize, marooning blocks of ice "the size of two m e n . "  1  3 
W h o l e trees were washed d o w n and abandoned on the river's banks, 
while walls built along its edge were smashed to pieces. L y o n s three 
bridges suffered damage so serious that the Consulate was forced to 
restrict traffic.14 A n y boats left tied on the bank were either carried 
downstream or smashed by the ice. Louis Ravat could not report the 
rivers free of ice and safely navigable until 2 February.'5 Even then 
the respite lasted only four days, for the cold returned on 4 Febru­
ary, and by the sixth the Saone was again blocked by ice.] 6 This time, 
the cold was not as severe as it had been in January, but it lasted longer 
and was accompanied by heavy snows. Not until the first days of 
March did the Great Winter of 1709 at last recede, though it still left 
temperatures as cold as 24° in its w a k e . '  7 
Mortality caused by the winter was m u c h higher than normal 
throughout m u c h of France, but it was only slightly so in Lyon. In m y 
investigation of mortality in the city, I have drawn on a range of data 
from 1703 through 1715 in the urban parishes of Saint-Nizier, Saint-Paul, 
Saint-Georges, and Saint-Vincent, the faubourgs of Vaize and La Guil­
lotiere, and the hospital of the Charite. For comparative purposes I 
have employed the years 1703 and 1715, which stand equidistant from 
the crisis period, and which c o m e as close as any to testing "normal" 
in a period w h e  n such an adjective is at best difficult to define. In fact, 
mortality was slightly above average in 1715 and slightly below aver­
age in 1703, making a combination of the two years a useful tool in 
gauging and measuring the crisis itself. From 5 January to 1 March 1709, 
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T A B L  E 5.1 Mortali ity of individual occupational groups as a percentage 
of total mortality 
Gnat Winter Winters 0/1703/1715 
Street People 1% 1% 
Da y Laborers 7% 5% 
Domestics 2% 2% 
Agricultural Trades 6% 4% 
Silk Workers 13% 18% 
Artisans 51% 49% 
Subtotal 80% 79% 
Clerks and Guards 2% 2% 
Professionals 2% 2% 
Merchants 8% 11% 
Nobles and Clergy 6% 4% 
Other 2% 2% 
Subtotal 20% 21% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Parish registers ofLyon 
352 people were buried in these parishes. Fifty-seven percent of the dead 
were adults aged 18 or older. B y comparison, only 41 percent of those 
w h o died during the relatively more normal winters of 1703 and 1715 
were older than 18.! 8 Thus, the great winter did kill the old in greater 
numbers than the young, but it did not pick out the poor. As table 5.1 
shows, the proportion of artisans and daylaborers w h  o died in January 
and February of 1709 was not markedly different from that during the 
winters of 1703 and 1715. Indeed, the silk workers, ever at the mercy of 
an uncertain economy, mysteriously suffered fewer deaths in the win­
ter of 1709 relative to other groups. T h  e great winter did not, there­
fore, alter normal mortality patterns a m o n g social groups in Lyon. 
Mortality, of course, is only the most extreme measure of suffer­
ing, and w  e can be sure that the winter branded itself in a variety of 
ways on the lives and minds of those w h o survived it. It also m a d e its 
mark on the land. Olives, fruits, and chestnuts in the south were all 
but destroyed.19 Vines either died or lay barren for one or more 
years, leaving growers destitute and forcing m a n  y off the land al­
together.20 Domestic animals lay dead in herds, their carcasses rot­
ting in the fields. 
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As awful as these losses were, however, they hardly compared to 
the loss of the winter wheat crop. Caught without any protective layer 
of snow, the ground around them drenched and then frozen by the 
arctic cold, the seedlings died where they lay. Wi th memories of the 
shortage of 1708 still fresh, peasants searched with increasing panic in 
March for signs of a harvest that would never c o m e . 2 ' 
While it killed the n e w grain in the earth, the winter also impeded 
efforts to m o v e old grain to cities in need. Marseilles was reduced to 
an eight-day supply by 14 January, and its merchants worked fever­
ishly with Le Bret to transport grain overland from Languedoc.2 2 
T h e Abondance of Lyon received its last shipment on the Saone on 
5 January; the river did not again yield to the passage of grain barges 
until mid February.23 Southern grain continued to arrive by the 
Rhone until 17 January, but the combination of wind and ice hur­
tling southward soon m a d  e the river too treacherous for even the 
hardiest of boatmen. Barges would not again climb the R h o n e until 
8 February.24 
Contrary to what might be expected, the Consulate was not un­
duly worried by these interruptions in arrivals. Ravat announced in 
his letter of 2 February that "w e are not so pressed right n o  w for grain 
as to restrict the commerce of boats on the R h o n e . " 2 5 H e assured 
Desmaretz that the consular order of 9 December 1708 confining 
Lyonnais boatmen to grain shipments had been lifted. H  e m a y have 
been buoyed somewhat by activities on the Grenette. There, as fig­
ure 5.1 demonstrates, prices remained virtually unchanged through 
January and early February despite the cold.26 Indeed, the major issue 
for the Consulate during the winter arose not from grain shortages, 
but from a large fire that destroyed the city's customs house. Letters 
to Versailles haggled energetically over the issue of w h  o should pay 
to rebuild it.27 T h  e only evidence of consular concern for the effects 
of the winter was an effort, ultimately successful, to persuade Lyon's 
archbishop to lift dietary restrictions during Lent.28 
This relative lack of consular concern over the grain shortage dis­
appeared in March . T h e price of grain on the public market, which 
had remained stable at 34 livres, 10 sous per ane'e through the winter, 
jumped to 39 livres the first week of March . B y the twenty-third it 
had reached 42 livres.29 O  n 6 M a r c h , Vincent wrote Rochebonne of 
violence in the countryside. A m o  b had pillaged several private gran­
aries in Saint-Laurent, not far from Rochcbonne's estates. While the 
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FIG. 5.1 Grain prices on the Grenette of Lyon, June 1708-February 1709, 
in livres per anee. 
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agent assured his master that "they are not so bold as to c o m  e here," 
he worried nevertheless about two cellar w i n d o w s "which are only 
of w o o d . " 3 0 
Letters reached Versailles with news of increasing panic at the delay 
of the winter wheat crop. D'Angervilliers of Dauphine reported fears 
of a crop lost to the cold on 9 M a r c h . 3 ' Le Bret of Provence reported 
the same on the twelfth, acknowledging in the same letter that the 
cities of Aries and Tarasgon on the R h o n e had refused to allow the 
shipment of grain purchased by Barthalon for L y o n . 3 2 Baville wrote 
from Languedoc on 15 M a r c h that grain "has been absolutely frozen 
in nearly all of lower Languedoc."3 3 Peasants there were already 
plowing their fields under to plant barley, which, like oats and buck­
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wheat, could mature in only five months. With increasing signs of 
panic throughout his province, Baville had begun in deepest secrecy 
to investigate the extent of available reserves. 
T h e timing of the Great Winter of 1709 could hardly have been 
worse for the Abondance of Lyon. M u c  h of the grain purchased by its 
directors was caught by the cold in transit. Supplies from Metz and 
Champagne were forced to winter at granaries in port towns such as 
Gray and Auxonne on the Saone. Supplies from Languedoc and Pro­
vence had to be stored in Aries, Tarascon, and Beaucaire to the south. 
With the passing of the cold, the Lyonnais quickly discovered that it 
was one thing to store their grain in these cities, quite another to remove 
it. Even w h e n at last they managed to pry a few barges loose in the 
south, their troubles were hardly over. T h e climb up the Rhone was a 
slow and tortuous process, easily blocked by any crowd large enough 
to overpower the m e  n driving teams of horses with barges in tow. 
Should such efforts receive official sanction, the city would be lost. 
For officials in these other cities and towns, however, the grain 
often proved a temptation they could not resist. In Valence, several 
kilometers south of Lyon on the Rhone , the situation in early March 
was desperate. T h e plains of lower Dauphine from which the town 
ordinarily drew sustenance had proved particularly infertile in 1708. 
Royal munitioners had taken any meager surpluses that remained.34 
Desmaretz concentrated his attention on Lyon to the north and Pro­
vence to the south, leaving Dauphine to fend for itself. At Valence, 
the arrival of three grain barges bound for Lyon on 17 M a r c h must, 
therefore, have seemed a gift from G o d  . Citing "the pressing neces­
sity to have grain in this city for the nourishment of the largest part 
of inhabitants w h  o have absolutely none," the consuls of the town 
elected to "stop at once" the three barges, to "discharge all grain," 
and to distribute it to the population.35 Delegations were sent to the 
intendant d'Angervilliers in Grenoble and to Lyon to explain the 
action. O n  e M  . de Brizeaux, a canon in the cathedral of Valence and 
a consul, was selected to go to Lyon. 
T h e canon from Valence appeared before the Consulate of Lyon 
on 19 March  . H  e assured the astonished echevins that the consuls of 
Valence would pay for the confiscated grain and hoped that they 
would accept his word on the matter. According to Ravat, the C o n ­
sulate was momentarily left speechless, first that the officials of Va­
lence or any other town would steal their grain, and second, that they 
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should send a representative to announce it.36 W h e  n they recovered, 
the canon found himself imprisoned and writing to Desmaretz to 
plead for his release.37 Valence, however, was not alone in its des­
perate act. At nearby Tournon, two barges had been stopped and 
emptied of their contents, while Aries, Tarasgon, Beaucaire, and 
Auxonne all refused to allow any grain to be transshipped from their 
granaries.38 Ravat professed amazement that such actions would re­
ceive the sanction of officials in the offending towns. H  e warned the 
controller general that such acts would starve the city, which was al­
ready reduced to a one-month supply.39 
At Versailles, far away from the terror taking hold in the provinces, 
Desmaretz considered the crisis a fraud. "Most of the counsels I re­
ceive lead m  e to believe that the damage caused to seedlings by the 
cold is not nearly so great as the people fear."40 Harking back to the 
advice of Daguesseau, he insisted that the e n e m y was the fear itself. 
"There are nonetheless just reasons to fear that the trouble will be­
come real and considerable if w  e do not oppose strongly the thought­
less haste of several farmers to plow their fields already planted with 
wheat in order to plant barley or other small grains." In an effort to 
restore confidence and stem panic, the intendants were instructed to 
prohibit any reseeding of fields already planted in wheat or rye. 
D'Angervilliers of Dauphine issued the order on 1 April, and Tru­
daine and Pinon soon followed suit.41 
T h e royal c o m m a n d not to reseed met with indifferent success. 
T h e cure of Vaize reported later that there was some compliance, 
but that m a n  y peasants secretly plowed and reseeded under cover of 
night.42 Bernard of M a c o  n observed that m a n  y terrorized peasants 
ignored the order altogether while the cleverest plowed and planted 
fallow fields, which had not been mentioned in the order.43 T h  e cure 
of Feurs probably reflected the general reaction to this and other such 
decrees from the court w h e  n he complained that "the remedies that 
c o m  e from there are always too late and often have to be repealed. 
O n e can say in general that those w h o govern do not k n o w what 
they are doing."44 Baville reported on 7 April that such orders were 
too late in Languedoc. Peasants there had already plowed their wheat 
under.45 Grain prices in Lyon provide further evidence that the order 
had little effect. T h e price of barley rose steeply in M a r c h from 28 
livres, 10 sous per anee to 45 livres, a 58 percent rise that raised it far 
above the price of rye.46 Such a price rise can only be explained by 
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the actions of peasants and laboreurs buying all the seed they could 
find to plant in place of ruined wheat and rye. 
T h e order enjoyed no better success in reducing the rising tide of 
panic. Baville wrote on the twenty-sixth that fears of shortage were 
already taking hold. Grain was disappearing from the trade routes, 
commerce slowing, and Languedoc's usually lively grain exporting 
cities of Narbonne, Beziers, and Agde were pleading with him to 
restrict exports.47 Closer to Lyon, there was unrest in the Forez and 
also in the Beaujolais, where the notables of Villefranche assembled 
on 28 March to pool their resources in an effort to buy grain.48 T h e 
worst trouble, however, came in Lyon itself. T h e city suffered its 
first serious rioting on 25 March . 
Ravat gave a meticulous account of the trouble. It started w h e  n a 
"young m a n  " appeared before the closed shop of a baker at "nine or 
ten o'clock" the night of the twenty-fourth and loudly demanded 
bread.49 T h e baker answered that it was too late. His spurned cus­
tomer reacted by throwing stones at the door. H  e was soon joined in 
this activity by a sizable crowd. T h e baker, "pressed and without any 
assistance, fired a gunshot which injured the young m a n in the arm." 
Alerted, Ravat rushed personally to the scene and arrested the baker 
for firing the gun, an action which pleased and calmed the crowd 
even if it did little for the baker. T h  e prevot then went h o m e to bed 
in hopes he had seen the last of such disturbances. H  e awok  e the 
next morning to news of crowds before several other bakeries in 
the city. Hurrying toward the Grenette, he encountered over 1,500 
w o m e  n besieging the shop of yet another baker. "I told all the w o m e  n 
w h o cried for bread that I would get them some." Finding a neigh­
boring shop open the prevot "gave bread to all those w h  o wanted it." 
Meanwhile, on the rue Le Platre, a carpenter at the head of another 
crowd chopped his w a y into a bakery with a hatchet. Ravat and his 
arquebusiers arrived in time to arrest him "coming out of the bakery 
with his hatchet in one hand and bread in the other." Once more, 
the prevot distributed bread to the crowd, and once more it dispersed. 
H  e was too late, however, to stop the last crowd that gathered that 
day. Arriving at a bakery on the rue Bouneaux in late afternoon, "I 
found the poor baker, a very honest m a n  , from w h o  m everything 
had been stolen up to the mattress on his bed." T w  o "unhappy per­
sons" were caught carrying his dishes, candles, and copper kettles 
and were arrested for theft.50 
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O  n each occasion, Louis Ravat's primary objective was to fore­
stall violence. For the most part, his actions consisted of giving the 
crowds exactly what they wanted, while at the same time endeavor­
ing to demonstrate some measure of authority by arresting someone 
on the scene, be it an armed baker or an angry carpenter. Each time, 
too, he talked to the crowds, attempting to calm them and channel 
their demands into one which he as prevot could supply. While he 
might improvise on the scene, his goal remained entirely consistent 
with that of every other magistrate in France: the maintenance of 
order at almost any cost. 
Ravat blamed this particular disorder on "beggars and vagabonds 
w h o have fallen upon this city."51 H e announced the resolve of the 
Consulate to place additional guards at the gates to keep them out. 
Such "beggars and vagabonds" were regularly blamed for disorder 
during subsistence crises under the Old Regime, and the veracity of 
this charge will be further explored in the next chapter. Ravat, h o w  ­
ever, also hinted at other possible causes. H  e noted "great misery" in 
the city and informed the court that the Abondance would begin dis­
tributing an additional 500 anees per week to the bakers to ensure a 
steady supply of bread. This last action suggests inequities in dis­
tribution that must have left some bakers short of bread. Customers 
used to purchasing in a single bakery might therefore find it closed 
and, fearing a general shortage or a case of hoarding, seek to open it 
by force. In addition, some w h  o did not usually shop at bakeries, 
preferring to bake barley or buckwheat bread at h o m e , must n o w 
have been forced to buy bread due to the inflated price of their usual 
grains at the Grenette. T h e rise in demand caused by these n e w cus­
tomers could only aggravate problems of distribution. 
O  f course, the misery of which Ravat spoke was not confined to 
outsiders w h o crowded the city. T h e price of bread had increased 
from 1 sou per pound in the fall of 1708 to 1 sou, 6 deniers by the 
beginning of M a r c h .  5  2 Given the wages described in chapter 1, such 
a price amounted to 100 percent of the effective daily wages of a silk 
worker with a family of four and more than 100 percent for a mason's 
helper. For the mason himself, bread at that price consumed 71 per­
cent of his daily wages. 
Such figures assume that all had been working regularly. Yet, as 
w e have seen, work virtually halted during the great winter. T h e silk 
workers petitioned in February for an increase in wage rates, asking 
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the Consulate to take notice of "the quantity of their m e  n with their 
wives and children w h  o have requested the aumone even though they 
only arrive at that extremity after having sold most of their belong­
ings."53 They complained that work had been irregular, that they 
had fallen into debt to their merchants, and that these were all rea­
sons w h  y "very often they abandon their children and carry away 
their furniture without paying any rent." Their request for a 30 per­
cent increase in pay was turned d o w n , however, by a Consulate 
painfully aware of the critical condition of the industry and of mer­
chant houses close to bankruptcy as a result of their involvement in 
the debts of the royal bankers.54 Louis Ravat m a y , therefore, have 
blamed foreign beggars for the violence of 25 M a r c h , but it seems 
more likely that the rioters were his o w  n people. 
T h e violence of late Ma rch did have the effect of galvanizing 
Desmaretz into action. T h o u g h he remained convinced that this was 
a crise depeur rather than a real shortage, he recognized the essential 
truth in the Old Regime that a crisis was a crisis no matter what the 
cause. H  e decided to m a k  e an example of Valence. Writing officially 
to the bishop of that town on 30 M a r c h , he announced that "the 
king has resolved that all grain taken by force and violence will be 
restored immediately."55 Further, the consuls were "condemned to 
pay damages and interests" and were ordered to "present themselves 
immediately before the Council to give account of their conduct." 
T h  e controller general counselled the officials of Valence "to obey 
the orders of His Majesty promptly" if they hoped for "any grace."56 
Only by making immediate restitution to Lyon and by writing obse­
quious letters of apology to the court, the Consulate, and the inten­
dant of Dauphine did the consuls escape the onerous and dangerous 
prospect of a trip to Versailles and public humiliation before the 
king.57 Ravat was somewhat mollified by this action, but uncon­
vinced that such an example would suffice.58 
Desmaretz, however, was occupied by problems other than the 
failure of crops and the growing paralysis in the grain trade. Samuel 
Bernard and his bank project had c o m  e to occupy most of the con­
troller general's attention, and in this he was by no means alone. T h e 
merchants of Lyon also were watching closely as the energetic banker 
attempted to establish his bank while at the same time rescheduling 
his loans in the prolonged Payment of Saints. Unfortunately, Lyon­
nais and Genevan merchants were so nervous about the advent of 
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the bank that Bernard suffered more than his usual problems in bor­
rowing n e w funds to pay back old loans. T h e Payment was prolonged 
a total of three times and did not officially close until 3 April, one 
month after the next Payment, that of Kings, was scheduled to be­
gin.59 For each extension the Consulate publicly cited the weather, 
which it blamed for detaining couriers and agents.60 In private, Ravat 
and Desmaretz k n e w that Bernard was the one and only cause, and 
Ravat complained that his indebtedness was ruining the Payments.61 
Wi th the additional time, Bernard and Nicolas managed gradu­
ally to reschedule their debt. T o do so, however, they had to agree to 
extraordinary interest rates, and to promise repayment in good coin 
regardless of a possible devaluation. Lullin, to w h o  m Bernard al­
ready owe  d 4 million livres at Saints, rescheduled his debt and lent 
an additional 1 million in coin in January, this time at an interest rate 
of 50 percent on the quart-au-deld. Including that transaction, he had 
amassed a total in mint bill securities by early February 1709 of 
6,915,725 livres to go with letters from Bernard and Nicolas totalling 
7,555,000.62 Given such an enormous sum, it is not surprising that 
Lullin became an ardent supporter of the bank project, even travel­
ling to Paris to press it personally on Desmaretz. 
At Versailles, Dangeau reported in his Journal on 15 January that 
an edict for the bank had been read in the Council and approved.63 
O  n the eighteenth he noted that six councillors of state had been 
named to sign the n e w bank notes on behalf of the crown and to 
keep a register of mint bills exchanged for bank notes.64 In Lyon, 
merchants virtually ceased business in anticipation of the bank. Tru­
daine reported on the twenty-fourth that no one wished to lend 
m o n e y "because they fear reimbursement in bank notes upon which 
there will certainly be a loss."65 R a y m o n  d Moulins wrote to his 
friend Meisonnier, "Keep hold of your money . I will sell nothing 
under these conditions. There are 9,000 livres due m  e in this pay­
ment which I plan to keep in hand whenever it arrives."66 David 
Ollivier wrote to Desmaretz on the twenty-ninth that "the suspen­
sion of commerce while awaiting the royal bank is so great that there 
has not been a single transaction here."67 H  e noted fears a m o n  g 
merchants that the n e w notes would be forced upon them just as 
mint bills once had been, a development that could effectively kill 
the all-important silk trade with Italy. T h e only good news for debt­
ors and creditors alike lay in the rising value of mint bills. T h  e promise 
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that they might be exchanged for paper of at least marginally greater 
worth led to an increase in their selling price from 64 to 78 percent of 
their face value.68 
F e  w of Bernard's letters from this period have survived, but there 
can be little doubt of his activities. T h  e center of his attention in late 
January can only have been the decision by one of his backers, the 
merchant Fayard of Lyon, to withdraw from the bank. Fayard had 
pledged 2 million of the initial 12 million livres in cash for the capital­
ization of the bank. Given the volume of Samuel Bernard's transac­
tions, it is difficult to understand h o w such a relatively small amount 
could have ruined so important a scheme. Perhaps the withdrawal 
of Fayard symbolized a loss of confidence in the bank project of far 
greater import than the cash, or perhaps Bernard was so short of ac­
tual hard currency that Fayard's m o n e y was truly vital to the estab­
lishment of the bank. Whatever the reason, the news filtered into 
the court on 30 January w h e n Dangeau remarked obliquely on some 
"difficulties" with the bank to be discussed in the Council.69 N e w s 
of Fayard's withdrawal struck Versailles on 3 February, and on the 
fourth, the Council of Finances shelved the project and withdrew 
royal sponsorship.70 
Bernard refused to give up. H  e continued to press Desmaretz on 
the bank through early February, but the controller general proved 
unresponsive and distrustful, and demanded to inspect the banker's 
accounts.71 Bernard dispatched them on the eleventh accompanied 
by a letter tinged with bitterness.72 T h e bank, he maintained, would 
have been "an infallible means to facilitate your affairs and maintain 
mine." N o w , he warned, " m y credit will suffer infinitely if you have 
not the goodness to find some device for putting m  e in a state to sus­
tain it." As before, he predicted the ruin of "an infinity of others" 
should he default. 
For Bernard's creditors in Lyon, the snows of February could 
hardly match the chill they felt w h e  n they inspected their o w  n ac­
counts. R u m o r s were rife through the month that the bank would 
not be established, and worse, that Desmaretz had elected to aban­
don Samuel Bernard to his fate.73 Trudaine worried on the twelfth 
about a further decline in the value of both Bernard's letters and 
the mint bills that backed so m a n y of them. 7 4 H e warned that the 
banker's fall would cause "the fall of m a n y good houses and ruin the 
credit of the king" not to mention a "great disorder to manufactures 
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and all sorts of commerce" in Lyon. The upcoming Payment of Kings, 
he wrote, "causes m  e to tremble." H  e dispatched several detailed 
plans to the controller general proposing to repay the banker over a 
series of years from royal revenues in the Lyonnais and pleaded for 
some sort of public declaration of confidence in Bernard from the 
crown. 7 5 Aware that his beloved bank project was dead for the for-
seeable future, Bernard worked with his Lyonnais correspondent, 
Castan, to see h o w he could get through the Payment of Kings, then 
scheduled to begin the first of March . 
Castan's absence from Lyon so close to the opening of the Pay­
ment caused consternation in the city. Trudaine wrote on 26 Febru­
ary that Castan must be present to accept Bernard's letters if total 
disaster was to be averted.76 As the Payment approached, however, 
it became clear to Bernard and Castan that they could not make good 
on their loans. O  n the twenty-fifth, only four days before the pay­
ment was to begin, they requested that it be put off for one month . 7 7 
This extraordinary request arrived in Lyon on the last day of Feb­
ruary. While the Consulate had been willing, albeit reluctantly, to 
grant extensions of payments, it had very seldom been asked to post­
pone one altogether. That such a request should arrive at the elev­
enth hour only irritated the echevins all the more. Ravat called the 
Consulate into session at nine o'clock in the evening on the twenty-
eighth, reporting to the controller general that they had agreed to 
the postponement.78 " W  e are assured," he grumbled, "that you did 
not desire this assistance for M ' s  . Bernard and Nicolas without being 
certain of funds." Once again the weather was the official public cul­
prit, but no one was fooled. W h e  n Ravat addressed the merchants at 
the ceremony on 1 March to tell them of the postponement, he spoke 
to m e n w h o knew the situation only too well. 
O n  e can imagine the tension, the desperation of m a n  y merchants 
and bankers as they gathered for the ceremony in the Place de Change 
to hear the prevot speak. "I spoke to them a long time. I told them 
that it was their interests which had moved us to this act . . . that I 
knew that the largest part of those listening to m  e were in no con­
dition to m a k  e loans."79 After his speech, which Trudaine termed 
"very wise and prudent," Ravat reported that an old syndic of the 
merchants approached him, "thanked m e , and told m e of the con­
fidence that all had in you, Monseigneur." T h e old m a n told the 
prevot "that they had to be persuaded that the postponement . . . was 
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only to m a k e things easier and that they hoped that those w h o had 
no m o n e y to lend at present would not lack funds the following 
month." "There is no one," he concluded, " w h o is not directly or 
indirectly engaged with Bernard, some for large sums." Even those 
like R a y m o n d Moulins, w h o had not involved themselves in the 
royal debt, knew perfectly well w h  y the payment had been put off. 
"The rarity of m o n e y is a cause as well as the royal bankers w h o o w e 
considerable sums in this payment for which they lack the funds."80 
Only the Italians were upset by the postponement, and some threat­
ened to demand payment in M a r c h anyway. Trudaine believed, 
however, that they could be mollified.81 
T h e postponement cannot have fostered m u c h hope that Bernard 
could be saved. Confidence in his credit depended on his influence 
at court. T h e failure of his bank project eroded that confidence, and 
Desmaretz did little to restore it. Villeroy and others pleaded with 
the controller general to give the banker some kind of aid, while 
Trudaine supplied detailed proposals for repayment from various 
royal revenues. Desmaretz decided, however, to give the banker 
only the barest m i n i m u m that he deemed necessary to help Bernard 
to get through the Payment of Kings.82 H  e promised 10 million 
livres in assignations but at the same time appointed royal commis­
sioners to examine the banker's accounts. It was hardly an over­
whelming signal of confidence. 
As Desmaretz turned his back, so too did Bernard's major credi­
tors. Lullin began busily selling both his mint bills and his letters from 
Bernard in late February, reducing his totals of 7 5 million in letters 
to 3.5 million and 6.9 million in bills to 2.4 million.83 Unfortunately 
for Samuel Bernard, Lullin m a d e no effort to sell letters and bills to­
gether. By separating them, he effectively separated loans from the 
securities that backed them, creating an imbalance which was to have 
catastrophic consequences in April. Castan also speculated on mint 
bills from Bernard, selling short in hopes of buying greater quantities 
at a lower price. Such behavior on the part of his major creditors 
only confirmed others in their determination to demand full pay­
ment at Kings without any rescheduling or restructuring. So sure, 
however, were m a n y bankers of receiving payment in mint bills rather 
than in coin, that they engaged in a form of speculation called "Roix 
pour Roix," promising bills they did not yet have to other bankers 
in exchange for coin at a loss on the bills of between 20 and 25 per­
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cent.84 It never occurred to them that Bernard might not even be 
able to m a k e good with mint bills. 
Bernard meanwhile prepared to do exactly that. A r m e d only with 
the 10 million livres in assignations given him by Desmaretz, he as­
sumed that he could m a k e good after he received the mint bills con­
nected as securities to his letters. Assignations and mint bills together 
would suffice to get him through as long as his creditors agreed to 
accept paper in payment. H  e believed that his creditors would have 
little choice but to accept whatever he offered. O  n 23 March he wrote 
confidently to Desmaretz, "I have worked without respite with 
M  . Castan, m y correspondent in Lyon, to settle m y accounts. W  e 
finished them today and he will depart tomorrow for Lyon in order 
to be present at the opening of the payment."8 5 
T h  e Great Winter of 1709 had abated, but the crisis had only begun. 
A severe grain shortage, with all its attendant terrors and miseries, 
stretched ominously before the people and officials of Lyon. Ravat 
and his colleagues faced the task of prying grain loose from popula­
tions at the edge of starvation, of flushing a rising tide of rural peas­
ants from their city, of feeding an increasingly restive citizenry. As if 
such a challenge were insufficient, they were soon to experience a 
severe financial crisis, entailing a collapse in the city's economy, high 
unemployment, and a severe blow to L y o n s financial resources and 
power. T h e two crises were like two trains hurtling toward each other 
in the dead of night. April promised a collision that would shake the 
city to its foundations. 
Crisis of Collision

Bertrand Castan arrived in Lyon in time for the opening of the delayed Payment of Kings on 3 April.! As the first phase of the 
payment, the acceptations got under way, he was deluged by creditors 
demanding cash payment on their loans to Bernard. Castan instantly 
terrorized them by refusing to accept any letter on Bernard until the 
arrival of Lullin.2 According to the plan hatched by Castan and Ber­
nard in Paris, the mint bills attached to Lullin's letters were to form a 
substantial portion of the paper assets that would be forced on 
creditors in a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Having been so long in 
Paris, Castan and Bernard seem both to have been totally unaware 
that Lullin had been busily divesting himself of the very mint bills 
upon which both bankers were depending.3 
If Lullin's arrival on 7 April provided any comfort to those await­
ing him, it was short lived. W  e can only imagine Castan's horror 
when he met with the Genevan banker and realized the scope of the 
disaster. In selling Bernard's letters and securities to various buyers, 
Lullin had separated them. Those holding mint bills that had been 
separated from letters felt no obligation to present them to Castan at 
the Payment. T h e bills were simply royal credit instruments. Their 
holders lacked any financial link to Bernard. Creditors holding let­
ters, however, presented them en masse, demanding coin and refus­
ing to reschedule. Without the mint bills, however, Castan lacked 
any means of paying the immense sums n o  w demanded. O  n 8 April, 
having procrastinated as long as he could, Bertrand Castan declared 
himself unable to accept and sign any letter of exchange on Samuel 
Bernard.4 T h  e greatest banker in France, the draper w h  o had toured 
the gardens of Marly with the king himself, w h  o had boasted of main­
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taining singlehandedly the solvency of the royal government and 
the royal war effort, had defaulted. 
T h e Payment of Kings collapsed. Ravat reported "a disorder so 
great that it is nearly impossible to describe. . . . T h e credit of Lyon 
is absolutely ruined inside the realm and in foreign countries."5 Mint 
bills immediately tumbled to half their face value. N  o official ex­
change rates could be fixed because there was no m o n e y to be had at 
any price.6 D e m a n d s for payment from Castan and Bernard multi­
plied so fast that one of Lyon's notaries had forms printed especially 
for the purpose. Trudaine was soon forced to issue a two-month mor­
atorium on prosecutions until the mess could be disentangled.7 
Bernard insisted that the whole business could be cleared up if 
those holding his mint bills would surrender them, since in his opin­
ion they held them fraudulently.8 Those w h  o had not separated let­
ters and bills could be paid with the bills they held as securities, while 
merchants holding letters unsecured by mint bills could be paid with 
the royal assignations Bernard had secured from Desmaretz.9 Unhap­
pily for Bernard, his creditors wanted no paper of any kind and con­
tinued to press for payment in coin. M a n y looked to Versailles, hop­
ing that the royal government would bail out the banker upon w h o  m 
so m a n y of them assumed it was totally dependent. Couriers carry­
ing letters from Desmaretz to the Consulate were followed to the 
Hotel de Ville by anxious creditors.10 T h  e controller general offered 
little solace, however, and contented himself with advising the need 
for time, consultation, and negotiation.11 While Ravat attempted to 
negotiate with Bernard's creditors, Trudaine left for the capital to 
consult personally with Desmaretz.12 
T h  e expected string of defaults by merchants began almost i m m e  ­
diately. Lacking payment from Bernard, house after house suspended 
payments, widening the circle of those affected by Bernard's default. 
T h e effect was particularly severe in Geneva, where the magistrates 
were forced to suspend negotiations in April rather than suffer a 
mass of bankruptcies that might destroy the city's economy. 1 3 In 
Lyon, one of the merchants wounded by the default, Sieur Archem­
baud, wrote Desmaretz of the disastrous impact on the city's econ­
o m  y and industry. There was, he wrote, no credit and no cash. 
Merchants dependent on the Payments for both could neither buy 
materials nor pay their workers. Merchants w h o had c o m e to buy 
finished silk and other products could not do so. T h e result, wrote 
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T A B L  E 6.1 Comparison of wine imports during 1709 and 1703-1706, in 
aneesoi wine 
1703-1706° 1709 
January 30,606 10,102 
February 6,761 5,672 
March 9,555 9,289 
April 27,591 44,755 
M a y 15,871 7,455 
June 5,080 3,822 
July 4,877 4,335 
August 11,566 12,328 
September 4,727 2,849 
October 11,333 2,300 
November 46,491 14,553 
December 10,923 2,726 
Total 185,381 120,186 
"Numbers are mean amounts for thefour-year period

Source: Accounts of the Hotel-Dieu

Archembaud, "is the almost total ruin of producers, workers, artisans 
and others."14 
As the financial crisis converged with the food shortage, a collapse 
in demand for any product save bread exacerbated the economic de­
bacle. "There is no demand, nor will there be for a long time," wrote 
R a y m o n  d Moulins. "All think only of bread. Since m  y last letter I 
have sold only two balls of silk."15 With no demand and no credit, 
the merchants of Lyon were forced to abandon their contracting ar­
tisans. Ravat concluded sadly, "Artisans and people have fallen into 
such misery that they fill the streets as if it were a feast day. There is 
no work at all. T h e merchants w h o employ them have nothing with 
which to pay them."1 6 
The mounting misery in the city manifested itself in m a n y ways. 
S o m e were as subtle as a decline in Lyon's usually hefty wine consump­
tion, others as overt as an increase in criminal behavior. Evidence 
for both comes from the accounts of the hospitals, which collected 
3 sous for every anee of wine imported into the city and one-third 
of all fines levied by the tribunal de police.17 As table 6.1 d e m o n ­
strates, the volume of wine imported into Lyon was below normal 
in January and February (a symptom of the Great Winter), normal 
90 ljog: Year of Trial 
in M a r c h , and high in April. April arrivals reflected orders placed 
earlier, before the rivers cleared of ice and in anticipation of the usual 
post-Lenten demand. In M a y  , however, the numbers fell off severely 
and continued well below normal for the remainder of the year. •8 
Lyonnais artisans obviously could not afford wine w h e n every sou 
had to be saved for bread. 
T h e increased volume of fines levied by the city suggests that crimi­
nal activity increased. T h  e Charite listed its third of all municipal fines 
in the accounts as six-month totals. T h e m e a n amount collected by 
the city for the first six months in the noncrisis years, 1704-1707 and 
1711-1714, was 414 livres. F r o m January to June 1709, by contrast, the 
city collected 1,386 livres in fines, triple its normal amount . 1 9 While 
such a number is admittedly a rough and ambiguous measure—the 
dearth of judicial records from the city during this period prevents 
any detailed analysis of the crimes committed or the criminals w h  o 
committed them—a rise in such behavior is nevertheless indicated.20 
Another and far more telling measure of the misery induced by 
the crisis can be found in the registers of the Hotel-Dieu. Each morn­
ing infants and small children abandoned at the door of the hospital 
were taken in and inscribed in its "Journal de Reception." Others 
were carried in by notables at whose doors they had been exposed, 
and they too were processed into the hospital. In each case, the mea­
ger wrappings were carefully described and any attached notes just 
as carefully copied. T h e notes were themselves microcosms of the 
crisis. "This girl is called Claudine, aged three years. Necessity obliges 
m e to expose her. I hope w h e n the times change to get her back."21 
Another, attached to a one-year-old baby, was briefer. "Jean-Baptiste, 
son of a master silk worker. T h e charge of six children obliges m e 
to leave h im." 2 2 Claudine was rebaptised under the n a m e Josette 
Jorjard and sent to foster parents in the rural parish of Saint-Cire de 
Valorge. O n  e of the lucky ones, she survived to be turned over to the 
Charite in 1713. Little Jean-Baptiste was rebaptised as Louis Danger. 
H e died on the last day of August in the crisis year.2 ? They were but 
two of hundreds abandoned during the Great Winter and Famine of 
1709 in Lyon. S o m  e of those abandoned in Lyon were not from the 
city at all, but had been carried in by rural parents desperate for food. 
It is one of the most extraordinary ironies of the crisis that these chil­
dren were immediately dispatched back into the barren countryside to 
foster parents or wetnurses where m a n y died for lack of sustenance.24 
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FIG. 6.1 Number of children abandoned each month in Lyon, 1708-1710. 
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Total abandoned 
V//X Mortality among 
those abandoned. 
Jan. Dec. Jan. Dec. 
1708 1709 1710 
Source: Archives of the Hotel-Dieu 
Figure 6.1 illustrates this atrocity, showing a steady climb in the n u m  ­
bers of abandoned children leading to an explosion in April and a 
peak in July. Based on these figures alone, it would be entirely appro­
priate to mark 3 April 1709 as the last "good day" of the crisis year. 
That night no children were abandoned in the dense alleys and dark 
corridors of Lyon. It was to be the last such night for seven terrible 
months . 2 5 
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Indeed, the misery in L y o  n did not approach that in the country. 
In a pattern nearly as old as agriculture itself, large numbers of peas­
ants deserted barren fields in late M a r c  h and April and hit the roads 
in search of food. M a n y came to L y o n and sought out the intendant. 
W r o t  e Trudaine: 
Troops of peasants come every day to m  y house from different par­
ishes near and far to beg for bread. . There appears in the minds of 
the peasants a design to abandon all because there is little hope for 
the harvest and because they fear high taxes. It pierces the heart to 
see and hear them, and everything they say is true. They are already 
gathering into crowds in several places and are breaking dow n the 
doors of houses to take food. Soldiers of the marechaussee are all in 
the countryside [but] they lack the strength to calm the disorders.26 
R u m o r s of violence in the countryside inspired terror in the towns, 
for it was upon the towns that the rural poor fell in great numbers. 
Only there might they find food in some form, perhaps at a market 
or from the charitable hands of a kindly bourgeois. As the deluge 
descended upon them in April, officials in towns all over Burgundy 
and the southeast acted to stop it with whatever means they pos­
sessed. For them, the rural poor were not simply miserable wretches 
in search of food, but a dark and dangerous m o  b w h  o brought noth­
ing but violence and disease. Worse , they threatened to s w a m p the 
meager resources available to those poor w h  o were properly town 
residents.27 
T h e difference in perspective between town and country could be 
quite striking. W h e  n eight peasants gathered before the closed gates 
of Belleville on 6 April, they were arrested and charged with gather­
ing into a m o  b armed with pitchforks, clubs, and guns. O n  e of those 
arrested, a 45-year-old vinegrower named Etienne du Riz, was interro­
gated after arrest. H a d he gathered with the others and armed himself 
to steal in the town? "Answered that having neither bread nor flour 
he went with several others to Belleville to buy grain but not to steal 
it and that he had not entered the town; said he had no gun or a pitch­
fork; said he had only a staff. Asked w h  y he was arrested, said that 
while awaiting the opening of the gates of Belleville the pre'vot arrived 
and took him with seven or eight others and m a d e them prisoner."28 
T o the officials of Belleville, Etienne du Riz constituted a threat. 
Everywhere the reaction was similar. T h e inhabitants of Feurs, 
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Gray, Charlieu, Villefranche, Bresse, and m a n y other towns m o v e d 
to repair their walls and post guards at the gates.29 Chalons enacted 
a 10:00 P . M  . curfew and arrested as a vagabond anyone found in the 
streets afterward.30 Every t o w n m a d e efforts to expel the rural poor, 
warning them of dire consequences should they try to return. T h  e 
magistrates of Gray ordered that every individual expelled from the 
t o w n be "marked" so that he or she might be identified u p o n any 
attempt to return.3' Officials at M a c o  n carried out their threat with 
dreadful ferocity. Twelve peasants convicted of fomenting disorder 
were executed there in late April, and their bodies were h u n g at inter­
sections in the roads leading to the t o w n as a warning against others.32 
A s they repaired their walls and closed their gates, the towns of 
France c a m  e to resemble fortresses in a desert of despair. B e y o n  d the 
walls, the roads became unsafe as the line between begging and extor­
tion faded, then disappeared. N o t even the great were secure. Dangeau 
reported that the Dauphin himself w a s accosted o n the roads by a 
crowd begging for bread. " H  e threw them a great deal of m o n e y , " 
wrote Dangeau , "and hurried o n his w a y . " 3 3 T h e small also suffered 
the fear of violence. Thos  e peasants w h  o did not flee their land often 
were forced to arm themselves against those w h  o sought to take their 
dwindling reserves, leading the bishop of Chalons to write Desmaretz 
of "the beginning of a civil war" in the countryside.34 T h e cure of 
Thisy reported the disappearance of cats and dogs to feed an increas­
ingly ravenous hunger. Other cures and officials were horrified to 
see children grazing in the fields like cattle.3* Makeshift villages sprang 
up in w o o d s along the routes and b e c a m e centers for the spread of 
disease. Creeks and ditches used both for the elimination of h u m a  n 
wastes and the quenching of thirst c a m e alive with the bacteria of 
typhoid fever. Just as t o w  n officials feared, the epidemic arrived with 
the poor. Bodies were strewn in the streets of M a c o  n in April, and 
the fever spread southward into the Beaujolais and the Forez.3 6 Like 
m a n y of his colleagues, the cure of Thisy w a s overwhelmed by the 
death of his parishioners. "Being o n foot night and day for the ad­
ministration of the sacraments, I w a  s unable to inscribe the n a m e  s of 
150 w h  o had died."37 
A s they tried to shut out the misery beyond their walls, the towns 
had yet to cope with their o w  n poor and destitute. Since formal in­
stitutions for poor relief were relatively rare, the practice in m a n  y 
towns w a s to collect the poor and divide them a m o n g their m o r e 
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comfortable citizens. Each of the "gens aises" would then be responsi­
ble for feeding and protecting his assigned group. This became the 
dominant pattern after a royal declaration of 27 April, the first public 
recognition by the royal government of the suffering, required that the 
bourgeois of every town tax themselves to aid the poor.3 8 Inevitably, 
the number of those requiring aid overwhelmed those able to give it. 
Bernard of M a c o  n reported that the poor of that town were dis­
tributed in late April, but that there were still over 150 in need after 
every bourgeois had taken his m a x i m u m  . A special fund had to be 
established to try to feed them.  3  9 In Charlieu, efforts to distribute 
the burden were unsuccessful. In a postscript to the order assigning 
each citizen his share, the secretary wrote that "instead of doing that 
which was required of them . . . they [the bourgeois] not only refused 
to receive the poor and give them food, but even mistreated them."4 0 
In Villefranche, the magistrates simply threw up their hands. With 
the price of bread at 3V2 sous per pound, the bourgeois had little for 
themselves and their families, let alone enough for over 600 of the 
destitute.41 
Even where there were institutions designed to help, they were 
quickly s w a m p e  d in a sea of desperation. A small register of bread 
distributions survives from the Charite of Saint-Etienne, a town sev­
eral kilometers southwest of Lyon . In orderly fashion, it notes the 
number of pounds of bread distributed to the poor each week begin­
ning early in 1704 and continuing into the crisis year. As figure 6.2 
illustrates, the amount of bread distributed rose steadily from Janu­
ary through M a r c h 1709, then jumped in April to three times its Jan­
uary level. In M a  y the Charite began special distributions for those 
w h  o had fallen upon the town from the countryside, but the strain 
was too great. Running out of grain, the hospital was forced to dis­
tribute only m o n e y in August, and w h e n that too was exhausted, 
there was nothing left to give. T h e numbers toward the end of the 
register, marked d o w n quickly and smeared by errors and correc­
tions, simply stop after 14 August, abandoning the reader to the stark 
eloquence of blank pages.42 
With the towns closing their gates and threatening trespassers, 
with institutions and individuals unable or unwilling to provide any 
relief, more and more of the rural poor streamed toward the great 
city. Famous for its Aumone-Generale, for its commercial wealth, for 
the size and quantity of its granaries, Lyon could not avoid acting as 
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FIG. 6.2 Pounds of bread distributed each month by the Charitede 
Saint-Etienne, 1708-1709. 
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Source: Archives of the Charitc dc Saint-Etiennc. 
a huge regional magnet. Ravat had already blamed the rising tide of 
"beggars and vagabonds" for the disorders of 25 M a r c h  , and the C o n  ­
sulate had already reacted by resuscitating the usually ceremonial 
watch and increasing its n u m b e r from fifty to sixty m e n  , all of them 
posted at the gates.4 * O  n 3 April the controller general urged the city 
"to hold fast in preventing the entry into the city of Lyon of beggars 
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from outside" and ordered that they be "sent back to their original 
residence."44 While the magistrates hardly needed such tardy advice, 
they m a  y have appreciated this tacit promise of royal support for 
whatever measures they might deem fit. 
O  n Sunday, 7 April, the directors of the Abondance met with the 
echevins and several former officials at the h o m  e of the prevot to set a 
strategy for dealing with the crisis. A document in the records of the 
Abondance lists the issues discussed and the decisions m a d e .  4  5 Unfor­
tunately, it does not detail the discussion itself, which might at times 
have been heated. T h e issues were clearly stated in the form of prop­
ositions: Should the city allow bread to be taken outside the walls? 
Should the bakers be restricted to baking only one or two types of 
bread? W h a  t should be done to bakers w h  o sell their Abondance grain 
for profit or w h  o m a k  e bread of inferior quality? Should declara­
tions of private grain stocks be required? W h a  t penalties should be 
exacted on those attempting to take grain beyond the walls? If the 
harvest is as bad as expected, what should be done about ensuring 
supplies over the long term? Finally, what measures should be taken 
to protect the security of the city and "get rid of strangers and above 
all vagabonds and beggars?"46 
T h  e assembled notables decided to leave the question of bread ex­
porting to the discretion of the prevot. Before restricting the bakers 
to any one type of bread, they elected to conduct an experiment to 
see which kind of bread utilized the available grain most efficiently. 
Bakers selling their grain or making "bad" bread were to be fined 100 
livres for the first offense, a larger fine and corporal punishment for 
the next. A n y grain taken outside the walls was to be confiscated. A 
committee of four was appointed to study the problem of long-term 
grain procurement and report to the Consulate with a plan. Finally, 
the foreign poor would be ordered out. T h e rectors of the Charite 
would be charged to send their Swiss daily "into the churches and 
into the streets in order to seize all the foreign poor and take them to 
the Charite. O  n the next day they would be put out of the city with 
warnings not to c o m  e back under penalty of being judged as vaga­
bonds."47 T h e assembly deemed it appropriate to pay the Charite 
5 sous per head for this service. 
T h  e discussions of the seventh led directly to the consular ordon­
nance of 10 April. Complaining explicitly that the rural poor "con­
sume a part of the food of the poor of this city," the Consulate gave 
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them twenty-four hours to leave. T h  e city further prohibited inn­
keepers from housing anyone "of this quality" on pain of a ioo-livre 
fine, ordered all boatmen to chain their boats from 6:00 P . M  . to 
6:00 A . M  . on pain of prison, and commanded the officers of the penms 
to arrest u n k n o w  n strangers of either sex, day or night, and conduct 
them to the Charite. Finally, the magistrates ordered a census taken 
of the city and a full declaration of all grain supplies, including those 
of all religious establishments.48 In outline, the strategy of the C o n  ­
sulate as it emerged at the beginning of April was twofold. N o n  ­
Lyonnais would be expelled and the city cleared. Lyonnais would 
then be identified and counted along with their grain. A r m e  d with 
both security and hard data, the Consulate could then more compe­
tently plan the city's survival. 
The good intentions of the ordonnance of io April collided i m m e  ­
diately with the realities of a porous city. Lyon had never—could 
never—close its gates. For a city founded upon the movement of 
people and goods, such a proposition was impossible. Ravat himself 
admitted as m u c  h in a letter of 4 M a y  . Noting the failure to keep out 
the rural poor, he regretted that it was something "we cannot stop 
without closing our gates, and that would cause a scandal in foreign 
countries which would not be advantageous to the realm"—or, he 
might have added, to the already wounded economy of L y o n . 4 9 
With the gates open, those desperate to enter used every possible 
subterfuge to get by the clerks and watchmen. Most entered, accord­
ing to Ravat, "under the pretext of carrying in goods." Others sim­
ply scrambled over the often low and easily scaled walls. "Desola­
tion in the country is so frightful that it is not necessary to punish 
these unhappy people w h e n they are caught lying."50 It was enough 
punishment, concluded Ravat, simply to throw them out. 
If the city could not keep out all of the rural poor, it could at least 
try to deny them the food they sought. All through April, the offi­
cials of the penons drew up the census upon which future procure­
ments and distributions would be based. O  n 18 April, directors of 
the Abondance watched while the bakers of the Charite carefully ex­
perimented with two tickets of grain, one from Burgundy, the other 
from Provence. They found, not surprisingly, that more bread could 
be made if no bran and no rough wheat flour were excluded from 
the process; one ticket from either region could then m a k  e ap­
proximately eighty pounds of bread divided into thirteen six-pound 
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loaves.51 B y 23 April the census was complete. It showed a total 
population of 87,689, of w h o  m 20,529 had access to private grain 
stocks of varying quantities. Not counting the stocks of the Abon­
dance, there were 5,803 anees of grain and flour in the city, enough to 
feed the counted population for thirty-one days at one pound per 
day per person.52 A r m e d with this n e w information, the notables 
again assembled on 23 April for another strategy session. They de­
cided this time to restrict all bakers save five to making "pain a tout," 
Lyon's famous dark bread, and to raise the price to 2 sous per pound 
to defray their o w n mounting costs.53 T h e five bakers exempted 
from this regulation would be allowed to make white bread for those 
w h  o wished to provide the grain or pay the market price, but would 
receive no Abondance grain. T  o m a k  e sure that only residents received 
the bread, each family would receive a ration card entitling each 
family m e m b e r to one pound of bread per day to be purchased from 
an assigned baker. O n c  e again, the notables determined to "speak to 
Messieurs of the Charite" about rounding up the rural poor. This 
time, unaccountably, they decided to pay only one sou per head.54 
T h e session of 23 April, like that of the seventh, was codified into 
an ordonnance issued the thirtieth. T h  e city printed ration cards and 
delivered them to each family. Henceforth, no more than eight per­
sons at a time would be allowed to congregate before any one bak­
ery, and none after 7:00 P . M  . For their part, the bakers were strictly 
ordered not to mix or weight their flour or to sell the bread w a r m , 
w h e n it was heaviest and therefore most expensive.55 T h e mills were 
locked in an effort to keep millers from filtering bran out of the flour, 
thus ensuring that only black bread would be produced. A police 
ordonnance of the same date ordered those with private stocks of 
grain to exhaust those and give eight days prior notice before tap­
ping into the rationing system.56 
In rationing their bread at 2 sous per pound, the magistrates of 
Lyon placed great faith in the Aumone-Generale to forestall disorder. 
Even for a skilled mason earning 18 sous per working day, bread at 
that price for a family of four consumed 85 percent of his daily wages. 
If, as he was bound to do, he reduced his family's consumption to the 
rationed amount of one pound of bread per person per day, his cost 
could be reduced to 60 percent. That was manageable as long as he 
was working, but as w e have seen, few were working. With the credit 
market in chaos and d e m a n  d for products near zero, merchants 
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could not afford to pay artisans, and municipal employers such as 
the hospitals were overwhelmed by the tide of native and rural poor. 
The only answer for skilled and unskilled alike lay with the Aumone. 
Unfortunately, there are no specific records of bread distribution 
by the Aumone for this period.57 Records of correspondence from the 
Charite are likewise thin, but a letter from the hospital to Desmaretz 
late in M a  y begging for his help in procuring grain does supply a n u m  ­
ber. T h e rectors announced that there were 1,800 enclosed within 
the hospital, and that they were distributing 59,000 to 60,000 pounds 
of bread per week through the Aumone-Generale.58 Such an amount 
would have been sufficient to support anywhere from 10,000 to 
15,000 supplicants per week depending on the number of children in 
various families and the amount allowed by the Charite for each.59 
W h e  n exactly the deluge began can be gleaned from the records of 
grain purchases. T h  e Charite habitually purchased its grain from a 
small group of Burgundian grain merchants. T h  e hospital contracted 
for each year's supplies in the autumn, supplementing those with 
additional purchases w h e n they became necessary. In 1709, the Cha­
rite'was able to get by with supplies purchased in 1708 until April. In 
that month, however, it began quite suddenly and feverishly to buy 
grain wherever it could be found and at whatever price.60 For the 
people of Lyon, April truly inaugurated a spring of discontent. 
H o  w m u c h of this "free" bread m a d e its w a y to the rural poor 
cannot be k n o w n  . T h  e safeguards discussed in the first chapter prob­
ably sufficed to limit the number of non-Lyonnais receiving aid, 
though some w h o lived close enough to the city to k n o w it well and 
speak with its accent might have escaped the scrutiny of the hard-
pressed rectors. Thepassade, the small measure of charity distributed 
to outsiders, did increase during the crisis year. It nearly doubled 
from its average of 1,353 offerings in the noncrisis years 1703-1706 to 
2,353 in 1709. Yet, such a rise is hardly comparable to that experi­
enced by the Charite of Saint-Etienne for the same period and almost 
certainly indicates successful efforts to restrict the number of those 
receiving it.61 
T h e sudden demand on the Aumone-Generale in April inspired a 
feverish search for grain. Likewise, the decision by the city to ration 
bread was not entirely the result of a need to confine supplies to 
proper residents, but was also a reaction to continuing paralysis in 
the grain trade. Never had Lyon's geographic isolation from grain­
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rich provinces proven so severe, and never had the need for grain by 
urban and charitable institutions alike been so great. 
Grain procurement had already brought the city into direct con­
flict with neighboring towns and provinces at the end of 1708 and 
the beginning of 1709. T h e seizure of grain at Valence and Tournon 
was only the first of several incidents. Ravat complained repeatedly 
in early April of rumors that stoppages were imminent the length of 
the Saone.62 H e was particularly worried about the situation in Aux­
onne and Gray to the north, where several thousand anees of grain 
from Metz were stored. T h e problem, as always, was to load and 
m o v e the grain without interference, and the city kept up a constant 
pressure on Desmaretz to insure cooperation from the intendants. 
Unfortunately, their cooperation was seldom adequate. A  n ordon­
nance issued 3 April by the intendant Le Guerchois prohibiting inter­
ference with the movement of grain in Franche-Comte offers a good 
example. U p o  n seeing the ordonnance posted in Gray, a crowd of 
w o m e  n stormed the house of the royal subdelegate w h o  , according 
to an observer on the scene, "would have been killed if he had not 
hidden in the house of a friend."63 From there they went to the house 
of one Demongeau , the lieutenant-general w h  o hastily promised to 
procure grain for them if they would wait until the next day. Unsat­
isfied with the delay, they charged directly to the docks by the river 
where they hurled insults and threw rocks at a small detachment of 
soldiers guarding the granaries. T h e officials of Gray finally surren­
dered to the ever-increasing number of townspeople, agreeing to un­
load a barge bound for Lyon and distribute the grain to the crowd.6 4 
Such violence set the authorities of Gray on a firm course of pro­
crastination about liberating any more grain for Lyon. Further orders 
from Le Guerchois only provoked delegations from the town plead­
ing with him to change his mind . 6 5 
In Auxonne also, boatmen attempting to load and m o v e grain 
were "threatened by armed people."66 T h e town sent an echevin to 
plead its case with the intendant Pinon, but the latter reacted by 
arresting the official and determined to go himself to Auxonne to 
oversee the loading of the grain. Unhappily, such laudable courage 
abandoned the intendant once he arrived to confront the angry A u x  ­
onnois. Bernard of M a c o n , whose city also had grain stranded in 
Auxonne, reported that Pinon "went himself to reestablish the trade, 
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but left quickly because o f the fear, or so they say, o f not being safe; 
the grain w a s not dispatched."6 7 Stern recriminations a n d orders 
f r o m the controller general w e r e insufficient to send P i n o n again to 
A u x o n n e . 6 8 
T h e refusal of Burgundians inside their towns and out to allow 
the export of grain was hardly surprising given the suffering and mis­
ery engendered by the crisis. Their resistance was given special force, 
however, by the fact that it was Lyonnais grain they were holding. 
Traditional resentments towards the city reenforced popular deter­
mination to prevent the export of grain, and this hostility was mir­
rored in the attitudes of Burgundian officials. All complained cease­
lessly about the city's avarice, its apparent greed, and the supposed 
plenty in its granaries. " W e see m a n y grain boats pass by here bound 
for the Abondance of Lyon," wrote the bishop of M a c o n . "I have 
stopped a large n u m b e r of peasants w h  o wanted the grain, but I can­
not promise to contain them again; I k n o w , Monsieur, that the gran­
aries of the Abondance are full of grain, and it is hard to see them lay­
ing in stock beyond their needs w h e n w e have none." 6 9 T h e bishop 
of Chalons concurred in this opinion, writing on the twelfth that 
this one city [Lyon] has twice the grain it needs for several years. The 
granaries of the hospital and those of the Abondance are full. . . . This 
rich city which does not lack m e  n seeking profit, has carried off all 
the grain from Bassigny, from Lorraine, from all of Burgundy, and 
from the city of Chalons. . . . Meanwhile, all the cities and villages of 
Burgundy suffer.70 
Though Desmaretz reacted to these and other complaints by defend­
ing the city and its needs, though L y o  n itself dispatched former 
echevins to lobby the relevant intendants, none could possibly have 
convinced the Burgundians that they should starve so that Lyon 
might eat.71 
T h e south told a similar story. Explicit orders from Le Bret to offi­
cials in Aries and Tarascon in early April to release stocks of grain 
stored for Lyon met with procrastination and haggling over the exact 
amounts. 7 2 Barthalon, the city's agent in Provence, had to agree to 
sell some of its grain in Aries in order to m o v e any up the river.73 
Only in Beaucaire did the Lyonnais have any luck. A n effort by offi­
cials there to stop a boat bound for Lyon met with swift action from 
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Baville, w h  o arrested the first consul of the town and saw to it that 
the barge was reloaded and sent on its w a y . 7 4 
Ravat would have been surprised by the statements of the bishops 
of M a c o  n and Chalons concerning the city's supposed wealth in 
grain. Through April, the Abondance managed to retain a reserve 
large enough to last one m o n t h . 7 5 Given the situation in both north 
and south, such a cushion gave no comfort at all to the Consulate, 
and reports from the Grenette were even less consoling. O  n 6 April 
the price of wheat rose to 60 livres per anee. O n  e week later, it had 
risen to 72 livres. O  n the twentieth it reached 84 livres. B  y the end of 
M a y  , as figure 6.3 illustrates, the public market price peaked at 102 
livres per anee, a 500 percent increase over the m e a  n in the noncrisis 
years, 1703-1707 and 1711-1715. Since the price of rye and other grains 
lagged only slightly behind the price of wheat, the Lyonnais had no 
choice but to depend on the Abondance for most of their bread.76 O f 
course, while high prices certainly indicated difficulties suffered by 
merchants in procuring grain, they more clearly represented the in­
trusion of the Abondance into the provisioning system. Those Bur­
gundian merchants with available stocks were selling most of their 
grain to the institution. T h  e Abondance in turn subsidized lower 
prices to the bakers, all of which m a d  e the Grenette an unprofitable 
market, especially given the dangers and difficulties of transporting 
any grain at all to the city. N  o private merchant could possibly afford 
the losses incurred by the city on every anee of grain it purchased, 
and few bothered to compete by selling grain in its market. Thus, 
the impact of the public market price was for the most part psycho­
logical. Only Lyon's richest citizens would or could pay such a price. 
Worrisome though they m a y have been, skyrocketing prices at the 
Grenette did not occupy nearly as m u c  h attention at the Hotel de 
Ville as the increasing pessimism of the controller general. Desmaretz 
had continued stubbornly to believe through early April that the 
winter wheat crop would arrive more or less intact, but his inten­
dants subjected him to a constant, daily barrage of letters arguing the 
opposite point of view. Their correspondence bulged with accounts 
of riots and disorders, of empty markets, of starving peasants and 
desperate towns, of a crop lost and gone forever. B y mid April, he 
had begun to believe them. W h e  n Trudaine wrote him what had 
become a standard letter from Lyon asking his help again in liberat­
ing the city's grain from various places, he wavered in his support. 
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FIG. 6.3 Prices of wheat and rye on the Grenette of Lyon, February-
October 1709, in livres per ane'e. 
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"You will easily understand the little support that your department 
can expect from neighboring provinces." Pinon of Burgundy and 
d'Harouys of C h a m p a g n e were both pleading with him to prohibit 
any exports "and indeed the shortage is even greater in several dis­
tricts of Burgundy than it is in the Lyonnais."77  B y the twenty-third 
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he had abandoned hope of the winter wheat crop and finally lifted 
his order barring reseeding in small grains—barley, buckwheat, and 
oats.78 
T h e Lyonnais knew full well h o w bad the situation was in neigh­
boring provinces. Their correspondents kept them well informed, 
but they could never admit the misery of the provinces upon which 
they depended for grain, especially to the controller general. Such 
an admission could only have reenforced the actions and opinions of 
those w h o wished to freeze the movement of grain, dooming the city 
to isolation and starvation. Indeed, the Consulate had depended on 
the controller general's chimerical belief in a hidden grain crop, 
because they knew it motivated him to keep the trade moving. 
Desmaretz's increasing "loss of faith" on top of paralysis in supply, 
the continued flooding of the city by the rural poor, and the misery 
induced by unemployment, all threatened Lyon with a real famine. 
That danger was so real, in fact, that Louis Ravat invoked it in 
his most anguished letter to Versailles. "The intendants act against 
the orders of the court distributing grain to the people even though 
w e did not even buy the seized grain in their provinces. It is no longer 
a question of discussing rights, Monseigneur; w  e do not have the 
time. W e are in famine if you have no pity for us. T h e hardship is 
great and it increases every day." T h  e actions of royal officials, he 
warned, "will destroy the second city of the realm; and I dare say it 
is not to the good of the state to suffer that event."79 
Villeroy, through w h o  m most of the Consulate's correspondence 
with Versailles was channelled, watched all this with rising anger. The 
time had come, he believed, for military action. If unadorned royal 
authority as exercised by the controller general and his intendants 
was insufficient to get the city its grain, then royal bayonets might 
prove more effective. H e appears to have reached this conclusion 
sometime around 18 or 19 April.80 O  n the twentieth he wrote Roche­
bonne with crisp orders: "The Lyon Regiment departs tomorrow 
for Lyon. Detach 300 m e n with the two companies of grenadiers to 
compose this number." H  e ordered Rochebonne to divide the de­
tachment, sending one part d o w n the Rhone, the other up the Saone. 
H  e instructed him also to write the intendants in the targeted prov­
inces with requests for supplies.81 Villeroy wrote the same day to 
Desmaretz, informing him of his decision and announcing that he 
had established a special courier service to speed correspondence 
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between city and court.82 Desmaretz raised no objection to the use 
of force.83 
Ravat and his colleagues were revived by this apparent deliverance. 
T h e regiment had no sooner arrived in L y o n o n the twenty-sixth 
than it was dispatched the next day to its destination.84 Its purpose 
was to prevent or suppress any efforts on the part of native popula­
tions in the towns along both rivers to block the loading and ship­
ment of the city's grain. In only t w o days the soldiers reached Gray, 
where flustered officials dipped into Abondance grain to feed them 
and sent yet another delegation to the intendant in Besangon asking 
to keep the grain.85 Le Guerchois ordered it liberated forthwith, 
and the quittances releasing it were finally signed by the consuls of 
the town on 5 M a y . 8 6 B y that time, part of the detachment had al­
ready travelled to A u x o n n e , w h e n c e it accompanied s o m e 1,200 
anees of wheat d o w n the Saone to L y o n . 8 7 Including the grain from 
Gray, the city was able to m o v e 9,218 anees d o w  n the Saone in late 
April and early M a y , enough to feed the Lyonnais for at least six 
weeks . 8 8 Troops in the south, however, were less successful. Only 
1,500 anees climbed the R h o n e in April and M a  y despite the presence 
of soldiers.89 Given the amounts upon which Desmaretz and Ravat 
had agreed at the beginning of April, there still remained over 6,700 
anees in various Saone ports, and at least 9,800 on the R h o n e .  9  0 
Villeroy's soldiers had given the city s o m e breathing space, but they 
had not succeeded in liberating all the city's grain. 
For the hospitals, the problem in April was not so m u c h the liber­
ation of old grain as the acquisition of n e w supplies. A s was their 
habit, they sent their o w n buyers into Burgundy in a vain search for 
wheat while at the same time requesting the various directors of the 
Abondance to act for them. H o  w difficult that search could be was 
expressed with great anguish by one of those buyers, sieur Chazel, in 
a letter that captures better than most the essence of the crisis m e n  ­
tality in the countryside: 
I a  m obliged to tell you that it is useless at present to think of buying 
grain in Burgundy, Franche-Comte and Champagne. Those w h o have 
grain fear to offer a price because they do not wish to sell. If you offer 
them 40 ecus for a load they want 50, and if you offer them 50 ecus 
they say that they will sell but under several conditions, which are 
first that you have to have an express order from the intendant of the 
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province that permits you to export the grain, that you remove the 
grain from the granaries at your o w n risk, that you come armed and 
try to force open their doors which they hold closed so that the peo­
ple think it is being taken from them by force and thus save them­
selves from the fear of having their houses burnt down, and on con­
dition that you pay for the grain before taking it from the granaries. 
O  n top of all that they do not wish to make any sale nor contract in 
writing because they fear the impots and so it is necessary to depend 
on their word which many do not keep.91 
Chazel concluded, with considerable understatement, that "these 
conditions appear difficult to execute." O n  e wonders after reading 
such an account h o  w m a n  y incidents of violence in the countryside 
were merely methods of disguising legitimate oral contracts. 
F r o  m agents in the provinces, from the controller general himself, 
the message was the same. L y o n could expect to procure very little 
grain in France until the barley and buckwheat crops, planted in such 
abundance through late M a r c h and April, could be harvested in the 
fall.92 T h  e directors of the Abondance realized as early as 7 April that 
a n e  w source had to be found outside of France. Trudaine suggested 
that Lyonnais and Marseillais merchants pool their resources to buy 
grain in the Levant, and the controller general expressed great enthu­
siasm for the idea.93 Yet, neither city shared in the enthusiasm, and 
Barthalon's efforts to deal with the Compagnie d'Afrique continued 
to be hampered by the Marseillais.94 Italy seemed a m o r e likely pos­
sibility. Indeed, it is possible that the city had agents in G e n o  a as early 
as the end of April, though the m e  n w h  o purchased grain there for 
the city at that time m a y simply have been there on other business.95 
Unfortunately, the grain they purchased had the disadvantage, like 
all grain from the south, of being expensive to buy and even more 
expensive to ship. Rising prices and the accompanying losses in sub­
sidized sales to the bakers forced the Abondance on 8 M a y to raise the 
price of bread from 2 sous to 2V2 sous per pound, a 25 percent increase 
in an already high price.96 
This rise in price resulted in Lyon's second incidence of violence 
on the twelfth. Ravat reported a "tumult which began yesterday at 
noon by several w o m e  n w h  o assembled in front of m  y house, crying 
that they did not want the price to go up. W  e took two m e n from 
amongst these w o m e n w h o were inciting them to m a k e this disorder 
and one of the more animated w o m e  n w h  o spoke only of killing and 
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burning, [after which] the crowd dissipated and the noise ceased sud­
denly." After a time, theprevot attempted to have his prisoners moved 
to jail. "That renewed the commotion. T h e arquebusiers were not the 
strongest, and the people showered them with stones. They were 
obliged to give up and abandon these three rebels in order to save 
their o w  n lives." Fortified by their victory over the "garots," the 
crowd reassembled in front of Ravat's house and again began vio­
lently protesting the price rise. "In front of them was a silk worker 
with stones in his pocket and a knife in his hand." H  e was arrested 
and taken into theprevot's house for questioning while a larger detach­
ment of arquebusiers charged the crowd and dispersed it "by force of 
arms."9 7 
This time Ravat m a d e no effort to blame the rural poor for the 
disturbance. Misery engendered by lack of w o r k was the cause, and 
prompt and severe punishment was necessary in order to "hold them 
to their duty." T h  e prevot urged the controller general to give Tru­
daine judicial authority over those arrested in the disturbances, be­
cause he feared that the judges of the Senechaussee would intervene 
and prove too lenient.98 This attitude of severity was by no means 
unusual for magistrates of the Old Regime, nor was it necessarily 
inconsistent with feelings of sympathy and pity. Ravat believed that 
only harsh examples would keep the misery from overwhelming 
and destroying all semblance of order, society, and authority. 
Interestingly, nowhere in any letter did he or any other magistrate 
from Lyon bother to remark on the preponderant role of w o m e  n in 
all these disorders. That w o m e  n should dominate bread riots in the 
Old Regime was hardly surprising. T h e purchase of bread for the fam­
ily was their responsibility. They knew the bakers, knew the proper 
price and quality of bread. T h  e nutritional maintenance of the fam­
ily was for them a point of pride as well as of necessity, and a mea­
sure of status. Authorities in Lyon and elsewhere were reluctant to 
arrest w o m e  n fighting for the survival of their children, as long as 
they did not destroy property.99 Certainly, the magistrates of Lyon 
downplayed their role, consistently looking for those few m e n in the 
crowds w h o  m they firmly believed responsible for leading the w o m e n  . 
Such disorders, piled on top of the inability to procure grain in 
either north or south, forced the Consulate to study seriously a 
memoire prepared and submitted late in M a  y by a Milanese mer­
chant resident in Lyon, Jean-Baptiste Castigliony. Despite his Italian 
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origin, or perhaps because of it, Castigliony had been a m e m b e  r of 
the merchant community in Lyon for several years and had served as 
a judge on the Conservation.100 In his memoire, the Italian merchant 
reviewed Lyon's unenviable situation, noting the impossibility of 
drawing grain from the city's "accustomed sources" and the need to 
procure supplies overseas. H  e argued that the city needed to ensure 
its subsistence beyond 1709 up to the harvest of 1710, since that of 
1709 promised only "small grains," if that. H  e argued further that 
Italy was "the best country for furnishing the necessary amount, not 
only because of its proximity but also because of a promising harvest 
there." A  n individual "whose integrity, spirit, and good tempera­
ment are recognized" should be chosen and sent with full authority. 
This individual, he argued, "must not be French," because of diffi­
culties in travel for a Frenchman due to the war, and because of the 
need to speak Italian fluently. Castigliony closed his memoire by urg­
ing the need for quick action before another fall and winter wors­
ened the chances and increased the price of transport.101 
T h e magistrates of Lyon accepted every argument in the memoire. 
Castigliony was deputized on 23 M a  y as an agent of the city and au­
thorized to travel wherever the search for grain might take him. T h e 
Consulate conferred "full power to write letters of exchange in the 
names of the pre'vot des marchands and echevins on Matthieu Delafont, 
former echevin and presently a director of the Abondance." They 
promised "to agree to and ratify all that he might do in consequence 
of the present deputation."102 It was a blank check. Castigliony set 
out for his native Italy with a self-made mission to feed a city of 100,000 
for two years. N  o one in Lyon in the spring of 1709 could possibly 
have predicted the mixed blessings that this all-important mission 
would bring in the months to come . 
Crisis of Delay

Castigliony departed a city in the throes of economic collapse. Efforts to restore the economy were delayed by the refusal of 
Samuel Bernard and his creditors to c o m  e to terms and by a con­
tinued lack of demand for manufactured goods. This last owed m u c h 
to the crisis itself, which m a d e food the only imperative. Food, in 
turn, proved as difficult to obtain as it had throughout the year. 
Officials on both rivers continued to resist the passage of grain, to 
postpone shipments, to write endless appeals to Versailles. T h o u g  h 
Castigliony wasted no time once he reached Italy, the distance was 
great, and the grain had yet to be collected, boats hired, or arrange­
ments made . T h e late spring and s u m m e r of 1709 were times of wait­
ing, worrying, and suffering in Lyon. A crisis that had begun with a 
sudden gust of icy wind lingered endlessly in the s u m m e r heat. 
For his part, Samuel Bernard had but one goal in 1709: to extri­
cate himself from his default in Lyon at no personal cost. O  n the 
opposite side of this goal stood his creditors, anxious to prosecute 
him for the full value of his debt in hard cash. Bernard enjoyed two 
advantages over his creditors. H e could count on royal support in 
quashing any effort at judicial recourse, and he could argue that he 
had been robbed by m e  n such as Lullin and Castan, w h  o had specu­
lated fraudulently in his paper and thereby, in his opinion, caused his 
default. His creditors counted on two advantages of their o w n . They 
believed in his need to restore his reputation in order to restore his 
credit, and they had, in writing on every letter of exchange, his signed 
promise to pay in coin on d e m a n d . l As events soon m a d e clear, Ber­
nard's advantages far outweighed those of his creditors. 
Bernard's first advantage was brought h o m e to his creditors almost 
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immediately w h e n Trudaine declared first a two-month, and then a 
three-month moratorium on all prosecutions for debts incurred in 
the Payments of Kings and Easter, 1709.2 Without recourse to the 
Conservation, Bernard's creditors could not hold him to the stipula­
tions in his letters that he must pay in coin. They were forced to ne­
gotiate. Negotiations entailed delays in restoring the Payments, and 
by extension, the econom y of the city. Indeed, they entailed delays 
in the Payments themselves. T h e Payment of Kings was prolonged 
twice, from 1 to 20 M a y , and from 21 M a y to 20 June. T h e Payment 
of Easter, scheduled to begin in June, was delayed to 25 August, and 
the Payment of August was delayed to the end of October.3 Since 
no coin could be exchanged until after a Payment, merchants found 
themselves unable to procure cash. Without hard currency they could 
neither pay nor m a k  e contracts with their workers. 
T h  e negotiations dragged despite the best efforts of Trudaine to 
accelerate them. His trip to Versailles after the default in April bore 
fruit in M a y w h e n he managed to pry another 14 million livres in 
assignations from Desmaretz to help in paying off Bernard's loans.4 
T h e intendant returned to Lyon on 14 M a y and immediately sum­
moned Lullin to his residence for a confrontation lasting eleven hours. 
Trudaine accused the Genevan banker of holding or fraudulently 
alienating a total of 6.7 million livres in mint bills once attached as 
securities to Bernard's letters, and threatened to arrest him if he did 
not turn them all over. Lullin, however, had no intention of giving 
up the bills. Bernard o w e d him a great deal of money . If he simply 
surrendered the mint bills he held, not to mention those he had sold 
and might have to recover, he might then be forced to accept them 
back at face value as payment on the debt he held in Bernard's let­
ters. H  e had already rendered those letters to his solicitor, Clapeyron, 
in preparation for a threatened lawsuit. T h  e bills represented his in­
surance. H  e believed that, sooner or later, Bernard would have to 
negotiate their return. Lullin intended to wait him out and try to 
press him in the courts as soon as the moratoria were lifted.5 
Trudaine, largely to placate Bernard, placed Lullin under the super­
vision of two merchants so as to block any effort at escape to Geneva. 
In reporting his action to the controller general, the intendant pleaded 
with Desmaretz to send someone with the power to negotiate in 
Bernard's n a m e , preferably the banker himself.6 Without such an 
individual present, Trudaine argued, negotiations by correspondence 
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could drag on endlessly. Bernard, of course, had no intention of 
coming to Lyon , where he feared he would be ensnared by the Con­
servation. Delay in negotiations could only help him and hurt his 
creditors, m a n y of w h o  m were in dire straits. W h e  n Desmaretz 
pressed him on the matter, he suddenly and most conveniently took 
ill "with fever and dysentery."7 His doctor confined him to bed, 
from which he could continue to procrastinate and observe the an­
guish of his creditors at a safe distance. 
S o m  e of their anguish resulted not from Bernard's illness, nor even 
from his refusal to negotiate, but rather from a less-than-welcome 
royal intervention in the negotiations. Desmaretz had planned to 
remint and devalue the coinage as far back as the spring of 1708. T h  e 
fortuitous arrival in spring 1709 of a French fleet from America 
bearing millions in silver supplied a wonderful opportunity not only 
to remint and devalue the coinage, but also to retire millions in mint 
bills. O  n 14 M a y  , the royal government decreed that all old coin must 
be surrendered to the mint. Old louis d'or worth 16 livres, 10 sous 
were to be replaced by n e w ones valued at 20 livres. Old ecus at 
4 livres, 8 sous, would yield n e w coins at 5 livres.8 T h e weight of the 
coin would not change substantially. Desmaretz decreed in addition 
that one-sixth of the total rendered to the mint could be in mint bills. 
In devaluing the two major coins of the realm by one-fifth and one-
seventh respectively and by allowing one-sixth of the "coin" to be in 
mint bills, the controller general hoped to retire millions in bills at 
no cost whatsoever to the royal government. 
As the following example helps to illustrate, merchants holding 
mint bills had little choice but to comply. Let us suppose that mer­
chant A has 60 old louis d'or worth 990 livres and 2 ecus worth 8 livres, 
16 sous. H  e renders them to the mint together with 200 livres in mint 
bills. H  e has surrendered a total of close to 1,200 livres in coin and 
paper with the bills as one-sixth of that total. W h e  n the n e  w coins 
are m a d e , he receives a total of 60 n e w louis d'or from the mint, each 
one worth 20 livres, for a total value of 1,200 livres. H e has lost 2 ecus 
and 200 livres in paper in the devaluation. Merchant B, on the other 
hand, has no mint bills. H  e renders 72 old louis d'or (value: 1,180 livres) 
and 3 ecus (value: 13 livres, 4 sous) to the mint for a total of just over 
1,200 livres. Like merchant A , however, he receives only 60 n e w 
louis d'or. H  e has lost 12 louis d'or (old value: 198 livres; n e  w value: 
240 livres). Given the mentalities of French merchants—their abso­
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lute horror of paper and great affection for coin—it is not at all sur­
prising that Desmaretz managed to retire 43 million livres in mint 
bills, while netting the treasury 11 million in n e  w revenue.9 W h a  t is 
surprising is that some 30 million livres in mint bills remained out­
standing, most of them probably in the hands of foreigners lacking 
the coin and therefore the need to surrender them—but some of 
them, of course, in the hands of Bernard's creditors. 
T h  e reminting further delayed and complicated negotiations be­
tween Bernard and his creditors and caused a further decline in the 
m o n e y supply. Those merchants w h o could afford the cost exported 
their money , exchanging it for coin of other states or turning it over 
to counterfeiters w h  o promised a better exchange. Bernard's credi­
tors demanded that he m a k e good in coin at the old rate as, indeed, 
he had promised to do during m a n y negotiations w h e n he last re­
scheduled his debt in January and February.10 T h e reminting also 
threw the question of mint bill values into confusion. Bernard con­
tinued to insist that his creditors accept them in payment on his debt 
at face value without any discount, a demand that only succeeded in 
enraging them. H  e demanded too that three of them—Lullin, Cas-
tan, and Fizeau, another Genevan—should be arrested for fraud in 
selling his mint bills. Lullin in particular was singled out for special 
vituperation in the banker's letters. "Lullin is a wicked m a  n w h  o 
lights a fire under the belly of all Lyon and w h o stirs up all the e m o ­
tions while appearing outwardly peaceful."1' Trudaine successfully 
resisted these demands for a time, arguing that arrests would be coun­
terproductive in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion.'2 
Most of Bernard's creditors faced a host of equally unpalatable 
choices towards the end of M a y  . They could agree to accept payment 
from him in mint bills at face value, but then would have to write 
them off in the reminting. They could accept payment in the assigna­
tions Trudaine had brought from Paris. These, however, would not 
mature for two to three years, and any merchant stuck with them 
would effectively see a large proportion of his assets frozen for that 
period. F e  w could stay in business under such conditions. Like Lul­
lin, they could try to wait and hope that Bernard would be forced to 
bargain on the rate of his mint bills, calculating that no banker could 
afford to keep such an oversupply of his paper in circulation lest it 
lose all value. Yet, even those w h  o chose to wait it out (and Luethy 
argues that m a n y gave up in M a  y and chose the first alternative) 
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were not greatly rewarded.13 Bernard showed no signs of bending 
until 3 June, and then he offered a discount of only 10 percent on his 
bills.14 Even Trudaine judged the offer "unacceptable."15 
T h  e delays and procrastinations of high finance paralyzed the 
Payments and extinguished credit. N o t even the state was i m m u n e . 
W h e n Trudaine was unable to borrow a mere 40,000 livres in L y o n 
to buy grain for the army of Dauphine, he had to pay for it from his 
o w  n pocket.16 Moulins wrote Meissonnier late in June that "debt­
ors don't have a sou. T h  e strongest houses pay nothing. T h  e little 
coin being m a d e by the mint goes to the army and to a few indi­
viduals w h  o will loan it at 24 percent [on the year]."17 Indeed, 24 
percent was a good rate. B y the middle of July, Trudaine reported a 
rate varying between 28 and 32 percent per a n n u m  , a height unheard 
of in the usually stable Payments of L y o n .  1 8 
N  o merchant could afford such rates, and few if any borrowed 
money . T h e lack of activity in their accounts translated directly into 
misery on the streets of the city. Trudaine wrote in mid June that the 
"cessation of silk manufacture [has] produced an infinite n u m b e  r of 
mendicant workers in the city w h o are no longer employed. . . . 
T h e number of these workers without w o r k is so great on the streets 
of Lyon that they cannot even be sustained by charity. . . . T h e mer­
chants cannot find m o n e y  . T h e  y are forced to lay off their workers 
and shut d o w n their looms." Trudaine believed that "only d e m a n d 
can reestablish manufactures in the present situation, and it is greatly 
feared that d e m a n d will not revive soon."19 
There was some debate in late July and early August about whether 
the collapse in the city's e c o n o m y was not due m o r e to a declining 
demand than to negotiations to restore the Payments. Certainly by 
1 August Bernard had managed to reclaim some 20 million livres of 
the 38 million total he o w e d , partly by increasing his offer to dis­
count the mint bills from 10 to 15 percent, partly by depending on 
the desperation of his creditors to extricate themselves and return to 
business. Yet, Lullin "and his cabal" still held out, and the Payment 
of Easter had to be prolonged to 26 August.2 0 
Those, including the merchants of Lyon's C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e , 
w h  o argued that d e m a n d was the chief culprit, pointed to the dismal 
failure of the Beaucaire fair in July.21 T h e fair at Beaucaire, un­
like those of Lyon , was a real commercial fair where goods of all 
kinds were normally displayed and orders placed. Ravat reported on 
H4 1709: Year of Trial 
2 August that "the fair at Beaucaire was deserted. Those w h o went to 
receive deliveries found a drought so great that they returned with­
out having accomplished anything."22 Baville and Le Bret reported 
in similar terms.23 T h e C h a m b e r argued that if the demand existed, 
"the price of m o n e y would not prevent production because on rich 
and precious cloth, this increase would be imperceptible."24 With 
remarkable disregard for their hard-pressed colleagues, the deputies 
of the C h a m b e r argued further that those w h o had been compro­
mised in the affairs of Bernard deserved their fate. "There are only a 
certain number of ambitious people w h  o find themselves in trouble." 
Rejecting all efforts at outside interference, the C h a m b e  r argued 
that the best road to restoration of the Payments was one of quiet, 
private negotiation.25 
Merchants negotiated, workers suffered. Through the summer and 
into the fall, the poor continued to fill the streets. "They fill our 
streets from end to end," wrote Ravat. " W h e  n one gives alms there 
are a hundred hands there to receive it." H  e reported that m a n  y had 
sold everything to buy bread and pay rent. Failing in the latter, they 
had no recourse but the streets. There they begged "at first with 
modesty," but after several days, "they become insolent."26 O  n 13 
September, the prevot noted the "closing d o w n of work, the total 
shortage of wine, of w o o d  , of coal, and of all things necessary to 
life."27 T h e only news that could have proven worse than the con­
tinued depression in the economy would be a continuing failure to 
procure grain. With a sort of inevitability that palled over the city 
through the long s u m m e r of 1709, such failures became a regular fea­
ture of life in Lyon. T h e s u m m e r of discontent stretched beyond the 
walls of the city into the provinces and beyond. 
T h e great hopes that accompanied Castigliony on his mission dis­
sipated through June and July in the frustrations of delay. This was 
not Castigliony's fault. H  e appears to have been diligent in his efforts, 
but his task was substantial. N o regular seaborne trade existed be­
tween Lyon and northern Italy. T h e raw silk that supplied the city's 
manufactures travelled overland through Savoy and the mountain 
passes of Dauphine, often arriving by wagon over the Guillotiere 
bridge.28 Overland transport of large quantities of grain was, h o w ­
ever, utterly impractical, even given the inflated prices of 1709. Cas­
tigliony thus faced a daunting task. H  e had first to locate and con­
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tract with various Italian merchants and landholders simply to collect 
the grain. T h e n he had to find and contract with boatmen willing to 
carry the supplies along the coasts of Italy and France and up the 
R h o n e . It was a hazardous and arduous journey, fraught with the 
additional perils of potentially hostile English warships.29 
O n the French side, the Consulate began w o r k in early June to 
procure passports freeing the Italian grain from import duties and 
fees and to find a French port where the grain could be processed 
quickly. Marseilles was out of the question. T h e Lyonnais feared the 
same problems there that they had suffered in towns throughout the 
region; they also dreaded the quarantine requirement on all incom­
ing grain designed to protect against plague. This problem was solved 
w h e n city and crown agreed on a small, little-used port at the m o u t h 
of the R h o n e , Tour de Bouc . Tour de Bouc appeared perfect for the 
needs of the city. It lacked any quarantine facilities and was legally 
open to Italian grain.30 
Having procured passports and a suitable port, the city had still to 
insure against stoppages on the R h o n e . T h e magistrates of Lyon , 
painfully aware of h o  w easy such stoppages could be, appealed to 
Desmaretz to discipline the intendants accordingly. T h  e controller 
general responded with a series of stern letters to Baville, Le Bret, 
and d'Angervilliers through June and July, warning them that the 
grain bound for L y o n "must not be troubled or delayed . . . because 
the least mishap . . . would reduce the city to famine and cause terri­
ble disorder there."31 Le Bret answered that he had sent the strictest 
orders to the cities involved not to interfere, and Baville reminded 
the controller general that he still had the m a y o r of Beaucaire incar­
cerated. H  e would brook no interference.32 
While they waited and worked to prepare for their Italian grain, 
the Lyonnais continued to chip away at supplies still retained in Bur­
gundy. T h o u g h the soldiers dispatched in April by Villeroy had not 
enjoyed as m u c h success as all had hoped, they had at least procured 
some supplies. Late in M a y  , the Lyonnais decided to try force again. 
Desmaretz wrote to Chamillart in the latter's capacity as secretary of 
state for war to request the redetachment of the Lyonnais Regiment 
for convoy duty on the Saone.3 3 Chamillart hesitated. H e wrote on 
the thirtieth that the king thought it better to detach troops from 
a garrison at Gray for the task.34 Desmaretz agreed on 3 June, but 
again Chamillart hesitated.35 T h e reason soon became clear. O n the 
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seventh he was summarily ordered by Louis X I V to retire to his 
estates in disgrace. For reasons unrelated to the grain crisis, the city's 
old adversary had at last been removed from office.36 Villeroy exulted 
in Chamillart's disgrace. Writing in his o w  n hand to Rochebonne, 
he erupted, "Thanks to G o d w e are suddenly delivered from Cha­
millart!"37 For the Lyonnais, the n e  w secretary of state for war, Daniel 
Francois, comte de Voysin, represented a considerable improvement. 
Villeroy counted himself "very m u c h a friend of Monsieur Voysin," 
and the n e w minister was related by marriage to both Desmaretz 
and Trudaine.38 Unfortunately, the change in ministers portended a 
further delay in sending troops while Voysin settled into his n e  w 
office. Orders did not go out to the garrison at Gray until 14 June, 
and the troops did not depart the town until the twenty-second, 
almost a mont  h after the idea had first been suggested.39 
T h  e relative success or failure of this second effort at military co­
ercion is difficult to determine. Four hundred twenty soldiers did 
arrive in Auxonne on 25 June, but the records of the Abondance do 
not mention h o w m u c h grain was delivered in that m o n t h . 4 0 S o m e 
1,561 anees arrived on the Saone in early July, but it is possible that by 
that time most of the troops had been diverted to the R h o n e to pro­
tect Italian barges, which, it was hoped, would soon arrive.41 If in­
deed the Consulate hoped to procure further supplies from Burgundy 
after the initial arrivals in early July, such hopes were soon dashed by 
the Burgundians themselves. 
T h e Estates of Burgundy were soon to convene in their triennial 
session.42 Desmaretz was aware in advance that the Estates would 
strenuously oppose Lyonnais demands on the province. H  e warned 
Ravat on 20 July to muzzle the city's agents in Burgundy. "In the 
present state of affairs, I predict that you will have m u c h trouble, 
above all during the session of the Estates of Burgundy, in obtaining 
restitution [of grain]."43 
Indeed, on that very same day, the governor of Burgundy, Louis, 
due de Bourbon-Conde, wrote the controller general at the behest of 
the Estates. "I pray you not to permit the export of any more [grain]. 
Please write to the intendant and forbid him to allow further exports, 
for without this order there will not be enough for seed."44 It was 
one of the duke's very few interventions on behalf of his province 
during the crisis. For their part, the Estates had already complained 
of the damage done the province by the great winter and of the inabil­
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ity of most to pay the taille. They argued that royal demands would 
have to be met, if at all, from receipts on the gabeHe, the salt tax.45 
Their concern about the export of grain derived chiefly from wor­
ries about revenues. In his letter of the twentieth, the due de Bour­
bon asked that Desmaretz restore the octrois on grain on the Saone 
that had been suspended in 1708.46 Since these excise taxes consti­
tuted one of the principal sources of income for most of the Saone 
port towns, their suspension bred considerable financial hardship. 
T h  e controller general probably responded to these requests in the 
negative. While there are no copies of his responses in the archives 
of his office, there are the repeated requests of the Burgundians, and 
it is evident that they went unfulfilled.47 It does appear, however, 
that the Estates enjoyed at least temporary success in reducing grain 
exports. There is virtually no mention at all of Burgundy in Ravat's 
correspondence from mid July to mid August, and the records of 
the Abondance show only 425 ane'es arriving from Burgundy in the 
latter month , the lowest total of the entire crisis period.48 O n c e the 
Estates had disbanded, of course, buyers from the city again infiltrated 
the province, searching this time to purchase large portions of the 
soon-to-be-harvested barley crop. Ravat argued that such "small grains" 
could help to fill the gap until the arrival of the Italian wheat . 4 9 
Desmaretz acquiesced in this renewed Lyonnais invasion of Burgundy 
on 21 August, encouraging the city with news that "freedom of trade 
is being reestablished day by day."50 T h e Estates had managed no 
more than to buy a month's respite for the province and to force fur­
ther delays on the city. 
T h  e controller general's sudden optimism about the grain trade 
(which contrasted sharply with his pessimism about royal finances) 
m a y have stemmed from efforts to draw large supplies from over­
seas.51 In southern France, Trudaine's project to import large quan­
tities of grain from the Levant had been underway for some time.52 
T h e controller general had latched on to it with great fervor, writing 
to the Consulate of Lyon , the intendants of Dauphine, Languedoc, 
Provence, and the Estates of Burgundy to encourage them to take 
part. In essence, the plan involved sending agents to Constantinople 
to purchase Black Sea grain that would then be convoyed to M a r  ­
seilles by royal frigates. T h e cost of the latter would, in turn, be borne 
by beneficiaries of the grain.5' All w h  o were asked, including the 
Lyonnais, sent agents to Marseilles, but the Consulate remained very 
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cool to the plan. T h  e magistrates objected to the predominant role 
assigned the merchants of Marseilles and worried about possible de­
lays caused by quarantines. They complained also about the high cost 
of the convoy.54 
Though they gave those arguments to the controller general, the 
more likely reason for their refusal to commit to the Levantine proj­
ect was that they had already placed all their bets with Castigliony 
in Italy. Antoine Bouchage, the Abondance director w h  o was sent 
to Marseilles to collaborate on the project, spent only 67,800 livres 
between June and December 1709. Castigliony, by contrast, spent 
746,200 livres in the same period. Sacerdoty, his Genoese subcontrac­
tor, spent an additional 212,600 livres for a total of 958,800 livres.55 
For the Abondance, which had collected a total of 57,552 livres in rev­
enues during the noncrisis year of 1707, such expenses constituted a 
m a m m o t  h burden.56 That the magistrates of Lyon committed any 
m o n e  y at all to the Levantine project is surprising and probably 
amounted to little m o r e than an effort to h u m o r the controller 
general. 
T o support the enormous financial burden of the Abondance, the 
Consulate had publicly to guarantee all its expenses and interests at 
whatever loss "without any consequence for the future," and trans­
ferred 120,000 livres directly to the Abondance accounts in mid July.57 
Even this transfusion failed to stem the financial hemorrhage. In order 
further to insure the solvency of the institution, the magistrates of 
Lyon appealed to the city's elites for private loans at an interest of 
2 percent per Payment, a rate far below that generally being offered. 
T h e merchants of Lyon responded with three separate collective 
loans of 777,534 livres in August, 597,119 in November , and 470,000 
in December. All of the great merchant houses took part, and one 
finds names such as Melchior Philibert, G a c o n , Trollier, Ollivier, 
and Anisson on the lists. Even the prevot himself contributed some 
70,000 livres.58 Ravat complained of the cost in his letters to Des­
maretz. (The enormous impact of these and other financial exer­
tions on the city's institutions is explored more fully in chapter 9.) 
With Burgundy as barren and resistant as ever and the southern 
provinces increasingly occupied with the Levantine project, the city 
looked forlornly through June and July for its Italian grain. Only at 
the end of the latter month did seven barges arrive at Tour de Bouc 
to begin the climb upriver. These originated not with Castigliony, 
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however, but with Melchior Philibert, w h  o had purchased the grain 
in early M a y . *  9 Not until 27 July did news reach Ravat of seven 
more barges, sent this time by Castigliony, which were in transit from 
Toulon. Eight more were soon to reach Toulon. 6 0 Castigliony sent 
word at the same time that 38,000 additional anees of wheat were 
available, but at the extremely high cost of 74 livres per anee.61 Ravat 
asked Desmaretz his opinion of the price, and the latter answered on 
6 August that while the price was high, he saw little alternative "in 
the present circumstances."62 Castigliony was ordered to purchase 
the additional grain. 
B  y 15 August, fifteen barges filled with Italian grain finally lay at 
anchor at the m o u t h of the R h o n e , ready to begin the voyage to the 
city. There they remained, for yet another exasperating obstruction 
had arisen to delay the city's Italian deliverance. This one was nei­
ther financial nor institutional, but physical. Red coral, with its sharp, 
boat-ripping tentacles, had s o m e h o w m o v e d in to block the m o u t h 
of the R h o n e near Tour de Bouc . Ravat exhibited laudable self-
control in patiently asking the controller general to have this n e w ob­
struction cleared.63 Desmaretz acknowledged the problem in his let­
ter of 21 August, implying that royal ships would soon take care of 
it.64 They did not. O  n the twenty-seventh Ravat again wrote the 
controller general. There were n o  w eighteen barges at Tour de Bouc, 
and the coral was still there. Worse , the Abondance granaries were 
nearly empty, and the ration was being cut to three-quarters of a 
pound of bread per person per day.6 5 As if to underline the serious­
ness of this n e w shortage, news arrived from Burgundy that Pinon 
had once again forbidden the export of all grain from Bresse and Bugey 
northeast of L y o n . 6 6 Desmaretz reacted far differently than he had 
in the fall of 1708 w h e n Pinon had issued the same order; this time, 
he acquiesced in the intendant's action. H  e accepted Pinon's argu­
ment that, without such restrictions, the intendant would be unable 
to feed the troops soon to winter in the region.67 T h  e controller gen­
eral did not ignore the plight of the city, however, but wrote twice to 
Pontchartrain, minister of the navy, on 31 August and 5 September, 
pressing him to clear the coral and free the passage of the boats.68 
At last the coral was cleared, and on 13 September, six weeks after 
they had arrived at Tour de Bouc, Castigliony s barges began their 
two-week struggle against the currents of the R h o n e / ' 9 They m a d e 
Lyon on 28 September, four months almost to the day after Jean­
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Baptiste Castigliony had departed on his mission.70 This was to be 
the first of m a n y shipments of Italian grain; by December, the gran­
aries of the Abondance were so full that the Consulate had to store 
some grain in the church of Ainay at the foot of the Presqu'ile.71 B y 
January, the city had acquired so m u c h that it was actively selling sup­
plies to the royal government for the army. 7 2 
For the Consulate, the struggle to procure a steady grain supply 
had been a long and expensive one. For the working and nonwork­
ing poor of Lyon, it had been m u c h too long. T h e delays of spring 
and s u m m e r wore d o w n the once lively crowds of the city, leaving 
m e n , w o m e n , and children silenced both by hunger and by life in 
the streets. Ravat was fully aware of the suffering; it filled his letters 
to Versailles as he beseeched royal aid again and again. Only once, 
however, did the magistrates of Lyon m a k e any effort to alleviate 
the essential problem of unemployment. O  n 23 July, they prepared a 
memoire for the controller general's consideration in which they put 
forward an idea of the prevot for a two-tiered price for rationed bread. 
They proposed "to sell bread to the rich at a slightly higher price than 
that of the poor, that is to say three deniers per pound more . "73 T h e 
extra m o n e y would be used either to feed those w h o had been thrown 
out of work or could be "turned over to the merchants to give them 
w o r k . " 7 4 
T h e method by which this plan was announced was unusual. 
Throughout the crisis, the Consulate had acted independently on 
such issues, informing rather than consulting Versailles. That they 
n o  w chose to consult, and that they attributed the plan explicitly to 
the prevot rather than collectively to the Consulate as a whole, sug­
gests the possibility of disagreement over it. Ravat was not himself a 
merchant as were the other echevins, and their opposition m a  y help 
to explain w h  y this plan was never adopted. Certainly, Desmaretz 
reacted negatively, judging the plan "difficult to carry out," and some 
merchants in Lyon evidently considered the amount that might be 
collected from such an operation insufficient to begin operations.75 
T h  e plan remains of interest nevertheless for its striking modernity. 
Not only was Ravat proposing a progressive price scale for bread, 
but he proposed to use the extra funds as an early form of unemploy­
ment insurance tax to subsidize industry and boost employment. It 
was another, if overly ambitious, sign of the willingness of local offi­
cials to improvise in the face of daunting problems. 
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Lacking w o r k and any plan to put them to work , Lyon's u n e m ­
ployed were left to the rationing system, assuming they could c o m e 
up with the m o n e y , or to the charity of the Aumone-Generale. T h e 
latter institution managed to keep grain supplies coming, writing 
repeatedly to Villeroy for his help and pressing agents such as Chazel 
to keep up the search.76 T h e extent of assistance the hospital sup­
plied after M a y is not k n o w n until N o v e m b e r , w h e n Villeroy him­
self put the number of those receiving aid at between seven and eight 
thousand.77 B y that time, however, the harvest in barley and buck­
wheat had arrived, and the grain crisis had ended. 
Even for those receiving the Aumone the hardship was great. T h e 
Consulate judged the amounts received to be "insufficient," and m a n y 
searched to supplement their meager rations. For those in Lyon w h  o 
could scrape together a few sous by selling whatever belongings they 
retained or by begging, the only alternatives to the Aumone were 
either the bakers of Lyon or the forains w h  o came from outside the 
city. Most of the former were tightly confined by the consular ordi­
nances of 10 and 30 April, which forbade them from making any but 
black bread, fixed the price, and imposed regular, hostile inspections 
by quarter officials.78 T h e bakers had brought such controls on them­
selves by such acts as selling their Abondance grain to individuals at a 
profit, using all their grain to m a k  e expensive white bread, or mixing 
in all manner of stuff to stretch out supplies and incomes.79 
They chafed under the restrictions, and in early fall 1709, peti­
tioned the Consulate to lift them. In their petition, they complained 
especially about the five bakers exempted from the rationing system. 
T h e five were accused of using all their grain to m a k e black bread, 
which they then sold at a price 33 percent higher than that fixed for 
the rest of the community. T h e y complained in addition that the 
Abondance grain gave their bread a peculiar taste which drove away 
customers. Interestingly, this is the only time that such a complaint 
appears in the record, and it is difficult to judge its veracity without 
further evidence. A  s for the forains "all the poor artisans to w h o  m 
are given the ration cards no longer buy but instead purchase bread 
that is carried in from outside and which is sold at a price lower than 
that fixed by the police."80 Whether this petition resulted in the end 
of the rationing system is not k n o w n , since no document indicates 
any date for its conclusion. It does serve, however, to fix our atten­
tion on theforains. 
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T h e role of theforains in the crisis remains one of its most fascinat­
ing mysteries. They emerge from the records only once, at the end 
of July, w h e n the rate of disease in Lyon began to climb, and rumors 
spread that poison in the bread of theforains was at fault.81 T h e C o n ­
sulate reacted swiftly to the rumors, appointing four "commissioners 
of health" to investigate and forbidding any "seditious discourse" or 
"false rumors" about the "entry into the city of bread from neigh­
boring towns."8 2 T h e Consulate further ordered that no one was to 
interfere in any w a  y with the entry into the city of any grain or any 
bread on pain of a 150-livre fine and "exemplary punishment."83 
T h  e double standard applied in favor of theforains was never m a d e 
more explicit. While strict supervision and regulation applied to the 
bakers of Lyon, the peddlers w h  o rolled their carts into Lyon each 
day suffered virtually no supervision at all. It is entirely possible, 
therefore—even probable—that some of the "bread" they hawked to 
the poor was indeed poisonous. Certainly they must have carried in 
some concoctions such as fern bread or bracken bread that officials 
in the countryside blamed for so m a n y deaths there.84 It is likely too 
that the poor of Lyon had little choice but to buy their product and 
risk the sorts of illnesses and diseases it might entail. Not to do so 
could m e a n starvation. 
That illness increased in the city there is no doubt. Mortality began 
to increase in Lyon in August and remained high for the remainder 
of the year, despite increasing supplies of grain. T h  e Lyonnais only 
began to pay the ultimate price for the Great Winter 01*1709 the fol­
lowing autumn. They continued to pay through the beginning of 
the n e w year. 
PART THREE

Victims and Victors


The Dying Time

The dying time in Lyon always began in August. In a given year, burials from that month through October, only one-quarter of 
the year, constituted better than one-third of the city's annual deaths.* 
Mortality normally swelled over 62 percent from July to August 
alone, rising from an average of 117 deaths in the former to 190 in the 
latter month. Figure 8.1 illustrates this increase, and a corresponding 
decline in the average number of marriages and conceptions during 
these same months. 
During the crisis period, the rhythm of conceptions, marriages, 
and deaths differed from the average mostly in degree. Figure 8.2 con­
firms that conceptions and marriages rose and fell with their usual 
monthly rhythms from August 1708 through March 1710. T h e fall in 
conceptions in June and July was, however, far more pronounced 
than usual, and the number of babies conceived in September was 
only half the usual number for that month. T h e number of marriages 
likewise remained lower than normal through most of the crisis year, 
and the usual increases before Lent and Advent were not so pro­
nounced as during a normal year. Mortality also followed its usual 
monthly pattern during the crisis (figure 8.3), but with two excep­
tions. O n e was a slight rise during the great winter, already discussed 
in chapter 4. T h e other was a dramatic rise in August continuing 
through November and December of 1709 and into the n e w year. 
Indeed, burials did not again regain normal levels until March 1710. 
By that time, Lyon had suffered a serious mortality crisis. 
Figure 8.4 combines all three factors for the crisis period, 1708-1710. 
For six months, from August 1709 through January 1710, deaths far 
surpassed conceptions in Lyon. September represented the height of 
the demographic imbalance. In those parishes studied, 366 people 
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FIG. 8.1 Average number of conceptions, burials, and marriages in Lyon, 
August through March, 1703-1707 and 1711-1715. 
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Source: Parish registers of Lyon. 
died in that month alone, while only 100 were conceived. In all six 
months, 1,644 people died, more than twice the average of 659 in 1703 
and 1715. This period obviously is of greatest interest in analyzing 
the demographic impact of the crisis and presents several interesting 
questions. Did people die at the same age during the period of high 
mortality as during a more normal year? Did death c o m e to one sex 
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FIG. 8.2 Average number of conceptions and marriages in normal years 
compared to actual number of conceptions and marriages from 
August 1708 to March 1710. 
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FIG. 8.3 Average number of burials in normal years compared to actual 
number of burials from August 1708 to March 1710. 
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FIG. 8.4 Actual number of conceptions, marriages, and burials in Lyon 
from August 1708 to March 1710. 
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more than to another or to one occupation group more than another? 
W a  s there some difference between the city's urban parishes and its 
faubourgs or between Lyon and towns in its region? Only by an­
swering those questions and by searching out those groups in the 
population w h o were most affected can one hope to gauge the social 
impact of the crisis. 
T h  e parish registers of baptisms, marriages, and burials supply the 
data. In m a n y parishes, the city's priests were remarkably thorough, 
detailing the age at death a m o n g newborns d o w n to the number of 
hours. They also generally gave some occupation for virtually every 
male or for the husband or father of every female. Unfortunately, 
the wealth of these registers is such that no single researcher can hope 
to gather all the information contained there. Sampling techniques, 
which have been successfully employed in surveying patterns over 
the whole of the eighteenth century by Maurice Garden and his stu­
dents in Lyon, would be of little use for the shorter period covered 
here because the numbers would be too small. Given the need for a 
manageable data base, I have chosen to concentrate m  y o w  n inquiry 
around questions of mortality, since it was the rise and duration of 
mortality that was the most striking aspect of the demographic crisis 
of 1709. This has permitted m  e to examine fully data from six par­
ishes in Lyon. These include Saint-Nizier, the city's largest parish, 
which alone counted nearly half its total population in the early eigh­
teenth century; Saint-Paul, one of L y o n s wealthiest parishes; Saint-
Georges, one of its poorest; and Saint-Vincent, h o m e to a variety of 
artisanal trades. Also included are the city's two largest faubourgs, 
La Guillotiere and Vaize, as well as the hospital of the Charite.2 As 
with the figures cited in chapter 4, the years 1703 and 1715 have been 
used for comparisons. 
As the age pyramids (figures 8.5 and 8.6) indicate, the highest pro­
portion of those dying at any time in Lyon, crisis or not, were chil­
dren. In a normal year, those under age 10 contributed over two-
thirds of total deaths. Even that proportion must be judged too low 
given the Lyonnais habit of sending newborns to the countryside 
to be nursed. Garden demonstrated the prevalence of this practice 
a m o n g all classes in Lyon and estimated that two-thirds of the in­
fants sent to be nursed did not survive the ordeal.3 Figure 8.6 illus­
trates this practice by breaking d o w  n child mortality into smaller age 
groups. It shows a relatively high mortality for newborns not yet sent 
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F I G  . 8.5 Mortality rates by^age and sex in L y o  n during crisis and 
noncrisis years. 
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to wetnurses, followed by a decline in the deaths of children aged 
1 month to 1 year, which represents their absence from the city. Once 
they returned, mortality again ballooned upward, only to fall gradu­
ally as they grew older. 
It is important to remember that the use of percentages masks a 
higher mortality for all groups. A great m a n y more children died in 
1709 than in normal years, but the crisis was proportionately kinder to 
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F I G . 8.6 Mortality rates by age and sex for children in L y o n during crisis 
and noncrisis years. 
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them, or at least to males. Those aged less than 18 constituted only 
56 percent of the total number of burials during the crisis, 10 percent 
less than in normal years. Age at death a m o n g females barely changed 
at all, however, and baby girls continued to die at the same terrible 
rate as usual. Thus, the only change in mortality w h e n measured by 
age was a slight proportional increase in death a m o n g adult males 
between the ages of 20 and 70. 
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T A B L  K 8.1 Marital status of adult w o m e  n dying in 1703/1715 compared to 
the fall and winter of 1709-1710 
1703/1715 Fall/Winter 0/1709-1710 
Married 44% 35% 
Widows 30% 35% 
Unknown, Presumed 
Single 25% 29% 
Nuns 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source. Parish registers ofLyon 
While age at death a m o n g w o m e n did not change, death a m o n g 
single w o m e  n did increase. This conclusion rests in part on specula­
tion, since one cannot be entirely sure that an adult w o m a  n not as­
signed a spouse in the registers (and for w h o  m the only occupation 
listed was that of a father) was necessarily single. It is certain that 
widows were single, and death a m o n g them as a proportion of the 
total did increase. Table 8.1 tells the tale. If those whose married sta­
tus is " u n k n o w n " were mostly single, then mortality a m o n g w o m e n 
without a male partner increased by nearly 10 percent during the 
crisis. Given the vulnerability of single w o m e  n to economic disasters 
at any time in the Old Regime, increased mortality during a subsis­
tence crisis is hardly surprising.4 
W h a t is surprising about mortality in Lyon is the relative propor­
tion of rich and poor. Even defining such terms poses perilous meth­
odological problems, since the cures of Lyon classified their dead 
with over 270 different occupations. In gathering various occupations 
into defined groups, I have relied upon socio-professional categories 
delineated in the works of Maurice Garden, Adeline D a u m a r d , and 
Louis Henry. 5 Even with such guidance, however, the process is 
fraught with difficulties, since the terminology employed by the cures 
could vary from parish to parish, or even from priest to priest in the 
same parish. W h e r e there has been substantial doubt about the sta­
tus of an individual, I have judged it better to exclude the case alto­
gether. Likewise, the cures of some parishes sometimes grew care­
less, especially during periods of high mortality, and neglected to mark 
occupations for some individuals. H o w m u c h this practice m a y skew 
the results of analysis, and in what direction, cannot be k n o w n . 
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FIG. 8.7 Mortality rates by occupation group in Lyon during crisis and 
noncrisis years. 
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These qualifications aside, there is nevertheless a wealth of reli­
able information. W h e  n divided into eleven separate groups, the data 
yield figure 8.7. It shows only a slight proportional increase in deaths 
a m o n  g the "working poor" of Lyo  n (those in the first six groups) 
during the crisis, with silk workers absorbing the largest increase and 
merchants enjoying a corresponding diminution. T h  e proportion of 
deaths a m o n  g artisans other than silk workers, w h  o constituted m u c  h 
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the largest proportion of the population in all years, hardly changed 
at all. If, however, the artisans are themselves divided into eight cate­
gories for analysis (figure 8.8), they present a different picture. Textile 
workers suffered m o r  e relative to other trades, while the propor­
tion of deaths a m o n  g tailors and those in the construction and print­
ing trades actually declined slightly from normal during the crisis. 
T h  e various textile trades, in combination with the silk workers, con­
stituted Lyon's largest and, in 1709, its hardest-hit group. That they 
suffered a proportionately higher mortality can be expected. That 
the total increase relative to other groups was so small—approximately 
5 percent—is unexpected, and suggests that efforts by the city to sus­
tain them m a y have enjoyed some success. O n c e again, the propor­
tions do mask large numbers. T h e artisans of Lyon did not increase 
their proportion relative to other groups, but they did maintain it in 
a period of m u c  h higher mortality. 
Since the greatest change between crisis and noncrisis periods oc­
curred within two well-defined groups, silk workers and merchants, 
a more detailed examination of these groups is possible. Figures 8.9 
through 8.12 break d o w n each group by age and sex and show pro­
portional changes between crisis and noncrisis mortality. T h  e silk 
workers share m a n y of the same trends with the general population, 
save for a more pronounced mortality a m o n g children. A s with the 
general population, older males suffered a higher mortality rate rela­
tive to younger ones during the crisis. In contrast to the remainder of 
the population, however, mortality a m o n g w o m e n in the families of 
silk workers was actually reversed, with baby girls dying in greater 
proportion to older w o m e n  . Figure 8.9 breaks d o w  n child mortality 
a m o n g silk workers and shows that this increase a m o n g baby girls 
was spread fairly evenly through their first year. Whether this dif­
ference can be traced to differing decisions about whether to send 
female babies to wetnurses is difficult to assess. Male children of silk 
workers between 1 m o n t  h and 1 year of age also suffered higher m o r  ­
tality relative to older children. Since those w h  o died at these ages 
died at h o m e , they likely suffered from the malnutrition of their moth­
ers. Given a ration of one pound of bread per day, nursing mothers 
(or wetnurses within the city, for that matter) probably could not 
produce enough milk to feed one infant, let alone more than one. 
That any infants at all survived in poor households in Lyon during 
the crisis is extraordinary. 
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F I G . 8.8 Mortality rates by artisanal occupation group in Lyon during 
crisis and noncrisis years. 
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F I G . 8.9 Mortality rates by age and sex for silk workers in L y o n during 
crisis and noncrisis years. 
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T h  e merchants tell a different story. Death a m o n  g children of both 
sexes decreased as a proportion of the total, and the slack was taken 
up by both males and females aged 20 to 50. Younger merchants tended 
to involve themselves more than their older, more conservative col­
leagues in the morass of Bernard's debts; they were more likely also 
to be less wealthy and more active than the old and therefore to suf­
fer from greater degrees of stress. Whether these factors necessarily 
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F I G . 8.10 Mortality rates by age and sex for children of silk workers in 
L y o  n during crisis and noncrisis years. 
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left them more open to disease or poor enough to suffer malnutri­
tion is a difficult question. T h e issue of what caused the mortality of 
1709 is explored below. 
It might be argued that this apparent lack of a proportionately 
higher mortality a m o n  g the poor can be traced to their not dying 
in their o w n parish. Richard Gascon and Claude Latta, in their 
brief analysis of mortality in Lyon during the crisis of 1693-1694, 
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FIG. 8.11 Mortality rates by age and sex for merchants in Lyon during 
crisis and noncrisis years. 
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noted a dramatic increase in the number of those admitted to and 
dying at the Hotel-Dieu in Lyon. They assumed that m a n y of these 
patients were poor, but they offered few figures to support their 
argument. 
Registers of entry for the hospital are unfortunately lacking for 
1709, and w e must rely for information on a document drawn up 
long after the crisis, which gives only the total number admitted.6 
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F I G . 8.12 Mortality rates by age and sex for children of merchants in 
L y o  n during crisis and noncrisis years. 
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Table 8.2 summarizes this information. It shows that mortality a m o n g 
the greater number admitted in 1709 was higher than normal, and that 
the crisis lingered into 1710. Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze 
the totals by month, so that comparisons with other data cannot be 
made  . Lack of data does not, however, conceal an essential weakness 
in the argument that the poor dying at the Hotel-Dieu represent a lost 
cohort that might s o m e h o w m a k e the entire mortality picture more 
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T A B U - : 8.2 Number of sick admitted to and dying at the Hotel-Dieu of 
Lyon in normal and crisis years 
Mean, 1711-1720 1709 1710 
Number Admitted 7,031 13 ,106 10 ,966 
Number Deceased 762 (11%) 2 ,481 (19%) 1,583(14%) 
Source. Archives oj the Hotel-Dicu 
comforting to historians convinced that they must have died in 
greater numbers than the rich during a subsistence crisis. There is 
simply no proof that those w h  o died at the Hotel-Dieu were buried 
there. Indeed, regulations concerning burial in one's resident parish 
were seldom more rigidly enforced than during a food crisis, and the 
close proximity of the city's parishes to the hospital makes it all the 
more likely that the Lyonnais w h  o died at the Hotel-Dieu were bur­
ied by their o w  n cures near their o w  n churches with families and 
friends in attendance. 
Thus, while analysis of age, sex, and social patterns of mortality 
reveals differences between crisis and noncrisis periods, these differ­
ences are not very striking. T h e n u m b e r of wealthy merchants did 
decline as a proportion of the total during the crisis, but that decline 
was slight, and a great m a n y m o r e merchants died in 1709 than died 
in a normal year. T h e crisis was not, in short, very selective about its 
victims. Mortality patterns in 1709 differed from normal mostly in 
degree. 
T h e death of small children in the homes of silk workers does serve 
to m a k e the rising tide of abandonments m o r e comprehensible. As 
was shown in chapter 6, abandonments began to rise in the spring 
and reached their peak in late s u m m e r . 7 Naturally, the anonymity of 
the practice precludes any social analysis, but information is avail­
able about the age of those taken in by the hospital. Such data are 
necessarily approximate, since the rectors of the Hotel-Dieu had to 
estimate the age based upon the size and condition of the child. Cer­
tainly, the ample practice offered by the crisis must have improved 
their accuracy. Figure 8.13 illustrates the distribution of abandoned 
children by age over three selected months during the crisis. In April 
1709, w h e n abandonments first began to rise, children below age 3 
constituted 90 percent of the total. B y July, however, older children 
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FIG. 8.13 Actual number and age of children abandoned to the Hdtel-Dieu 
in Lyon in April, July, and September 1709. 
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IABI.K 8.3	 Percentage of survivors and nonsurvivors a m o n  g children 
abandonee 1 in Lyon in April, July, and September, 1709 
Number and Percentage Number and Percentage 
Age OfSurvivors ofNonsurvivors 
April	 0-1 3 3 (3 7%) 57(63%) 
1-3 36(67%) 18(3 3%) 
3-7 13(81%) 3(19%) 
July	 0-1 42(31%) 93(69%) 
1-3 42 (64%) 24(36%) 
3-7 39(72%) 15(28%) 
Sept	 0-1 31 (34%) 61 (66%) 
1-3 47 (60%) 32(40%) 
3-7 2 3 (74%) 8 (26%) 
Totals:	 All Ages 306 (50%) 311 (50%) 
Source. Archives of the Hotel-Dieu 
found themselves abandoned in greater numbers, and those between 
3 and 7 years of age had expanded to m a k e up 21 percent of the total. 
By September, older children and newborns had both declined in 
proportion to those aged 1 to 3. 
Such numbers cannot begin to describe the agony of decision by 
parents too poor to support their o w  n children. In the beginning, 
parents apparently abandoned their youngest children, m a n y of them 
newborns for w h o m an attachment borne of months or years of 
childrearing had not yet been formed. As the crisis lengthened, the 
decisions grew harder, and older children were abandoned. It seems 
that the worst times for such decisions must have passed by Septem­
ber, since the age of those turned over to the Hotel-Dieu declined 
slightly. It is possible that the larger number of children between ages 1 
and 3 abandoned during that month were those returning from wet-
nurses to parents w h  o could neither afford to pay the nurses further 
nor feed them themselves. T h e hospital was the last, and for many, 
the only resort. 
O  f those abandoned in the crisis year, the proportion w h  o sur­
vived remained fairly constant. As table 8.3 demonstrates, only one-
third of those abandoned before their first birthday survived no 
matter when the abandonment took place. T h e odds of survival natu­
rally increased with age as maturing gastrointestinal systems became 
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better able to adapt to a variety of foods. Yet, the percentage of older 
abandoned children w h o died increased from April to September, a 
sign either that they were weaker at the time of their exposure or 
that the foster parents to w h o  m they were sent could not support 
them. 
At any rate, the decision of the poor to abandon their children 
was not taken lightly, nor was it the product of ignorance about the 
Hotel-Dieu. Given that children below age 10 constituted 56 percent 
of all deaths w h e n kept at h o m e during the crisis, their chances were 
not that m u c h worse w h e n abandoned. Indeed, the odds of survival 
m a  y even have been marginally better, at least for older children. 
T h e charitable institutions of Lyon m a d e no secret of the care they 
provided to children in the city, and orphans were constantly paraded 
about to request alms and inspire greater giving a m o n  g the city's cit­
izens.8 W h e  n the poor abandoned their children, they did so in the 
not entirely unfounded belief that those children might be better off, 
or at least no worse off than if they stayed at h o m e . It was the sort of 
harsh life and death decision that became all too c o m m o  n in 1709. 
T h e inference of some historians that the abandonment of chil­
dren was so regular as to be the most effective method of family lim­
itation seems altogether too accepting of the idea that the poor were 
generally hardened to the death of their children.9 In that sense, such 
an interpretation is at best too sanguine and at worst condescending. 
T h e m a n y notes attached to children abandoned in Lyon during the 
crisis year testify to the great sadness and desperation that drove Lyon­
nais families to this extremity.10 That their confidence in the hospi­
tals m a  y sometimes have been justified does not m a k  e the decision 
less tragic. 
Only a very few of these children were ever recovered by their par­
ents. O  f the 451 abandoned before the crisis in 1708, only 7 (1.5 per­
cent) are listed as having been returned to their natural parents. 
O  f 1,973 abandoned in the crisis year, 42 (2.1 percent) were recovered. 
In 1710, as the crisis passed, only 10 (1.6 percent) of 610 were reclaimed. 
T h e hospitals required some proof of identity for reclamation, and 
m a y also have demanded compensation for expenses. Either require­
ment would have m a d e reclamation difficult if not impossible for 
poor families. Those w h  o were not recovered and w h  o managed to 
survive were surrendered to the Charite after age 7. T h  e records of 
that institution (illustrated in figure 8.14) show the delayed impact of 
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.14. Actual number of abandoned children yielded by the Hotel-Dieu 
to the Charite, 1709-1720. 
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the crisis as younger children abandoned in 1709 matured in 1713, 
1714, and 1715.1' 
S o m e of those w h o were abandoned probably came from outside 
the city walls, for mortality in some rural parishes and small towns 
reached astronomical proportions. In the parish of Thisy, the priest 
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buried 13 people in an average year from 1703 through 1708. In 1709, 
he buried 120.12 In the town of Feurs from April 1709 to April 1710, 
the cure buried 305 out of a total population of 1,700, or 18 percent 
of his parishioners in a single year.13 In the town of Villefranche, 
only a few kilometers north of Lyon, 415 were buried from January 
through December 1709, compared to an average of 120 in each of 
the preceding eight years.14 Mortality was naturally uneven in the 
countryside depending on the presence or absence of epidemic dis­
ease, and with a population in motion, sources are not always very 
reliable. A great m a n y must have died on the roads, u n k n o w n and 
unregistered by any parish priest, buried by family members or trav­
elling companions, lost forever in the massive movement of the rural 
poor. 
W  e can be sure that the rural poor constituted a substantial por­
tion of those w h  o died in the towns. In his study of Charlieu, a small 
town near Lyon in the Forez, Dontenwill discovered that at least one-
fourth of all those w h o died were outsiders. T h e priest listed them 
variously as "errants," "vagabonds," and uetrangers."x 5 In Lyon, it is 
more difficult to assess the proportional mortality of the rural poor. 
T h e number of those identified by cures as residing elsewhere re­
mained very small—a total of only 50 during the entire crisis period. 
T h e number of those for w h o m no occupation or place of origin was 
listed, m a n  y of w h o  m might have been outsiders, did increase sub­
stantially during the crisis. In 1703 and 1715, in the six parishes stud­
ied, 367 people (15 percent of the total for those years) were buried in 
this anonymous fashion. In the entire crisis period, the number rose 
to 691,19 percent of a m u c  h higher total. 
M o r e interesting than the number, however, was the seasonal dis­
tribution of these deaths over the crisis year. During the great winter, 
those without occupations constituted 20 percent of the total (61 
people), but during the spring months of March , April, and M a y  , 
w h e n mortality in the city as a whole was relatively low, those with­
out occupations numbered 157, or 36 percent of the total buried in 
those months. Spring, of course, represented the real beginning of 
the crisis, w h e  n Ravat complained most vociferously about the influx 
of the rural poor.16 In addition, the relatively low level of mortality 
during these months reduces the probability that priests were simply 
too busy to identify occupations. During the period of highest mor­
tality (August 1709 to February 1710), the relative proportion of those 
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without any occupation declined to 14 percent. O n c e again, that was 
14 percent of a m u c h higher number, or 258 people. If those marked 
in the registers for burial without any occupations were indeed from 
outside the city, then their increased numbers supply further evi­
dence of a city under siege. 
If registers were available from the Hotel-Dieu for the crisis, they 
would surely be of assistance in gauging mortality a m o n g the rural 
poor, since the origin of those admitted was usually noted. Even with­
out those registers, it is likely that m a n  y of those admitted to the 
hospital came from outside the city, and that some found their w a y 
into the cemeteries of the city's parishes. 
Thus far, in analyzing mortality, Lyon and its faubourgs have been 
considered as a single entity. Yet there were substantial differences. 
T h  e faubourgs did not enjoy the benefits of the Abondance, did not 
partake of the rationing system established by the Consulate in early 
M a y  , and received no assistance from the Aumone-Generale. Despite 
these evident debilities, the faubourgs did not suffer a terrible m o r  ­
tality in 1709. As figure 8.15 illustrates, mortality did exceed the aver­
age in Vaize and La Guillotiere, but the numbers remained relatively 
small. If the percentage by which mortality exceeded the average in 
each month in the faubourgs is compared to that by which it exceeded 
the average within the city, the result is figure 8.16. It shows that m o r ­
tality in the faubourgs was comparatively higher than that inside Lyon, 
that is, that the faubourgs lost a higher n u m b e r compared to their 
usual rate than did the parishes within the walls. This figure also 
shows that the faubourgs tended to anticipate trends within the city 
by one or more months. Thus , the crisis did affect mortality in Vaize 
and La Guillotiere, and the impact was both greater and quicker than 
that within the city, but it did not kill nearly the percentage suffered 
by some of the surrounding rural parishes. 
T h  e figures for the faubourgs, like those for the rest of the city, 
beg the question. W h a  t was the cause of death? H o  w and w h  y did 
the crisis of 1709 kill more people than usually died during these peri­
ods? It is the most difficult question of all, because there are so few 
sources. T h  e cures almost never noted the cause of death in the regis­
ters unless it was accidental or violent—a drowning or a gun shot— 
and even these notations were rare. J. Rousset, in his article on the 
causes of death and disease in early modern Lyon , bemoaned the 
dearth of medical theses, autopsy reports, or medical observations 
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FIG. 8.15 Average mortality by month compared to crisis mortality in the 
faubourgs of Vaize and La Guillotiere. 
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on cases in the city despite the excellent reputation of the Hotel-Dieu. 
H  e was forced to draw most of his conclusions from a few scattered 
medical treatises.17 
Fortunately, the question is not new , and several historians inves­
tigating mortality in various regions of France have m a d  e an effort 
to answer it. S o m  e have focused the question of causality on the two 
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lie;. 8.16 Percentage by which crisis mortality exceeded the mean average 
(1703-1707, 1711-1715) in Lyon and its faubourgs from August 
1708 through March 1710. 
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interrelated categories of malnutrition and "environmental depriva­
tions," while others have preferred to contrast the effects of hunger 
and disease. Efforts to differentiate causes are themselves somewhat 
artificial, however, since nutritional, environmental, and pathogenic 
factors all affected each other and conspired together to murder a 
large number of people. 
Since the crisis of 1709 was first and foremost a food crisis, it might 
be useful to begin by dismissing starvation as a probable cause of 
death. There was some food available to nearly everyone, either by 
w a  y of the rationing system from the bakers, from the Aumone, or 
from theforains w h  o hawked their concoctions in the streets. Actual 
starvation probably would have inspired notice from the cures, at 
least in their brief accounts of the crisis, and neither the cure of Vaize 
nor the cure of Saint-Vincent testified to such an occurrence. T h  e 
lack of real starvation did not, however, preclude widespread mal­
nutrition. F r o  m the end of April until at least the middle or end of 
September, the majority of Lyonnais subsisted on one pound of bread 
per day. T h e Lyonnais pound weighed approximately 419 grams, 30 
less than the corresponding pounds of Paris and Geneva. If 450 grams 
of wheat bread contained close to 1,050 calories, then the Lyonnais 
pound would have contained less, somewhere between 950 and 1,000 
calories.18 Without any supplements, such an amount was one-third 
less than the m i n i m u m judged necessary by most modern nutrition­
ists to sustain any degree of health, or indeed, life itself. In normal 
times, the Lyonnais could hope to boost their caloric intake with 
small amounts of meat, lysine-rich lentils, or the wine they liked to 
drink in such prodigious quantities. Unfortunately, such supplements 
were in short supply in 1709 and completely beyond the reach of man y 
w h  o could not even afford the smallest amounts of rough bread.19 
Paradoxically, inadequate amounts of wheat bread m a y have been 
more harmful than no food at all. W h e a t is low in the protein re­
quired by the body for cell and tissue replacement and for glucose 
production. With no food at all, the body ceases to break d o w n its 
o w  n proteins and instead switches to ketones produced by the kid­
neys to maintain m i n i m u  m life support. A  n adult can thus survive 
for a long period without food.20 But if the body continues to receive 
an inadequate supply of food (such as wheat bread) high in carbohy­
drates and low in proteins, this physiological safety switch fails to 
function, and the body continues to break d o w n its o w n proteins— 
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to feed on itself—in a desperate effort to supplement a useless diet. 
Malnutrition could lower overall body temperature, hindering the 
action of enzymes and the entire i m m u n e system and thereby con­
tributing to an increased risk of infection. T h  e presence of infection 
could drastically increase the need for protein because of a greater 
need of n e w cells and tissue, causing further malnutrition. Such a 
truly vicious cycle easily becomes lethal. A s the weeks and months 
wore on in Lyon, as delay followed delay in restoring the city to eco­
nomic and alimentary health, the population grew gradually weaker. 
Lassitude, anemia, and a steady decline in the ability to resist disease 
combined in a deadly mixture with environmental factors.21 
T h e foremost environmental problem was the lack of hygiene.22 
Chamber pots were emptied into the streets, and the refuse was swept 
from house to house, seeping into the wells that supplied the city's 
drinking water.23 Typhoid fever and bloody dysentery thrived under 
such conditions, and the spread of typhoid was further aided by the 
seasonal flooding of the polluted Saone and the lack of quais in the 
city to hold it back.2 4 Additionally, with the price of wine inflated 
by shortages, those w h  o might ordinarily drink wine instead drank 
ever greater quantities of polluted water.25 Water was not the only 
villain, however. Artisans lived packed together in one room, often 
sleeping in the same bed, itself m a d e of rough feathers or straw cov­
ered by sheets that were never changed.26 B o d y lice flourished there 
and in clothing that was carefully and fatally passed on from person 
to person. Typhus fever travelled with the lice or took to the air in 
the feces of lice, the dust of which seldom escaped the badly venti­
lated rooms. 2 7 Poor ventilation and smoke from fires added a vari­
ety of respiratory diseases to the mix . 2 8 
Artisans never washed, and the working poor lived with varicose 
veins and skin ulcers that worsened with the lack of food and could 
easily become infected.29 A s private granaries emptied and increas­
ing numbers of people turned to the supplies of the Abondance, the 
rats that ordinarily occupied the granaries sought sustenance else­
where, moving closer to people, to w h o  m they could transmit a vari­
ety of diseases. T h  e filth and bacteria increased the threat to n e w  ­
borns, w h  o must have died of umbilical tetanus or from various birth 
defects induced by the malnutrition of their mothers.30 That same 
malnutrition surely contributed to the drop in conceptions as fam­
ine amenorrhoea and male sterility increased.3' 
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Typhoid and typhus were only two a m o n g the m a n y diseases that 
invaded and attacked the Lyonnais. Children succumbed in normal 
years to endemic smallpox, diarrhea, and dysentery, conditions that 
no doubt worsened in the crisis year.32 Malnutrition alone could be 
lethal to the very young because of their greater need of protein for 
rapid growth. Their parents fell victim in autumn to malaria, as mos ­
quitos swarmed in from the backwaters of the Saone and the marshes 
below the Presqu'ile.33 Influenza took its share of the weak , as 
did tuberculosis, which was endemic in all its visible and invisible 
forms throughout France.34 Bacterial dysentery became particularly 
virulent in the fall, especially a m o n  g those w h  o insisted, as they did 
in 1709, on picking and eating various fruits before they were ripe.35 
Dysentery could be extremely contagious, transmitted by touch, on 
clothing, or on bedding. Like all gastrointestinal infections, it pre­
vented the absorption of even the most meager sustenance, killing its 
weakened victims with deadly velocity. 
These environmental and pathological factors became even more 
dangerous with the influx of the rural poor. Natives of the city might 
be expected to have built up a marginal resistance to local bacteria. 
T h  e invasion of n e  w bacteria, of n e  w and different strains of disease, 
could expect deadly success a m o n  g a virgin population, especially one 
battered, as the Lyonnais were, by a shattered economy and u n e m ­
ployment. T h e loss of hope, evidenced by the enormous tide of aban­
donments, must easily have crippled the very will to live. Indeed, the 
cost of the crisis in lives could not match the psychological cost, the 
loss of livelihoods, the endless varieties of brain damage to old and 
young alike from fevers and lack of food, the agonizing decisions by 
families to stay or leave, to feed one child and starve or abandon an­
other. N o number can communicate, no graph can detail these terri­
ble costs. They were borne silently, heavily, and with enormous sad­
ness by the people of Lyon. 
T h  e problem of mortality in the crisis of 1709 is not, therefore, an 
issue of simple cause and effect. Mortality was rather the result of 
what some historians have called "synergy," a combination of inter­
related cycles in which various diseases, chronic malnutrition, envi­
ronmental detriments, and psychological factors all acted as mutual 
catalysts.36 T h e actual causes of death in 1709 were no different from 
those for any other year in the dangerous, risk-filled environment of 
the Old Regime. Greater malnutrition, overcrowding, and u n e m ­
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ploymcnt simply strengthened the usual causes of death and provided 
them with far more than their customary number of victims. 
This synergistic argument helps to answer the nagging question of 
greater mortality a m o n g the rich. Diseases were not particularly se­
lective, and many  , such as typhus and typhoid fevers, did not require 
malnutrition as a prerequisite. Environmental factors were probably 
sufficient to explain the greater n u m b e r of deaths a m o n g the elite. 
T h e merchants of Lyon could, of course, have fled the city, though 
their relative lack of country estates m a d  e that option less attractive. 
Certainly, had there been a single, visible epidemic, they would have 
left, but no such monster reared its head in Lyon . T h e merchants 
stayed and paid their grim share of the cost.37 
There was another cost. T h e crisis not only burdened individuals 
and families, it also pressed hard on institutions. Hospitals pushed 
their budgets deep into deficit to care for the sick and abandoned in 
1709. T h e city spent enormous sums to buy expensive grain and sell 
it at a substantial loss to the bakers. Ironically, the arrival at long last 
of Castigliony's Italian grain only worsened matters for the Consul­
ate of Lyon. T h e crisis of shortage mutated into a crisis of surplus. 
Louis Ravat and his colleagues had n o  w to confront the bill for their 
effort to feed the city. 
The, Accounting

The accounts of the Chambre d'Abondance began to hemorrhage as early as the s u m m e r of 1708. F r o m a debt of only 35,700 livres 
at Easter, the institution leapt 522,558 livres into the red by August. 
Twelve months later, that debt had tripled, and by March 1710 it stood 
at a staggering 2,059,974 livres. Such a debt exceeded by 300,000 livres 
the average annual revenue for the entire city government from 1701 
to 1707.l Figure 9.1 illustrates the debt of the Abondance as it rose 
from Payment to Payment from 1707 through 1713, and contrasts it 
with the institution's expenses and revenues for those years. It shows 
that while the debt declined slightly in M a r c  h 1710, it remained high 
until the end of 1711, and that it far outdistanced revenues during the 
period. 
As the Abondance continued to purchase wheat at enormous prices 
and sell it at a loss to the bakers, the resulting flow of red ink threat­
ened to drown the city. T h e arrival en masse of Castigliony's grain 
barges should have brought relief. Instead, this supposed deliverance 
quickly developed into a mixed blessing. At the very m o m e n  t that ex­
pensive Italian wheat climbed the Rhone, the peasants of Burgundy be­
gan harvesting fields rich in barley, and enterprising^rams descended 
upon Lyon with loaf upon loaf of cheap barley bread.2 Ravat had 
argued in 1708 that the Lyonnais would not eat such bread, and he 
m a y have been correct at that time, but months of hunger and high 
prices had intervened to temper the stubbornness of the city's artisans. 
B  y October, they were buying cheaper barley bread and deserting 
the bakers in droves.3 T h  e bakers stared at shelves filled with expen­
sive wheat bread and began to cut their purchases from the Abondance. 
T h e cut came in October, just as arrivals from Italy reached their 
peak. T h e Abondance, which had supplied over 1,500 anees per week 
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FIG. 9.1 Revenues, expenses, and debt of the Chambre dAbondance, 
1707-1713, in livres. 
Debt 
Actual Expenses 
•-- Actual Revenues 
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Source: Accounts ofthe Abondance. 
throughout the crisis, n o  w found itself selling only one-third that 
amount . Its granaries filled to overflowing, and the Consulate faced 
the consequences of its o w  n miscalculations. T h  e magistrates had 
underestimated the barley crop; indeed, they had both underesti­
mated the ability of the Burgundians to rebound from the crisis and 
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overestimated the d e m a n d for wheat. B y January of the n e w year, 
with both deficits and grain stocks rising about them, they faced the 
ultimate irony: a crisis of plenty. 
They turned first to Villeroy, w h  o quickly transformed himself 
into a wily grain merchant. M a k i n  g remarkable use of his court con­
nections, especially those with the minister of war Voysin, the duke 
managed to convince the crown to buy over 20,000 anees for the army 
at 56 livres per ane'e, 5 livres more than the Abondance was then charg­
ing the bakers.4 Trudaine, whose sister was Voysin's wife, joined this 
effort, persuading a reluctant Desmaretz that the price was fair, which 
in fact it was on the first of January.5 B y mid February, however, 
before a single sack of grain had been delivered to the army, the price 
of wheat on the Grenette had dropped to 51 livres. T h e fall in price 
represented an effective loss to the crown of 100,000 livres. W h e  n 
the Consulate had the gall to complain to Villeroy on 7 February 
that 68 livres would have been a better price, the duke replied coldly 
that it required all his "savoir faire" to achieve the agreed-upon price, 
and that it was the best possible under the circumstances.6 
T h o u g h the echevins entered the grain business with great deter­
mination, they recognized that such purchases could neither clear 
their overflowing granaries nor reduce their towering debts. As they 
had so often in the past, therefore, the magistrates decided to coerce 
the bakers. In a session of 6 January 1710, one year to the day after 
the arrival of the great winter, they noted their forbearance in "al­
lowing" the bakers to reduce by two-thirds their purchases from the 
Abondance. They concluded, however, that such a reduction was un­
justifiable given the kindness they deemed to have shown to the 
bakers by selling wheat to them at such a loss. "As they [the bakers] 
are insensitive to all the advantages that have been provided to them, 
and as it is assumed that the resistance to all orders to which they 
have been inclined for three months can only be due to their bad 
intentions and to the spirit of a cabal which it is time to repress," it 
was decided to force them to purchase the grain.7 A list was ordered 
drawn that would require each baker to buy his share of a total of 
539 anees per week at 51 livres per anee.H 
T h e resulting list showed 137 bakers spread out through the city's 
thirty-five quarters.9 T h e weekly amounts assigned varied from 1 to 
7 anees depending on the condition of each baker, but the final total 
came to only 384 anees and not 539 as originally intended.lo It appears 
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that someone, probably the bakers themselves, must have intervened 
in making up the list to decrease the amount. 
Even that amount was too m u c h for some, especially with the 
ready availability of other sources. T  o lower their costs and reduce 
their o w  n debts, several bakers resorted to illegal schemes, most in­
volving the secret purchase and resale of grain on the market. S o m e 
bakers established lookouts at the gates, watching for wagoners bring­
ing in supplies for the market. Alerted to such arrivals, the conspir­
ing bakers journeyed furtively to the inn where the seller and his grain 
had put up for the night and there m a d e a deal to buy it. Buyer and 
seller then stole out into the darkness, lanterns in hand, to measure 
the grain in the stable. T h e next day, w h e n the wagoner sold the grain 
on the market, he did so not as a seller but as a secret agent for the 
baker, w h  o pocketed the profit.11 O  n 12 M a r c  h the city attempted 
to prohibit such practices, maintaining the rule against any purchases 
by the bakers (other than from the Abondance) within the five-league 
limit, and against any purchases at all outside the Grenette.12 T h e 
practice continued, however, for the prohibitions had to be repeated 
in early April w h e n two innkeepers of La Guillotiere were fined for 
allowing such sales in their inns.13 
N  o consular coercion could change the economic facts of life. 
T h e Lyonnais were not about to buy wheat bread m a d e expensive 
by the Abondance w h e n cheaper bread was available on every street-
corner. Citing "low consumption," the bakers petitioned the Consul­
ate on 1 April to reduce their assigned weekly amounts . 1 4 Hopeful 
of improved baker compliance, the magistrates reduced the total from 
384 to 219 ane'es per week and decreased the m a x i m u  m individual al­
lotment from 7 to 3 anees.{5 
T h e bakers would have liked to prohibit the activities of the fo­
rains altogether, but Ravat and his colleagues were not prepared to go 
that far. They did agree that bread selling had gotten out of hand. 
A n ordonnance de police of 7 April noted "that m a n  y persons neglect 
their natural profession in order to sell bread," and that it was being 
sold everywhere—in alleys, streets, squares, even in the open hall­
ways of houses.'6 T h e ordonnance attempted to restrict the trade only 
to authorized bakers andforains and to confine them to specific loca­
tions. Bakers were also prohibited from mixing wheat flour with 
barley or buckwheat as part of the city's effort to force them to use 
Abondance wheat.'7 
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This ordonnance appears to have enjoyed no more success than the 
others. Stockpiles in the Abondance granaries remained stubbornly high 
throughout the spring, and the Consulate worried increasingly about 
the dangers of spoilage. B y early June, over 12,000 anees still remained, 
and the magistrates decided on one last desperate measure to unload it.'8 
If the bakers could not be forced to buy the grain, the bourgeois 
of Lyon would have to take it. O  n 17 June, the Consulate prepared 
an ordonnance that would force the citizens of the city to buy an as­
signed share. In the preamble to the ordonnance the magistrates re­
viewed the sad situation of the Abondance and admitted the reality of 
the situation. "It has pleased G o  d to put an end to all our fears by the 
extraordinary quantity of bread that theforains bring daily to this city, 
by the abundance of small grains that were harvested last year, and 
by the increasingly certain probability of a harvest [in 1710] which 
will leave nothing to be desired."'9 T h e  y argued that the assessment 
of grain on the citizens was the only method "to avoid a loss that our 
citizens would be obliged to bear in one w a y or another." A list was 
ordered drawn alloting some 9,235 anees a m o n  g individuals and even 
a m o n g religious houses in the city. T h e price was to be 58 livres per 
anee, higher than any price ever charged the bakers or the crown. T h e 
penalty for not purchasing one's assigned share was fixed at 500 livres 
and loss of privileges as a bourgeois.20 
Never before in the history of the city had such a forced sale been 
attempted on the population. Anticipating resistance, the magistrates 
kept the ordonnance secret while they worked to win royal support. 
A copy of the ordonnance travelled to Villeroy, w h  o carried it per­
sonally to the controller general.21 O  n 28 June, Desmaretz wrote the 
city in the king's n a m e . "The king has ordered m e to write you of his 
intention that your ordonnance be executed." T h e list was to be m a d e 
and obeyed. Desmaretz gave permission that his letter be m a d  e public 
and ended with a threat. "If anyone resists to conform to your ordon­
nance, and to the lists that will be m a d e  , I a  m ordered to render ac­
count of it to his majesty, and to receive his orders."22 A  s so often 
during the crisis, the crown had done as it was instructed to do by local 
officials, lending royal authority to local actions. T h  e magistrates 
printed the letter and posted it beside the now-public ordonnance.2 3 
There is no evidence of active resistance by the bourgeois to the 
ordonnance of 17 June. They resisted, of course, but passively. W h e  n 
officers of the penons, themselves bourgeois, finished the lists on 
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10 July, they accounted for only 6,926 anees of wheat instead of the 
9,235 originally intended. O  f that total, individuals eventually purchased 
2,482 anees, only one-quarter of the original amount and one-third 
of the listed allotment.24 There are no records or indications of any 
prosecutions for failure to comply, nor were there further efforts at 
such public forced sales. T h  e Consulate contented itself with the re­
sult, however unsatisfying. 
M o r  e active resistance to the ordonnance did c o m e from one quar­
ter. Claude Saint-Georges, archbishop of Lyon , had proven very co­
operative during the crisis. H  e had dropped dietary restrictions dur­
ing Lent, allowed several churches to be used as granaries, and given 
his blessings, if not his money, to extraordinary efforts at poor relief.25 
That the magistrates of the city should, however, attempt to force 
the clergy to get them out of debt was simply too m u c h . T h e church 
had surrendered m u c  h to the secular city over the years, from rights 
over bridges and hospitals to its responsibility for charity, but it would 
not surrender its most sacred privilege. " N  o one," declared the arch­
bishop, " m a  y tax the clergy but the clergy itself."26 T h  e archbishop 
condemned this "tax" as a "dangerous novelty" and appealed to the 
crown to quash it. Ravat responded that it was not a tax but a simple 
"distribution of grain," and noted that the religious houses had not 
deigned to refuse Abondance grain during the crisis.27 Confronted by 
a rather touchy conflict between local authorities, Desmaretz forced 
a compromise. T h e church w o n on form, but the Consulate cap­
tured the substance. T h  e ordonnance was not officially to apply to 
the church, but the archbishop was ordered himself to distribute 400 
anees of Abondance grain a m o n  g the various religious houses at 58 
livres per anee.28 Saint-Georges resisted, but the Consulate had w o  n 
the battle. T h  e clergy had to pay its share. 
Unfortunately, the victory over the clergy did little to solve the 
essential problem. B y December 1710, the Abondance granaries were 
still not empty, and the magistrates were forced finally to prohibit all 
bread selling by the forains.29 T h  e bakers at last obtained the m o  ­
nopoly they had always coveted. It was an ironic end to the crisis of 
1709. T h e same Consulate that had so feverishly sought bread from 
every source, that had practically bankrupted the city to import grain 
from great distances, n o  w sought to restrict the very trade it had 
fought so hard to encourage. T h  e crisis had m o v e  d to the account 
books, and there it stubbornly remained. 
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T h  e forced sale of grain failed to balance the books of the Abon­
dance, but the sale to the crown did have an impact on the debt. T h e 
city sold over 24,000 anees to the royal armies, providing 1,337,000 
livres in revenues.30 That was enough to cut the debt in half, to 
1,321,815 livres.3' T h  e Abondance carried this debt with interest from 
Payment to Payment until December 1711, w h e n the city transferred 
1,000,000 livres directly from the main consular account into that of 
the Abondance.12 T h e final debt of 257,501 livres was cleared in Octo­
ber 1714 with another transfusion from the city.3 3 
Transferring the debt from one set of books to another hardly ex­
tinguished it, but such an action did act to diminish its importance. 
O  f all the accounts kept by various institutions in Lyon, that of the 
city itself was the healthiest. T h e Consulate worked hard to ensure 
that expenses seldom outdistanced revenues in any given year. W h e  n 
deficits did occur, the magistrates looked to extinguish them by re­
ducing spending or by taking out long-term loans of different sorts. 
T h e "gifts" given by the city to the royal government in 1708 and 
1711 were invariably accompanied by promises of increased revenues 
from the crown and financed by loans (many of them m a d e in Genoa) 
with repayment schedules designed to match those revenues. Figure 
9.2 illustrates the success of this strategy. 
T h  e Consulate counted the debt as a part of its expenses, but as 
with the Abondance accounts shown in figure 9.1, the debt has been 
detached in order to reveal trends in real spending. T h  e debt cer­
tainly did increase in 1710 as bills for the crisis came due, but reve­
nues outdistanced spending from 1711 to 1714. T h e city was thereby 
able to reduce its debt to precrisis levels by the end of 1714. Only one 
entirely n e w source of income accrued to the city as a result of the 
crisis, an excise tax on raw silk granted by the crown in 1713.34 Like 
all such taxes, this one was inevitably passed on to consumers of rich 
silk cloth, most of w h o  m lived not in Lyon but in Paris or at Ver­
sailles. T o a certain extent the crown, by supplying the armies, and 
the courtiers, by purchasing silk stockings, could both be said to have 
paid for the expensive grain imported into Lyon in 1709. 
T h e Abondance was not the only Lyonnais institution to suffer the 
burden of debt. T h  e hospitals also were hard pressed. T h  e rectors of the 
Charitewrote anguished letters to Villeroy and the controller general 
complaining of high expenses and diminished revenues.3<r Their ac­
counts support their claims. Combined income to the Charite from 
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F I G . 9.2 Revenues , expenses, and debt of the city of L y o n , 1701-1720, 
in livres. 
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the sale of pensions and annuities, direct loans, rents on properties, 
and the wine tax declined approximately 50 percent during the crisis 
from the average in the five-year period 1703-1707.36 B y contrast, 
the cost of grain increased, from an average of 55,833 livres per year 
in 1703-1707 to 125,353 livres in 1709 and 176,136 livres in 1710.37 Thus, 
the hospital's costs increased by over 100 percent just as its usual 
sources of revenue declined by half. 
Yet, the real debt, as illustrated in figure 9.3, did not increase sub­
stantially due to a stroke of morbid luck. In October of the crisis year, 
the Lyonnais merchant Henri Archembaud died, naming the Charite 
as guardian for his children of a fortune exceeding 116,000 livres.38 
This infusion of capital enabled the institution to stretch out its debt 
until it was able to hold a lottery in 1714.39 T h e lottery, of the same 
type the hospital had held several times before, reduced the debt to 
precrisis levels. Henri Archembaud had unwittingly helped to feed 
the poor of L y o  n in the crisis year. 
N  o such precision can be obtained in analyzing the situation of the 
Hotel-Dieu. That hospital was even more dependent than the Charite 
on income from rents and the wine tax, so it can be assumed that 
revenues suffered similarly to those of the Charite. Unfortunately, 
the accounts of the institution were maintained in such a haphazard 
fashion by its treasurers that they yield little reliable information. 
Only the debt can be ascertained with any accuracy and then only 
for two-year periods w h e n the books changed hands.4 0 As is shown 
by figure 9.4, the debt did increase, but it did not remain high in­
definitely. Georges Durand, in his book on the institution, argues 
that the hospital ran a surplus in 1728, so it would seem that here, too, 
the crisis threw the accounts into temporary, but not permanent, 
disarray.41 
T h  e overall picture that emerges from analysis of these institu­
tional accounts is one of organizations strained but not broken by 
their financial exertions during the Great Winter and Famine of 
1709. Mos  t recovered within a few years, returning to whatever con­
dition they had enjoyed or suffered prior to the crisis. 
T h e same cannot be said for the treasurers and rectors w h o guided 
them. In fact, the debts that piled up during the crisis were not actually 
borne by institutions at all, but rather by the individuals w h  o kept the 
books. It was the treasurer of the Abondance, Pierre Balme, w h  o ad­
vanced m o n e  y from his personal accounts to maintain the institution. 
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FIG. 9.3 Revenues expenses, and debt of the hospital of the Charite, 
1703-1716 in livres. 
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While he m a d e sure to repay himself as revenues arrived, the task 
proved a great strain on his personal finances. W h e  n he turned over 
the books to a successor in 1711, he awarded himself an additional 
15,000 livres "for the extraordinary pain and care that I have taken to 
m a k e payments and receipts, for the purchase of chests to keep coin 
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FIG. 9.4 Debt of the Hotel-Dieu, 1704-1715, in livres. 
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secure, for the bad money , the lack of revenues, the theft of silver 
twice in 1709, the cessation of m  y commerce for four years, and for 
the extraordinary taxes which have been imposed upon m e in con­
nection with the Abondance."42 T h  e rectors of the hospitals also car­
ried great burdens, meeting constantly, lending money, worrying 
about grain stocks and the onrushing tide of the poor. 
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T h  e crisis m a d  e service as a rector singularly unattractive. W h e  n 
Nicolas Lery, merchant of L y o n , was asked to serve a two-year term 
as rector of the Charite in January 1710, he refused. H  e gave as his 
reasons "his indispositions and lack of health," but also offered a 
3,000-livre contribution to the hospital "on condition that he be ex­
empted absolutely and forever from entering said hospital as rec­
tor."43 Luckily for the hospitals, not all of Lyon's elite snared Lery's 
lack of enthusiasm, and both hospitals continued their functions 
through the eighteenth century and well into the m o d e r  n era. 
T h e Abondance continued as well, making grain purchases in its 
usual sporadic m a n n e r through the 1760s. Indeed, the Consulate in­
vested a large s u  m in 1722 to build a n e  w municipal granary for the 
institution, one of the first large buildings constructed by the city in 
the eighteenth century.44 T h o u g h it has since been converted into a 
barracks for the gendarmerie, the old granary still stands on the banks 
of the Saone, the horn of plenty of the Abondance over its entrance, its 
m a n  y large w i n d o w  s at the ready to ventilate grain stocks long since 
vanished. It stands in silent testimony to the commitment by past city 
governments, motivated partly at least by the experience of 1709, to 
provision the city in time of shortage—no matter what the cost. 
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On Sunday, 15 June 1710, theprevot des marchands and echevins of L y o n marched in grand procession to the College of the Trinity 
to celebrate the anniversary of the school's founding. During the 
crisis of 1709, they had cancelled this same ceremony, judging it inap­
propriate amid the general suffering. This time, however, they cele­
brated in grand style, for the procession symbolized m o r  e than just 
the founding of a college. It represented an end to the time of trial. 
T h e director of the College, Father Galiffet, used his welcoming speech 
to the Consulate as an opportunity to look back. A s his words m a d e 
clear, he suffered n o doubts about the performance of the city's m a g ­
istrates during the crisis: 
Lyon, Messieurs, this great and flourishing city, which counts in its 
care as m a n y inhabitants as an entire province, had more to fear than 
any other from these terrible extremities. A n  d it never could have 
avoided them if providence, which watches over and conserves it, had 
not upheld and maintained for the duration of the calamity magistrates 
of a foresight so just, an activity so generous, an application so con­
stant, a vigilance so exact, and above all a heart so great. . . . You 
predicted the evil that threatened the city far enough in advance to 
prevent it. You sent agents everywhere there was hope of finding grain 
within the realm and outside the realm. You collected it from every­
where with great care and at incredible expense. The measures that you 
took were so just that one could see with admiration that although 
bread was beyond price in the capital and though there was none in 
many other places, in Lyon the people never bought it at so low a price.' 
N o  t only had they supplied and fed the city, Galiffet declared, but they 
also had managed to maintain order: 
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You knew always how to keep the people to their duty. Twice we 
saw them in danger of mutiny; but what did it take to calm them? I 
say this to the chief of the Consulate. His presence alone sufficed. 
H  e appeared at the beginning of the unrest without arms, without 
soldiers. His authority alone, joined with his moderation, his gen­
tleness, and his love of the people, dissipated the crowds that formed. 
Galiffet returned in his speech to marvel at the sheer volume of grain 
that had been imported: 
It would have been difficult to believe it if it had not been public and 
constant; you had enough to supply your city; you had enough to 
supply the armies. . . enough to supply neighboring provinces. O n  e 
witnessed with astonishment grain leaving Lyon to climb the Saone 
and be distributed in provinces that normally supply it. 
T h e reverend father ended by noting that the king too had taken no­
tice of the Consulate's accomplishments and especially of the achieve­
ments of the prevot, w h o  m he had decided to reappoint for another 
term. N o  w quoting the king, Galiffet read "in this continuation w  e 
follow less a habit that has been often practiced than our o w  n desire 
to m a r  k h o  w w  e are content with the service he has rendered to us 
and to the public." Galiffet closed to general applause. 
W h e n Ravat gave his answering address, he w a s brief and modest. 
After a short s u m m a r y of the tasks that had been successfully accom­
plished, he turned to himself. "If I filled for myself this multiplicity 
of duties, it is for the public to judge. Its approbation will always be a 
fixed reward." H  e added, however, that Galiffet could have done 
him no greater honor than to cite the words of the king.2 
Such laudatory judgments were not unusual in the aftermath of 
the crisis. T h e cures of Saint-Vincent and Vaize both wrote in nearly 
identical terms of the accomplishments of the Consulate, and t w  o 
years later, Brossette wrote the following in his history: 
But in the midst of so much pain, the city of Lyon found resources in 
the vigilance and indefatigable cares of its magistrates, w h  o provided 
for its pressing needs by a considerable quantity of grain that they 
purchased in far away lands; and these provisions were sufficient to 
maintain the citizens in a state of abundance in the middle even of 
the horrors of the famine.3 
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T h  e Consulate and m a n  y Lyonnais as well obviously judged their 
performance in 1709 an unqualified success. T h e  y had foreseen the 
crisis, planned for it, implemented their designs, and brought forth 
the horn of plenty. This perception was as important, if not more so, 
than the sterner reality w  e have explored thus far. It reenforced the 
elite of Lyon in their devotion to the efficacy of the paternalistic model. 
They had found that the grain trade could be controlled, bread prices 
could be moderated, the behavior of bakers and merchants could 
be regulated, the people could be disciplined, and the city could be 
guided through the crisis. T h e mechanisms of paternalistic control 
were no mere ideals. They had worked. T h e city had m a d e it. T h e 
king had said so. 
If any contemporaries dissented from such rosy assessments, their 
accounts have not survived.4 T o be sure, the Consulate did accom­
plish m a n y of its goals, but the cost of its success was very high. In 
analyzing the degree and cost of success in 1709, it is necessary first to 
fix upon the goals of the officials and then to see h o  w these goals dif­
fered from the needs of the Lyonnais in whose n a m e they were pur­
sued, and from the goals and aspirations of neighboring cities and 
towns. 
T h e overriding priority of the Consulate was to feed the people of 
Lyon, and to feed them at prices that would not drive them to vio­
lence. This directive necessitated other goals: to maneuver the crown 
into crushing the resistance of grain-supplying areas, to keep order in 
the city, to institute and administer a rationing system by defining 
the deserving population and disciplining the bakers, to import grain 
from great distances, to find m o n e y for such purchases where there 
appeared to be none. Side by side with provisioning goals went the 
need to restore the city's e c o n o m y by rebuilding its m o n e y market 
and its manufactures. Only then could the Consulate hope to restore 
the ability of the city's artisans to pay nonsubsidized prices for bread. 
All these ends had to be accomplished simultaneously if the magis­
trates were to be successful in saving the city. 
T h e Consulate was remarkably successful in manipulating the 
crown. In 1708, the magistrates used the attraction of the "free gift" 
to win the cooperation of a royal government desperate for cash, 
then stretched out the payments through the crisis year as a subtle 
reminder of their generosity.5 They used influence, too, passing their 
letters to the court through Villeroy, w h  o always attached brief cover 
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letters reinforcing their desires. Moreover, the duke met personally 
and constantly with the controller general, and these meetings offered 
the opportunity for added personal pressure to insure royal c o m  ­
pliance with the city's wishes. It would be surprising too if Villeroy 
did not enlist his m a n  y and varied allies at court in the city's cause. 
Even if he did not do so explicitly, his ability to enlist such aid was 
always implicit. Desmaretz certainly recognized the duke's power in 
the w e b of court connections and clientage systems, and treated him 
with the respect such connections demanded. Trudaine also took up 
the city's cause, travelling to the capital on its behalf after the col­
lapse of the Payment of Kings, and Anisson was ever busy lobbying 
in favor of its mercantile privileges. 
Lyon, however, influenced the crown in m o r e subtle ways than 
through simple bribery and personal influence. Its officials sought 
constantly to place themselves and their city in the mainstream of 
royal policies, to the extent that such royal policies could be identi­
fied. W h e  n Desmaretz wished to keep the grain trade moving, the 
city portrayed itself as the victim of those w h  o wished to stop it. W h e  n 
Desmaretz believed the crisis to be a fraud perpetrated by hoarders 
and speculators, the city depicted itself as their helpless prey. W h e  n 
the controller general expressed outrage at the official sanction of vi­
olence, such as the seizure of grain at Valence, the magistrates shared 
and encouraged that outrage. W h e  n Desmaretz sought to exercise 
royal authority through the intendants, the city tried to insure that 
such authority would be exercised in its behalf. 
Manipulation of the crown was important to the magistrates of 
Lyon. They recognized in the royal government a very powerful and 
useful tool. They used that tool in the form of the Lyonnais Reg­
iment, they used it in the form of Desmaretz's public letter of 28 June 
1710 reinforcing their ordonnance, they used it to pressure and coerce 
other towns and provinces. Indeed, the city did not resist royal power 
in 1709, but competed for its use with other local authorities in France. 
In this, the crisis demonstrates that the French state of the Old Regime 
was not by definition opposed to local privileges or to local power. 
Rather, it was built upon their foundations. It sought not to under­
mine them, but rather drew sustenance from them both literally and 
figuratively. 
Louis X I  V had gained the loyalty of the magistrates of Lyon by 
empowering them. 6 Wi th such acts as the establishment of the tri­
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bunal de police against the Senecbaussee, the creation of the lieutenant 
of police, and a myriad assortment of deals over the sharing and dis­
tribution of revenues, the king established the Consulate as a local 
authority constructed at least in part by royal power.7 Yet, this e m ­
powerment could work in both directions. If Louis X I V increased 
the power of the Consulate, it needs to be remembered that the mag­
istrates drew power from other sources as well. T h e wealth of the 
merchants of Lyon enabled their Consulate to dominate the sur­
rounding region with a power quite apart from that endowed upon 
them by the king, and their traditional contacts with Genevan and 
Italian bankers gave them the financial leverage to m o v e and manip­
ulate a monarchy desperate for money . In a very real sense, their 
access to hard cash helped them to e m p o w e r Desmaretz. That he 
returned favor for favor was to be expected in a system built upon 
the interlocking synergy of patronage and clientage. Mutual depen­
dence governed political relationships, and therefore political power, 
in the Old Regime.8 
Yet, even given their special relationship to the monarchy, there 
was very little that the royal government could actually do for them 
or for other local officials in 1709. In the end, the state of Louis X I  V 
was neither omnipresent nor omnipotent; it was seldom even pres­
ent at all. M a n  y localities wished for more royal control and coor­
dination rather than less in 1709, and only powerful ones such as Lyon 
managed to pull the state to their side and m a k e it work for them. 
T h e object of the Lyonnais in using the power of the crown was to 
force cities and towns holding their grain to give it up or let it pass. 
Toward this end, as w  e have seen, they enjoyed only mixed success. 
Burgundian towns like Gray and Auxonne proved singularly tena­
cious in hanging on for dear life to grain supplies, the legal status of 
which they never questioned. For them, as for such towns as Aries 
and Tarasgon on the Rhone , Lyonnais grain represented the dif­
ference between survival and starvation, between civic order and 
social chaos. They held on despite the will of the crown as expressed 
through its intendants, despite even the presence of soldiers. W h e  n 
they let it go, they did so only grudgingly and never completely, be­
lieving that once that grain was gone, there would be no more. 
T h e substantial court influence possessed by Lyon could not for­
ever resist the efforts of these m a n  y towns and provinces to convince 
royal officials of their plight. T h  e increasing success of such efforts 
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through the s u m m e  r of 1709 threatened to isolate the city from its 
supplies. A  s the tide turned against it, the Consulate relied increas­
ingly on the incoming Italian grain for deliverance and concentrated 
its influence with the crown on clearing the path for its arrival. W h e  n 
the magistrates discovered h o  w badly they had miscalculated the 
d e m a n d for that grain, they again manipulated the crown, this time 
into buying their expensive wheat or into helping them force others 
to buy it. T h e means were the same even if the ends had changed. 
Unfortunately for the Lyonnais, attempts to force grain from towns 
in the region did little to endear the city to those towns. T h e bishops 
of M a c o  n and Chalons only mirrored the long- and short-term hos­
tility of their t o w n s m e n w h e n they c o n d e m n e d L y o n as a hoarder of 
grain. That their perception of its needs and real reserves was wholly 
inaccurate did not diminish their anger or resentment. T h o u g  h the 
role and attitudes of surrounding towns toward L y o n during the 
Revolution have never been adequately explored, it would be sur­
prising if s o m  e at least did not rejoice at the intention of the C o m  ­
mittee of Public Safety to tear it d o w  n brick by brick.9 Certainly, 
m a n y would not have objected to such a plan in 1709. 
Grain did, of course, reach L y o  n throughout 1709, and the city 
managed for the most part to maintain a constant one-month reserve. 
Galiffet and others marvelled that, having imported the grain, the 
magistrates then managed its equitable distribution a m o n  g the popu­
lation by w a y of the rationing system implemented by the ordon­
nance of 30 April. Here , the degree and definition of success enjoyed 
by the magistrates is problematic. T h e system was undoubtedly an 
administrative triumph. T h e census taken in 1709 c a m e close to an 
accurate count, and ration cards were regularly printed and distrib­
uted. Yet, the ration itself, consisting of only one pound of bread per 
day, was hardly adequate to sustain health without supplements that 
few could afford. In addition, m a n  y unemployed artisans could not 
even afford bread at the rationed price of 2 sous, 6 deniers. It m a d  e 
little difference to them that that price was less than half that of bread 
in surrounding towns and villages. T h e y had to depend for survival 
either on weekly distributions by the Aumone-Generale or on food­
stuffs of wildly varying quality carried in daily by theforains. T  o their 
credit, the magistrates encouraged both these sources, and it seems 
on the whole that this combination of baker, aumone, andforain was 
at least marginally adequate. T h e poor of L y o n did not die in gross 
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disproportion to their usual number in 1709, though m a n y were 
forced to abandon their children, their houses, and their property to 
survive. They o w e d their survival partly to official help, but mostly 
to their o w  n dogged perseverance. 
T h  e efforts of Ravat, Trudaine, and others to restore the Payments 
and economy of Lyon in 1709 largely failed. They foundered on the 
decline in demand for goods engendered by the crisis and on the stub­
bornness of Samuel Bernard and his creditors in coming to terms. 
Lullin did not initial an agreement until he lay on his deathbed in 
October of the crisis year. H  e ended up accepting a 25 percent dis­
count on Bernard's mint bills in finally rendering his letters. N  o one 
got a better deal.10 Others, however, took even longer to settle their 
accounts, and the econom y of the city only revived gradually in 1710 
as demand picked up slightly and the Payments recovered. T h e mag­
istrates had little to do with either development and could only hope 
that their city would not again be inundated by royal indebtedness. 
T h  e financial crisis remains important in its o w  n right, of course, 
for having sown the seed for a royal bank and the use of paper cur­
rency, ideas that returned in the guise of John L a w and his Systeme. 
Interestingly, the crisis of 1709 also witnessed the first renunciation 
by the crown of strictly private finance, as the king's ministers re­
jected Samuel Bernard and his colleagues in favor of the financiers 
within the framework of the royal fisc. T h e collapse of the Systeme 
thus represented the second such failure, and a crown twice burnt 
was loath to return again to the use of private finance in the form of 
a bank. T h e lack of such a bank limited the financial options open to 
an increasingly burdened monarchy in the eighteenth century and 
had no small role in its destruction in 1789. 
As for Lyon, if its magistrates could not revive their city's econ­
o m  y in 1709, they did manage at least to finance their grain purchases. 
They found the funds by appealing to the city's merchants for loans, 
and by effectively putting up the city itself as collateral. It is a sign 
both of the security that m a n  y merchants continued to feel in their 
control of and confidence in the Consulate, and of their o w  n desire 
to maintain order, that they lent it m o n e y at the very m o m e n t they 
refused loans to each other. W h e  n the bills came due, the magis­
trates ingeniously deflected m a n y of them onto the crown, thereby 
gaining a measure of subtle revenge for the trials of Samuel Bernard. 
Whether Nicolas Desmaretz, whose mind was as sharp and quick as 
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any that ever served the crown, recognized this turnabout is not 
k n o w n  . If he did, he acquiesced. 
Having imported their grain and paid for it in 1709, the magistrates 
took great pains to restrict it to their o w  n citizens. W h e  n efforts at 
the physical expulsion of the rural poor failed, they employed the ra­
tioning system. Likewise, rectors of the Aumone-Generale worked 
hard to deny bread to those w h  o could not prove residence in the 
city. Only theforains were free to serve the rural poor, but one w o n  ­
ders if any of the latter could afford the prices charged. This pattern 
of expulsion and rejection was repeated in towns throughout the 
region. Shut out of the towns, shut off from supplies, pursued and 
prosecuted as vagabonds and beggars, the rural poor wandered the 
desolate roads. S o m  e joined criminal bands to steal from travellers 
and passersby.l' M o s t simply drifted into oblivion. T h e y were the 
true victims of 1709. 
T h e presence of the rural poor helped to reenforce the values, atti­
tudes, and behaviors that c a m e to constitute a collective subsistence 
culture during the Old Regime. This culture was not exclusively 
"popular." It was not confined to the popular classes, and the behav­
iors that characterized it were only occasionally directed against the 
elite. It was shared by people from all orders in France, by both land­
lords and tenants, merchants and artisans, government and governed. 
A  n individual's role in this culture was defined not by his or her social 
and economic status, but rather by his or her relationship to the food 
chain. W h a  t mattered in subsistence culture was not whether one 
was noble or bourgeois, but whether one was a producer or a con­
sumer of food. H e n c e , the collective violence that characterized sub­
sistence crises tended to be directed against those trades specifically 
associated with the creation and sale of bread—grain merchants, mil­
lers, and bakers. T h  e motivations behind such violence resulted from 
certain values that characterized the culture. 
Chief a m o n g those values was loyalty to and priority for one's 
community or town. Whi le such loyalty is characteristic of most 
cultures, it took on special significance during food crises such as that 
of 1709. Hostility to outsiders and to "other" communities became a 
matter of both popular action and official policy. Officials through­
out France demonstrated the strength of this idea w h e  n they passed 
laws and posted guards to exclude outsiders, w h o  m they labeled as 
vagabonds and criminals. This was the case not only in L y o n and the 
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cities and towns of the south, but elsewhere as well. At Dieppe, for 
example, officials filled their walls, while in Paris and Bordeaux, par­
lements issued orders expelling noncitizens on pain of imprisonment. 
In Rouen , the Baillage posted armed guards at the gates.! 2 If officials 
failed in their repeated efforts to plug their respective dikes, they were 
not dissuaded from the effort. 
Inevitably, lesser citizens also acted in their o w  n fashion to pro­
tect their community and themselves. Their activities took the form 
of an endless series oientraves, popular, often violent efforts to block 
grain exports. Preceding chapters have indicated m a n  y instances of 
such movements along the Saone and R h o n e rivers, and they were 
prevalent throughout the country. In Poitou, towns and villages 
blocked exports for Bordeaux, and the Rouennais were particularly 
active in their vain efforts to slow the constant hemorrhage of grain 
to the capital.13 These movements of smaller towns together with 
the efforts of larger cities to crush them all represented explicit m a n ­
ifestations of community loyalty. 
For the royal government, this apparent magnification of c o m m u  ­
nity solidarity during a crisis posed a miserable conundrum. Even as 
the king's ministers attempted to keep the trade moving, local offi­
cials m a d e every effort on their end to freeze it. At the same time, 
those same officials appealed constantly to the crown for justice, 
which they defined simply as royal pressure to force other officials 
in other towns to undermine the survival of their communities by 
allowing the export of grain. T h  e extraordinary fragmentation of 
the grain trade in France, so ably demonstrated by Jean Meuvret in 
his posthumously published these, reinforced the power of local c o m ­
munities to resist any nationalization of the trade.14 T h  e govern­
ment of Louis X I V , bankrupted by war and immersed in debt, could 
not even define justice on a national level and could not thus fulfill 
even this, its oldest and most legitimate role. N  o king could mete 
out justice in a crisis that was self-evidently injustice incarnate. 
Given its impossible position, the behavior of the crown during 
the crisis was at best ambiguous and at worst arbitrary. B y aiding 
some towns, it automatically hurt others. Mostly, of course, it left 
them to themselves. T h e one general royal declaration aimed at mit­
igating the suffering, that of 27 April, enjoyed at best a limited influ­
ence in such towns as M a c o n , at worst no influence at all. Left to 
their o w  n devices, cities such as Lyon used all the resources available 
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to them to insure their o w  n survival without care or thought for the 
effect their policies might have on other regions. Like Antoine Prost 
and Bricitte at Saint-Germain-au-Mont d ' O r on that April night in 
1709, they fought mostly in the dark for uncertain supplies, but they 
fought for their o w  n communities, and for no others. 
Another value central to subsistence culture lay in the general ac­
ceptance of the idea and practice of "police." A  s m a n  y writers then 
and n o  w have noted, "police" in the context of the Old Reg ime de­
fined the entire regulatory apparatus as well as the various admin­
istrative entities charged with its enforcement.15 Both officials and 
people held tight to the fundamental correctness of these regulations 
as a bulwark of justice and communi ty welfare. T h e regulations them­
selves epitomized a hardy belief in the existence of secret grain sup­
plies, the constant search for which was a c o m m o  n element of most 
food crises. Thus , few official actions merited greater public approval 
than the arrest of a hoarding merchant or a greedy baker. Naturally, 
the same values that accepted the system of regulations also supported 
the authority that enforced it. W h e  n the Lyonnais rioted, they sel­
d o  m m o v e  d against their officials, but rather turned against indi­
viduals such as those specific bakers w h o  m they judged guilty of vio­
lating the rules.16 
This basic loyalty to authority helps to explain Louis Ravat's appar­
ent success in breaking up several disturbances with a very small force 
of policemen. O n e finds it in Paris as well, where Marc-Rene d'Argen­
son, Lieutenant-General of Police, enjoyed the same success. O  n 
those occasions, evidently numerous, upon which his carriage was 
blocked by angry crowds, he noted, " m  y habit is to descend first from 
m y carriage and to talk with them, to listen to their complaints, to 
sympathize with their troubles, to promise them s o m e relief."17 
Ravat and d'Argenson could pacify their crowds because the people 
in those crowds believed in the ability and necessity of their officials 
to succeed, to supply their cities as a whole and themselves individ­
ually with bread. Only w h e n people judged the officials themselves 
guilty of violating the rules did they m o v e against them. Thus , Pinon 
was driven from A u x o n n e for trying to "steal" its grain for the greedy 
Lyonnais. T h e intendant of R o u e n , Courson, came under siege w h e n 
rumors spread that he was aiding and abetting the export of grain to 
Paris, and officials everywhere, including L y o n , suffered popular 
violence w h e n they attempted to raise the price of bread.'H 
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T h e belief a m o n g the poor in a "fair price" of bread was entirely 
consistent with their endorsement of the whole regulatory apparatus. 
C o m p l e x systems of price controls such as those in Lyon , the d u m p ­
ing of municipal supplies on local markets to force d o w  n the price, 
or actions to allow mixing of cheaper grains with wheat, all served to 
reinforce and give official sanction to the idea of a "fair price." Vio­
lence resulted from disagreements between the people and their offi­
cials over the price itself and not over the shared belief that it must be 
kept low. 
O  f course, support for the efficacy of "police" went further than 
mere anger at hoarders or concern for low prices. It expressed itself 
also in a lively respect for certain public institutions, especially the 
hospitals. Children were abandoned at an awful rate in 1709 through­
out m u c h of France.19 Paradoxically, it seems probable that aban­
donments would not have been so high in Lyon had the hospitals 
not enjoyed success in demonstrating their competence. Parents 
abandoned their children in the belief that these public institutions 
would be able to feed them. That they were often tragically wrong 
takes nothing away from their obvious trust in the hospitals as part 
of the paternalistic system of "police." 
If the people believed in the various codes of regulations and the 
institutions that administered them, so, obviously, did their officials. 
Virtually all the efforts of magistrates in L y o  n and other cities out­
lined in the preceding chapters demonstrated their definition of and 
belief in their o w  n responsibility for subsistence. T h e  y accepted that 
responsibility without question and strained all their resources to 
fulfill it. T h  e Chambre d'Abondance was by definition a symbol of the 
idea of "la police de subsistance" in pre-Revolutionary France. Its 
entire structure, its every action, hewed to the ideals of regulating 
levels of subsistence so as to maintain order and stability. 
Yet, in the structure and efficiency of its institutions, Lyon dif­
fered markedly from other cities in France. While there is some evi­
dence that cities like Aries and Marseilles improvised bureaux of 
abundance to supervise limited municipal grain purchases, the sim­
ilarities end there. N  o other French city in 1709 possessed a semiper­
manent institution such as the Abondance. N  o other city attempted a 
total census of its population, and none even dreamed of a system ot 
public rationing. B  y and large, officials in other French cities con­
fined their efforts to selling municipally purchased grain on public 
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markets to force d o w  n the price.20 In a very few cities, such as Paris 
and Rouen , large public works projects were attempted to feed the 
poor, but they failed for lack of resources and themselves led to seri­
ous disorders.21 Bordeaux managed to construct public ovens that 
baked some 12,000 pounds of bread per day. Unfortunately, this 
amount was not nearly sufficient to meet the d e m a n d , and the m a g ­
istrates of Bordeaux did not share the success of their brethren in 
Lyon in forcing supplies out of surrounding Poitou.22 
Unfortunately, there are no demographically detailed studies of 
other large cities during 1709 with which to compare the relative suc­
cess or failure of Lyon. As has been shown, smaller towns did suffer 
far higher rates of mortality in 1709, but whether the city enjoyed a 
similar success in relation to cities like Paris or Bordeaux remains to 
be discovered. 
W h  y was Lyon so unusual? T h e complex answer to so simple a 
question could well constitute a separate study of respectable length, 
but m u c  h of the preceding discussion has been directed towards its 
resolution. Lyon's special mercantile and institutional relationship 
to the cities of northern Italy, the overwhelming municipal control 
of charity, the peculiarities of the city's geographic position and its 
dependence on Burgundy, the cohesion a m o n g its merchants and 
their attachment to and control of their Consulate—all of these fac­
tors combined to give the city its special character. Yet, they did not 
prevent it from sharing in the same culture of subsistence that held 
other cities so firmly in its grip. 
That grip in and of itself surely constituted the final and most p o w  ­
erful value in subsistence culture, for the purest definition of that cul­
ture is to be found in its brutal priority. Nothing was or is more basic 
to survival than nourishment, and nothing was more important in 
1709. Merchants defied their o w  n bankruptcy to lend m o n e  y to the 
Abondance, the Consulate spared nothing, nor did officials in towns 
large and small all over the country. N o matter what their other con­
cerns, the food crisis came first. T h e priority was crudest, however, 
for those least able to afford it. Parents abandoned children, surren­
dering their families to the crisis. M e  n and w o m e  n abandoned their 
native towns and villages, surrendering the security of their homes and 
their work. M a n  y abandoned their very futures by turning to crime 
on the roads. They recognized that, at its extreme, subsistence culture 
was a culture not only of privation and disease, but finally, of death. 
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That death could c o m e to anyone in a famine was k n o w n by all, 
and all therefore shared in the values, beliefs, and corresponding be­
haviors that gave this culture of subsistence both meaning and sig­
nificance. Officials and people of France and elsewhere were to prac­
tice the politics of food well into the nineteenth century, as they still 
do n o  w at the close of the twentieth. Food crises have abated in France, 
but they continue to plague m u c h of the world. Communities still 
compete with each other, officials still appeal to central authorities, 
regulatory agencies large and small still exert themselves to the limits 
of their resources, and the problem continues to exert its undimin­
ished priority. T h  e rural poor, of course, still take to the roads, and 
all too often, they still meet the same fate as those w h o wandered the 
royal roads of France in 1709. 
In that year of sorrows, the battle for survival stripped the Old 
Regime to its essentials—to wealth and influence, to local power 
and personal privilege, to the mutual desperation of rich and poor. 
T h e crisis of 1709 was not an aberration of the Old Regime. It was 
rather more like a confession, as if by their every act, contemporaries 
laid bare their most basic motivations and deepest values. That is, 
perhaps, w h  y subsistence crises remain of such great interest to his­
torians, w h  y they continue to merit closer study and analysis. Given 
the concentration of thought, activity, and emotion that they un­
leashed, scholars can never be at a loss for further inquiry. 
Epilogue

The lives and careers of those w h  o grappled with the Great Winter and Famine of 1709 did not c o m  e to an end with the bountiful 
harvest in the autumn of the crisis year. Most continued in their po­
sitions, while others moved on. Nicolas Desmaretz served as con­
troller general until the old king's death in September 1715. Unlike 
others w h  o suffered dearly at the hands of the C h a m b e  r of Justice, 
held in 1716 to punish those w h  o had "defrauded" the government 
by handling its finances, Desmaretz successfully defended himself 
and retired to his estates at Maillebois. H  e lived long enough to wit­
ness the crash of Law's Systeme, dying on 4 M a y 1721 at age 73.l S a m ­
uel Bernard emerged from the crisis virtually unscathed, transferring 
the base of his operations to the Amsterdam m o n e y market. H  e 
continued to lend large amounts to the crown and became heavily 
involved in the 1720s in the northern grain trade, upon which, no 
doubt, he garnered substantial profits.2 H  e died after a long illness 
in 1739, at age 88, his default in Lyon a distant and fading m e m o r y . 
O  f the intendants, Baville governed in Languedoc until 1718, w h e  n 
deafness and the hostility of the regency forced him, at age 70, to 
retire to his estates. H  e died there six years later. H  e had dominated 
the province for 33 years, so long that most of its people could re­
m e m b e r no other.3 A n n e Pinon never recovered from his poor per­
formance during the crisis and was unceremoniously recalled from 
Burgundy in March 1710. H  e was replaced by none other than Tru­
daine. Pinon died in October 1721, without ever holding another 
intendancy.4 Trudaine served in Dijon until August 1714, w h e  n he 
w o  n election zsprevot des marchands of Paris. H  e held that office until 
1720, but did not depart before presiding over ceremonies in which 
bank notes from Law's Systeme were publicly burnt.9 It must have 
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given him great satisfaction at last to throw worthless paper m o n e y 
into the flames, and w  e m a  y well imagine his thoughts wandering 
back to other bits of worthless paper from another, earlier crisis. 
T h e duke of Villeroy courted his w a y back into favor with an old 
and dying king in 1715, and managed to become governor to a very 
young Louis X V t w o years later. For five years, from 1717 to 1722, he 
regaled the young king with tales from the old days and advice on 
the proper royal attitude toward inferiors. "You must hold the cham­
ber pot for your ministers, sire, as long as they are in office; then you 
can empty it over their heads once they are out of office."6 Villeroy 
himself was turned out in 1722, but scrambled back to court in 1724 
and endured until his death at age 86 in July 1730. His funeral service 
in the chapel of the Charite in L y o n drew a great outpouring of grief 
from a city he had held close to his heart for over 70 years.7 
Louis Ravat retained his office until 1715, but his retirement from 
service to his native city was only temporary. In 1728, L y o n lost its 
first lieutenant of police, Louis Dugas, and Ravat was called to the 
office at age 73. There he served for five m o r e years, issuing a steady 
stream of ordonnances de police, keeping the people to their duty and 
the city in order. H e even managed to guide it through one m o r e 
small grain shortage in 1732. H  e died on 27 September 1733, at age 
78, in service to the last. 
For the people of L y o n , the silk workers and tailors, the masons 
and booksellers, the bakers and beggars, there is no epilogue. M o s t 
had survived the Great Winter and Famine of 1709, and it n o  w passed 
into m e m o r y . N o doubt, the old told of the wind and the ice, the 
barren fields and the ragged poor, the ration cards and the hunger. 
T h e young probably listened, shivered, and went about their w o r k , 
hoping that they would not have similar stories to tell their o w  n sons 
and daughters. M o s t of them did suffer through grain shortages of 
varying severity in their lives, but none lived to see the return of the 
"grandes crises" that had marked the reign of the Sun King. France 
would not suffer another crisis like that of 1709 until the Revolution, 
w h e n failing crops and soaring debts would again collaborate to create 
a crisis of legend. 
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in a given year ( A D H  L E145, E147). 
53.	 They are listed along with the abandoned in the "Journal de reception" 
(AHDL G6, G 7 . G8, G9, and Gio). 
54.	 A H D  L E1653, Accounts for January through June, 1708. Garden found the 
same percentage of survival for children sent to the provinces in the years 
1716-1717 {Lyon et les Lyonnais, p. 127). 
Notes to Chapter 1	 189 
55.	 A C  L H219: "Institution de l 'Aumosne Generale de Lyon: Ensemble de 
l'economie et reglements qui s'observent dans l'hopital de Notre-Dame de la 
Charite, ou sont les Pauvres renfermes de ladite A u m o n e  " (Lyon, 1699), 
pp- 93-94­
56.	 A C  L E97. Applicants had to have been residents of the city for at least seven 
years. The names and ages of those accepted are in A C L F6: "Registre d'inscrip­
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51	 Gutton, La societe et les pauvres, pp. 295-362, discusses the history of this 
movement , as does W i l m a J . Pugh in two articles, "Social welfare and the 
Edict of Nantes: Lyon and Nimes," French Historical Studies 8 (1974): 349-76, 
and "Catholics, Protestants and Testamentary Charity in Seventeenth-
Century Lyon and Nimes," French Historical Studies 11 (1980): 479-504. 
58.	 Gavin's discussion of this practice in Renaissance Florence ("Charity and 
Children in Renaissance Florence," pp. 438-66) indicates that the Lyonnais 
practice might have been yet another borrowing from the Italian. 
59.	 The figure for 1711-1713 is a mean computed from the weekly census in A C L 
E1475: "Journal de distribution et consommation de pain." T h e total number 
of poor resident in the Charite was closer to 1,600 from 1711 to 1713, but this 
number included some 200 of the old and 100 children w h  o cannot properly 
be said to have been interned. Pugh argues that efforts to "check begging had 
broken d o w n by the 1690s" ("Catholics, Protestants and Testamentary 
Charity," p. 492). It would be more accurate to ascribe a temporary lull after 
the large number interned during the crisis of 1693-1694. Efforts revived 
handily after 1700 w h e  n the Charite hired two m e n for the purpose of round­
ing up beggars ( A C L E84). 
60.	 See Davis, "Poor Relief, Humanism and Heresy." 
61.	 A C  L E89, "Extrait des Deliberations du bureau de l'hopital general de la 
Charite." 
62.	 Ibid. The faubourgs had first been excluded in 1592, readmitted, and again 
excluded. Pugh argues that the catechism did not become obligatory until 
1672, but the deliberations mark it at the earlier date ( A C  L E89, p. 41). 
63.	 Ibid., p. 38. Again, the Aumone had attempted to require a "red and blue 
patch" as early as 1582, but only began issuing the crosses in 1628.1 have been 
unable to locate a sample of the cross. 
64.	 Ibid., p. 49, Deliberation of 11 November 1694. 
65.	 A C  L E94, Deliberation of M a  y 1598. 
66.	 Ibid., Deliberation of August 1632. The passade is mentioned as being distrib­
uted at 3 sous per person, but the deliberations offer no exact date for its return. 
67	 A C  L H219, "Institution de l 'Aumosne Generale de Lyon" (1699), pp. 80-81. 
T h e official was a priest w h o held the title oiOeconome. Since the passade was 
primarily intended for pilgrims, the rectors probably judged a priest best able 
to distinguish a true pilgrim from a fraud. 
68.	 The amount distributed was listed by month in the accounts of the Charite 
for 1703-1706 ( A C  L E3o8, E309) but given thereafter only as a yearly total 
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( A C L E310). The monthly mean, or the average amount of the passade given 
out each month from 1703 to 1706, was 17 livres, 10 sous, which amounted to 
116 individual offerings at 3 sous per person in a given month or just under 
1,400 in a given year. 
69	 A C  L E1475: "Journal de distribution et consommation de pain (1711-1713)." 
70.	 The rectors held court each Thursday to receive applicants ( A C L H219, 
pp. 86-88). The percentage cost is computed from the accounts of the Charite 
for the years 1703-1715 ( A C  L E308, E309, E310, E311, E312, E313, and E314). 
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Chapter 3 
1.	 Th  e story of Samuel Bernard's tour of Marly has been retold m a n  y times

since Saint-Simon's version. I have relied on Arthur de Boislisle's edition,

Memoires de Saint-Simon, 43 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1879-1930), 16:34-37

Sourches indicated the exact date in his Memoires du marquis de Sourches sur le

regne de Louis XIV, 12 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1882-1893), 1175.

2.	 Th  e figure is from Jacques Saint-Germain, Samuel Bernard, le banquier des rois

(Paris: Hachette, i960), p. 162.

3.	 The financial history of the Old Regime has produced an abundant liter­

ature. For the seventeenth century as a whole see especially Julian Dent,

Crisis in Finance-. Crown, Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-Century France 
(London: David and Charles, 1973). For the latter reign of Louis XIV, see the 
fine dissertation by Gary B . McCollim, "The Formation of Fiscal Policy in 
the Reign of Louis X I V : T h e Example of Nicolas Desmaretz, Controller 
General of Finances (1708-1715)" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1979). 
A n d , on the financial crisis of 1709, I a m indebted for much that follows to 
Andre Sayous, "La crise financiere de 1709 a Lyon et a Geneve," Revue d'his­
toire economique et sociale 24 (1938): 57-86, 163-77; and especially to the for­
midable these of Herbert Luethy, La banque Protestante en France de la re­
vocation de I'e'dit de Nantes a la Revolution, 2 vols. (Paris: S . E . V . P . E . N . , 1959). 
(The initial citation in each chapter will be "Luethy, La banque Protestante." 
Subsequent citations will be "Luethy" only.) 
4 .	 This was the case from the beginning. See John Bell Henneman , Royal Taxa­
tion in Fourteenth-Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322-1256 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) and Martin Wolfe, The Fiscal 
System of Renaissance France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). 
5	 For m y discussion of mint bills, I have depended heavily on Luethy and on an 
older but still valuable work by Armand Seligmann, La premiere tentative d' 
emission fiduciaire en France: Etude sur les billets de monnaie du tresor royal a la fin 
du regne de Louis XIV (1701-1718) (Paris: Presses Univcrsitaires de France, 1925)­
6.	 There is no satisfactory biography of Chamillart, but m u c h can be gleaned 
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from the various memoirists of the reign, chiefly Saint-Simon, Sourches, and 
Dangeau. S o m e of Chamillart's papers were published by the Abbe Esnault 
as Michel Chamillart, controleur general des finances et secretaire d'etat de la guerre 
(1699-1709): Correspondance et papiers inedits, 2 vols. (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 
1885), but they have proved of little use here. For Desmaretz the best source is 
McCollim's dissertation cited in note 3 above, though there is an older biogra­
phy by Rene D u m a s , La politique finandere de Nicolas Desmaretz: Controleur 
general des finances (1708-1715) (Issoudin: Imprimerie du Centre, 1927), which is 
still useful. O n the "Affaire des Quatre Sous" through which the Le Telliers 
engineered Desmaretz's disgrace in 1683 (an exile that did not end until 
Chamillart named him director of finances in 1703) see Arthur de Boislisle, 
"Desmaretz et l'affaire des pieces de quatre sous," Appendix XI in the same 
author's edition of Saint-Simon's Memoires, 6:521-91. 
7 Both D u m a s , La politiquefinanciere, p. 27. and Seligmann, La premiere tenta­
tive d'emissionfiduciaire, pp. 51-52, m a d  e the argument in favor of Desmaretz 
as shadow controller general. Pierre Goubert followed Saint-Simon in deni­
grating Chamillart's capacity in Louis XIV et vingt million frangais (Paris: 
Fayard, 1966), p. 244, as did John C  . Rule in Louis XIV and the Craft of King­
ship (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), p. 86. 
8.	 The Council of C o m m e r c e counted deputies from all of France's great cities, 
including Jean Anisson from Lyon and Samuel Bernard from Paris. It was 
chaired by the influential Henri Daguesseau. See T h o m a  s J. Schaeper, The 
French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715: A Study of Mercantilism after Colbert 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983). 
9 This particular aspect of the ministerial environment under Louis X I  V has not

been sufficiently investigated, but it is evident from any reading of the admin­

istrative correspondence in the series G  7 of the Archives Nationales. Historians

have preferred to concentrate on factions at court, and the best such studies

are John C  . Rule, "King and Minister: Louis X I  V and Colbert de Torcy" in

Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley, eds., William HI and Louis XIV Essays

1680-1720 by and for Mark A  . Thomson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,

1968), pp. 213-36, and Emmanuel Le R o y Ladurie, "Versailles Observed: The

Court of Louis X I  V in 1709," in the same author's The Mind and Method of the

Historian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 149-73.

10.	 Luethy, i:in. Whatever resentment the emigre Protestant bankers m a y have 
felt against Bernard's hypocrisy was probably overcome by his usefulness as a 
correspondent and consistent source of profit. 
11	 Saint-Germain, Samuel Bernard, p. 17 
12. Ibid., pp. 145-55. 
13 Luethy, 1:113. 
14.	 R a y m o n  d Moulins to Jean Moulins, 20 June 1700, cited by Michelle M a r  ­
guin, " U n e entreprise marchande lyonnaise a la fin du XVIIc et au debut du 
XVIIIe siecle: La maison de R a y m o n d Moulins" (Memoire de Maitrisc, 
Centre Pierre Leon, Universite de Lyon II, 1965), p. 18. Marguin's citations 
are the only surviving examples of Moulins's correspondence from this period. 
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The archival liasse was lost during recataloging at the Archives departementales 
du Rhone, and concerted efforts have failed to recover it. 
15 Maurice Garden, "Le grand negoce lyonnais," p. 91. 
16.	 A C  C Lyon, "Deliberations," 3 August 1709. 
17	 Ibid. See also Jean Anisson's memoir to the Council of C o m m e r c e dated 
4 March 1701, published in Bois. Corr. 2, Appendix IV: 479-82. 
18.	 O  n the origin of the fairs and their prosperity in the sixteenth century see 
Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine and Jacques Savary des Bruslons, 
Dictionnaire universel de commerce, 3 vols. (Paris, J. Estienne, 1723-1730). 
19.	 Luethy, 1:53-54, analyzes the structure and practice of the Payments. There 
are several contemporary accounts in the various Almanacks de Lyon begin­
ning in 1713, but the most accessible is in Herbigny'sMemoire, pp. 331-32. 
20.	 See chapter 1. 
21.	 Vaesen, La juridiction commerciale a Lyon, p. 147. 
22.	 See Marie-Therese Boyer-Xambeu, Ghislain Deleplace, and Lucien Gillard, 
Monnaie privee etpouvoir des princes: L 'exemple des relations monetaires a la Renais­
sance (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1986). 
2 3.	 Luethy, 1.36-51. 
24.	 Ibid., 1:98-99. T h e crown followed a pattern of devaluing the currency by 
reminting followed by successive edicts revaluing the coinage upward. Grad­
ual revaluations enabled the crown to maximize the benefits accruing from 
the inevitable devaluation to follow. 
2 5	 Seligmann, La premiere tentative Remissionfiduciaire, pp. 69-74. 
26.	 Ibid., pp. 75-77. Arrets changing the value and interest on various bills tum­
bled upon each other in chaotic fashion from 1704 to 1709. M a n  y of them are 
published in Charles Florange, ed., Curiositesfinancieressur les emprunts et 
loteries en France depuis les originesjusqu'a 1873 (Paris: n.p. , 1929), pp. 2 2 - 4 4 . 
27	 The intendant of Flanders wrote Chamillart in M a  y 1707 that "no one 
wants any letters on Paris. Those that have them will lose a part of their 
capital because the third they will receive in mint bills can never be worth as 
much as they have lent in coin." (Bois. Corr. 2: 1236). Desmaretz felt the 
pressure from Parisian merchants w h e n he was intendant of finances in 1706, 
writing to Lyon in that year that "their [Paris's] commerce . . . cannot long 
support such excessive losses. Lyon merchants will soon have to share a part 
of this loss with the merchants of Paris." (Bois. Corr. 2.1081). 
28.	 Luethy, 1:169-87, discusses this affair. Because it followed so quickly on the 
heels of the bankruptcy of Jean-Henri Huguetan, it represented a severe 
blow to the general confidence in the royal bankers. O  n Huguetan, see 
Luethy, 1:149-68, and Andre Sayous, "Jean-Henri Huguetan, financier a 
A m s t e r d a m et a G e n e v e , " Bulletin de la Societe d'histoire et d'archeologie de 
Geneve 6 (1936). 
29	 A copy of the declaration of 12 April is in A C  C Lyon, "Deliberations," 7 M a  y 
1707. 
30.	 Ibid. 
31.	 The declaration was repealed by an arret of 24 M a y 1707. a copy of which is 
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Chapter 8 
 T h e parish registers of Lyon are collected in the Archives municipales. For 
figures 8.1 through 8.4, I have employed data from seven parishes and the 
hospital of the Charite. T h e seven, delineated below, include Sainte-Croix, one 
of the city's wealthiest parishes, which helps to balance the weight of the poor 
in Saint-Nizier, Lyon's largest parish. Unfortunately, the priests of Sainte-
Croix neglected to note ages or occupations for most of their dead, and it has 
been necessary to exclude that parish from specific analyses of mortality. T h  e 
registers are: 
Saint-Nizier: G G 5 6 , 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 
66, 67, 68,148,149,150,151, and 152. 
Saint-Paul: G G 4 6 3  , 464, and 465. 
Saint-Georges: G G 5 4 4  , 545, and 546. 
Saint-Vincent: G G 2 4 2 , 243, and 244. 
Saint-Croix: G G 4 1 0  , 411, 412, and 413. 
Vaize: G G 2 6 4 a n d 2 6 s . 
La Guillotiere: GG515 and 516. 
Charite: 
2.	 Garden, Lyon et les Lyonnais, pp. 40-41, analyzes the relative population of 
each parish. Altogether, the seven parishes analyzed here accounted for 69.2 
percent of total baptisms in the city in 1700. Without Sainte-Croix, the number 
is still 65.1 percent. Figures from the Charite have been added so as better to 
represent the elderly, w h o were sometimes buried there rather than in their 
o w  n parishes. Garden confirms (pp. 100-103) that Saint-Georges was by far 
the city's poorest parish. 
3.	 Ibid., pp. 150-60,167. 
4.	 Hufton pointed to this vulnerability in The Poor in Eighteenth-Century France, 
pp. 20,115,311-17. 
5.	 I have borrowed m y classification mostly from Garden, w h o devotes a major 
portion of his book (Lyon et les Lyonnais, pp. 173-399) to this problem. I also 
have benefitted from Adeline D a u m a r d  , " U n  e reference pour l'etude des 
societes urbaines en France aux XVIIIe et X I X  e siecles: Projet de code socio­
professionnel," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 10 (1965): 185-210; and 
Louis Henry, Techniques d'analyse en demographie historique (Paris: Institut 
National d'Etudes Demographiques, 1980), pp. 22-23. 
6.	 Richard Gascon and Claude Latta, " U n e crise urbaine au XVIIe siecle. La crise 
de 1693-1694 a Lyon: Quelques aspects demographiques et sociaux," Cahiers 
d'histoire 8 (1963): 371-404. T h  e statistical "extrait" for the Hotel-Dieu is in 
AHDL. 
7.	 In analyzing specific data on child abandonment, I have employed the m a m  ­
moth registers of "Comptes des enfants mis en nourrice" ( A H D  L E1653,1654) 
in which the payments for and fate of each child are detailed. 
8.	 T h e Charite paraded the poor (especially orphans) regularly, but the largest 
"Procession of the Poor" took place on the third Sunday of the Easter Fair, 
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w h e n rich merchants had gathered in L y o n for the Payment and could be 
expected to contribute to the cause. T h e order of procession was carefully 
prescribed, and the poor of various sexes and ages were carefully dressed in 
humble grey habits, and given crucifixes and small loaves of bread to carry. It 
must have been an impressive and sobering sight for everyone in the city, 
both rich and poor ( A C L H H - 2 1 9 , pp. 111-15). 
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tory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 184. O  n Geneva, 
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19.	 Vernon Y o u n g and Nevin Scrimshaw, " T h e Physiology of Starvation," Scien­
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Gevaudan," translated in Elborg and Robert Forster, eds., European Diet from 
Pre-Industrial to Modern Times ( N e w York: Harper and R o w , 1975), pp. 19­
46; Maurice A y m a r d , "Toward the History of Nutrition: S o m e Method­
ological Remarks ," translated in Robert Forster and Orcst R a n u m  , eds., Food 
and Drink in History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). 
pp. 1-16. Lentils increased in price by over 500 percent in 1709 and were 
often entirely absent from the Grenette ( A M  L BB270-71) . 
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22.	 This is Jean-Pierre Peter's argument in "Malades et maladies a la fin du 
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translated as "Disease and the Sick at the End of the Eighteenth Century" in 
Robert Forster and Orest R a n u m  , eds., Biology of M a  n in History (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 81-124. 
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ious to the recovery of the sick" ( A H D  L E1596). 
24. Francois LeBrun noted the importance of the lack of quais for spreading 
waterborne diseases in his Les hommes et la mort en Anjou aux XVIIe et XVIIIe 
siecles: Essai de demographie et de psychologie historiques (Paris: M o u t o n , 1971) 
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25. The danger of high wine prices was suggested by Dr. Jean-Noel Biraben in a 
1963 colloquium dealing with issues of mortality, Actes du Colloque Interna­
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30.	 LeBrun, Les hommes et la mort, p. 186. 
31.	 Emmanuel Le R o y Ladurie explored the problem of female sterility in his 
n o w classic "L'amenorrhee de famine (XVIIe-XXe siecles)," Annales: Eco­
nomies, Societe, Civilisations 24 (1969): 1589-1601, translated as "Famine 
Amenorrhoea (Seventeenth-Twentieth Centuries)," in Forster and R a n u m , 
eds., Biology of M a  n in History, pp. 163-178. Rose Frisch extended the prob­
lem of sterility induced by hunger to m e  n in "Population, Food Intake and 
Fertility," Science 199 (6 January 1978): 22-30. Malnutrition also destroyed 
the ability of nursing mothers to lactate, and Hufton noted that in that event, 
newborns were "fed" from dirty rags soaked in polluted water, an almost 
certain death sentence (Poor in Eighteenth-Century France, p. 331). 
32.	 LeBrun, Les hommes et la mort, p. 280, and Claude Bruneel, La mortalite dans 
les campagnes: Le Duche de Brabant aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Louvain: Edi­
tions Nauvelaerts, 1977), pp. 339-42. 
3 3. Rousset, "Essai de pathologie urbaine," pp. 86-88. Rousset noted that typhoid 
fever was also prominent in the autumn months. 
34.	 Ibid., p. 100. Pierre Deyon, Amiens capital provincial Etude sur la societe 
urbaine au XVIIe siecle (Paris: M o u t o n  , 1967), pp. 11-13. Th  e presence of 
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tuberculosis is considered to have been especially likely by historians in the 
field, but all are forced into speculation by the ability of the disease to 
conceal itself (save in its pulmonary form) behind a host of different symp­
toms. A n n Carmichael explores this problem briefly in "Infection, Hidden 
Hunger and History," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore K  . Rabb, eds., 
Hunger and History-. The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consumption 
Patterns on Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 65. 
3 5 LeBrun noted the connection between fruit and dysentery in his Les hommes 
et la mort, p. 279, as did Bruneel in La mortalite des campagnes, p. 342. That the 
problem existed in Lyon is k n o w n from an ordonnance de police of 2 August 
1709, which cited the consumption of unripe fruits "which could cause sick­
ness a m o n g the people." T h e sale of all "autumn fruit" was prohibited on 
pain of fine and confiscation before 15 September ( B M  L fC A507705). Given 
the lack of regulation of the forains, it seems unlikely that this particular 
ordonnance was well enforced. 
36.	 T h e concept of synergy is explicit in both Carmichael, "Infection, Hidden 
Hunger and History," pp. 51-60; and in Carl Taylor, "Synergy A m o n  g Mass 
Infections, Famines and Poverty," in Rotberg and Rabb, eds., Hunger and 
History, pp. 285-303. It is implicit through m u c h of Post, Food Shortage, 
Climatic Variability and Epidemic Disease. 
3 7 Massimo Livi-Bacci supplies other examples of deaths a m o n g elites in the 
midst of food crises in "The Nutrition-Mortality Link in Past Times: A 
C o m m e n t , " in Rotberg and Rabb, eds. Hunger and History, pp. 95-100. 
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1.	 The Consulate thought so highly of Galiffet's speech that it was printed word

for word in the Deliberations ( A M  L BB271, fols. 84-87).
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11 O  n one of these criminal bands and the conflict it caused between two 
towns in the Lyonnais, see Henri Hours, "Emeutes et emotions populaires 
dans les campagnes lyonnais au XVIIIe siecle," Cahiers d'histoire 9 (1964): 
137-53­
12.	 O  n Dieppe and Rouen, see G u  y Lemarchand, "Crises economiques et atmo­
sphere sociale en milieu urbain sous Louis X I V ,  " Revue d'histoire moderne et 
contemporaine 14 (July-September 1967): 252, 257-58. O  n Bordeaux, see 
M . Labuchelle, "Bordeaux il y a 200 ans: La misere a Bordeaux de 1709 a 
1713," Revue historique de Bordeaux et du departement de la Gironde 2 (1909): 
120-31; and on Paris, Arthur de Boislisle, "Le grand hiver et la famine de 
1709," p. 493­
13.	 O n the entrave as a form of collective violence, see Louise Tilly, "The Food 
Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," pp. 23, 47-57 O n Bordeaux, 
Labuchelle, "Bordeaux il y a 200 ans," p. 125; and on Rouen, Lemarchand, 
"Crises economiques et atmosphere sociale," p. 254. 
14.	 Jean Meuvret, Le Probleme des subsistances a Vepoque Louis XIV: Volume 3, Le 
Commerce des grains et la conjoncture (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sci­
ences Sociales, 1988). Meuvret argues throughout this third volume that the 
trade was so fractionalized and weak that any kind of centralized coordina­
tion was doomed to fail. 
15.	 Th  e classic contemporary treatment is Nicolas Delamarre, Traitede la police, 4 
vols. (Paris: Brunnet, 1713-1738). T h  e best recent treatment is Alan Williams, 
The Police of Paris, 1718-1789 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
J979); see also Harold Anderson, "The Police of Paris under Louis X I V " 
(Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1978). 
16.	 Popular trust in and support of the authorities vanished in the eighteenth 
century as officials of the crown became associated in the public mind with 
hoarders and speculators. T h  e point at which this fundamental and vitally 
important change transpired is the subject of Steven Kaplan's excellent Bread, 
Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV, 2 vols. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1976). 
17.	 Cited in Pierre Clement, La police sous Louis XIV (Paris: Didier, 1866), p. 355. 
18.	 Courson was guilty, of course, as every intendant of Rouen had to be to 
maintain his position. See Lemarchand, "Crises economiques et atmosphere 
sociale," pp. 252-54. 
19.	 O  n Rouen, see Lemarchand, "Crises economiques et atmosphere sociale," 
p. 258. O  n Paris, see Boislisle, "Le grand hiver," pp. 488-89. 
20.	 Rene Pillorget indicates several cases in his Les mouvements insurrectionnels de 
Provence entre 1595 et 1715 (Paris: Pedone, 1975), pp. 976-77, but this was the 
c o m m o  n response in virtually every case. 
21.	 O  n the effort in Rouen, see Lemarchand, "Crises economiques et atmo­
sphere sociale," p. 260. Th  e best account of the fiasco in Paris, which 
resulted in a riot so fierce it had to be quelled by the army, is in Herlaut, "La 
disette de pain a Paris en 1709," pp. 62-76. 
22.	 Labuchelle, "Bordeaux il y a 200 ans," pp. 48-51. 
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Epilogue 
1.	 Desmaretz fared so well in the review that he was awarded a 350,000 livre gift. 
See Rene D u m a s , La politiquefinanciere de Nicolas Desmaretz, pp. 111-16. 
2.	 Steven L  . Kaplan discusses Bernard as a grain supplier and accused hoarder in 
The Famine Plot Persuasion, pp. 9-11. 
3 Saint-Simon, Memoires, 2:223, note 2. 
4 . Ibid., 17:201, note 2. 
5 Ibid., 31:21, note 4. 
6.	 The citation comes from Jacques Levron, "Louis XIV's Courtiers," in Ragnhild 
Hatton, ed., Louis XIV and Absolutism (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1976), p. 153. 
7	 B M  L fC62ii, "Description de la pompe funebre de Monseigneur le Marechal 
due de Villeroy." 
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ALSO OF INTEREST 
Zwickau in Transition, 1500-1547 
The Reformation as an Agent of Change 
SUSAN K A R A N T - N U N N 
Written from an ethnographic perspective, 
Zwickau in Transition reveals the interaction 
between religious ideology and the social, eco­
nomic, and political aspirations of groups in 
conflict. It analyzes the setting within which 
T h o m a s Muntzer and the Zwickau Prophets 
formulated their radical views and explains h o  w 
the city councillors exploited Lutheranism to 
benefit their class. 
Anne ofAustria 
Queen of France, 1601-1666 
R U T  H KLEINMAN 
In this first biography based on available docu­
ments of the period of A n n e of Austria, daugh­
ter of Philip III of Spain, wife of Louis XIII, 
mother of Louis X I V , and regent for her son 
during his youth, Kleinman presents A n n  e as a 
w o m a  n w h  o had the strength to survive diffi­
cult circumstances, to go beyond what she had 
been taught, and to adopt a n e  w allegiance. 
The Revolution against the Church 
From Reason to the Supreme Being 
M I C H E L VOVELLE 
Vovelle traces the history of the sudden and 
violent attempt at "dechristianization"—a 
willful endeavor to eradicate religious institu­
tions, practices, and beliefs—that flared up in 
Paris and spread through m u c  h of France dur­
ing the winter and spring of 1793, crowned by 
the effort to set up a n e w cult, that of Reason. 
'Year of Sorrows is extremely impressive in both its research and composi­
tion. It makes a solid contribution to the social, economic, financial, 
and political history of the final part of the reign of Louis XIV. All 
scholars interested in this period will find this work important and 
original." 
— T h o m a s Schaeper, 
St. Bonaventure University 
O h i  o State University Press 
Columbus 
